

This publication finds its origins in the round table conference, entitled 'Transatlantic Relations at a Crossroads: Current Challenges in US-European Relations, with an Emphasis on the (Future) Role for Germany'. The conference was jointly organized by the Germany Institute (University of Amsterdam) and the Netherlands Atlantic Association on 19-20 June 2003 on the premises of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW) in Amsterdam. The majority of the texts that you will find in this book are revised versions of speeches that were delivered during the conference.

Germany Institute Amsterdam

Netherlands Atlantic Association

Transatlantic Relations at a Crossroads



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Contributions to a Conference on
Current Challenges in US-European Relations organized by the

Germany Institute Amsterdam

and the

Netherlands Atlantic Association

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Foreword by the Organizers

This publication finds its origins in the round table conference, entitled 'Transatlantic Relations at a Crossroads: Current Challenges in US-European Relations, with an Emphasis on the (Future) Role for Germany'. The conference was jointly organized by the Germany Institute (University of Amsterdam) and the Netherlands Atlantic Association on 19-20 June 2003 on the premises of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW) in Amsterdam. The majority of the texts that you will find in this book are revised versions of speeches that were delivered during the conference.

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The Hague, November 2003

Introduction

Ton Nijhuis

The problem with transatlantic relations is not just *what* to think of them, but *how* to think about them. What level of “analysis and critique”, what level of “involvement and detachment” – to paraphrase Norbert Elias – are appropriate for this domain: participating in the discussion or observing the observers? analyzing the language being used? How should one weigh the different determinants, which vary from personal temperament to long-term structural factors? In what sense is the current crisis first and foremost a failure of diplomacy, an effect of the political ambitions of Bush, Blair, Schröder and Chirac? Or can the crisis and uncertainty better be interpreted as manifestations of a post-Cold-War restructuring of the international order? Is it already possible to detect some new structures that are beginning to solidify out of the current chaos?

The problem of organizing a conference on transatlantic relations is that every week there are so many new developments that one can rewrite the program constantly. And the risk is that one is inclined to reflect on the latest developments and conflicts, which, while being useful, may be too short-sighted an approach. Large questions like the future of NATO, the role of the UN, a common foreign policy and a European security and defense policy, and relations with Russia have been on the agenda for a long time, and were made urgent by the fall of the Berlin Wall and the eastern enlargement of the EU and NATO. 9/11 added new dimensions as did the war in Iraq, but the question of the future of transatlantic relations predates these developments.

There are not many points left on which American and European perspectives converge. Both sides have different visions of Europe, the US and the world, and the respective roles they play. There is no shared view of the threat that results from the explosive mixture of Terrorism, Tyrants and Technology for the production of weapons of mass destruction. On both sides of the Atlantic different definitions of threat are being used as well as different security assessments. Is the current situation in much of the world inherently dangerous and destabilizing, or does it represent a certain kind of stability that may be lost when we intervene? How indispensable is a common threat assessment for the military alliance? There is also a lot of mistrust between the United States and European countries. Neither believes the other is sincere with respect to its goals.

The EU has a long tradition of declarations, of saying what should be done without making efforts to translate them into deeds. Europe fails in its ambition of becoming

a strategic power. It rather plays the role of a critical free rider. Then of course there is the complaint about American unilateralism. But is unilateralism an adequate concept to describe the current American policy? The Bush Administration made some efforts to create a large coalition of the willing. The aggressive style of “you are either for or against us” may not be a very polite way to treat friends, but that is not the same as unilateralism. It is a rough and aggressive form of multilateralism. Maybe we should distinguish more precisely between European and American views or styles of multilateralism.

But despite all these differences, what are the chances for a new transatlantic bargain? Or is it more likely that Europe will split into a two or more groups of countries with different foreign and security policy concepts, with initiatives such as those made by France, Germany, Belgium, and Luxemburg on the one hand, and the transatlantic security concept of the ‘new’ countries like Poland the Czech Republic and Hungary on the other? Europe has often defined itself in contrast to the United States: the social welfare state vs. American jungle capitalism, conflicting views over the death penalty, multilateralism instead of unilateralism, military power vs. civilian power and the rule of international law, etc. Because of the lack of consensus among European countries, it has often been easier for them to find agreement with each other in the critique on the United States on the basis of high moral standards, although within strict limits. The French idea of Europe as a counterbalance to the United States does not find much support elsewhere on the continent. It has become clear that Europe cannot be united against America. The idea of Europe as a counterbalance to the United States will split Europe. The only way to prevent this is through finding a new transatlantic bargain, but that is not solely a European question. The future of the transatlantic relationship will in the end be determined in Washington rather than in Brussels

And what to think about the role of Germany? After the fall of the Berlin Wall most observers of international relations expected Germany to become a leading country in Europe. Now it is often described as an insignificant player. Is this loss of power only temporary? And what to think about the main parameters of German foreign policy? In its 50-year history, the Federal Republic of Germany could always be counted on to give NATO priority over Europe in its security policy. Is this still the case? In the German conception of foreign policy European integration and transatlantic partnership were always two sides of the same coin. But does Germany still play its role as safeguard of the transatlantic orientation and as balancer within Europe? Germany used to play the role of broker between France, England and the United States as well as acting on the European continent as link between East and West. The main road to Brussels for the new member states, especially Poland, was via Berlin. But security cannot be bought in Berlin. Has Germany’s balancing role come to an end, and what could become functional equivalents for this role? Will Germany

“return” to the United States and break ties with France if the latter persists in its attempts to create a more independent security policy? Or has Germany’s reorientation a more permanent character?

These large questions and huge problems will be discussed in this book by a variety of authors from both sides of the Atlantic.

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A Transatlantic Reality Check

John Kornblum

Writing fifty years ago in his book *Fire in the Ashes, Europe in Mid-Century*, the American journalist E.B. White concluded that “Europe [is] stranger to American understanding than ever before in our linked histories. [...] Europe wants rest, quiet and forgetfulness. But even this it cannot have in the world of today, for it is helpless to calm the world.” White describes the new Eisenhower Administration in Washington and the American efforts to line up Europeans to fight communism. He notes: “The United States and Russia constantly want to act, to do, to make history – and Europe has a bellyful of history. [...] [A] sense of powerlessness is the incubator of all European restlessness – this sense of being swung about by the actions of strange men in distant places.”

Even with all that has happened in fifty years, the dynamics of today’s Atlantic relationship are remarkably similar. The current version of the Soviet threat is the specter of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. Europeans worry about unbridled American power. Americans are frustrated with European inactivity. Both sides complain that established methods of consultation no longer work. Some observers are even arguing that the partnership is near collapse.

We are undoubtedly experiencing the breakdown of the post-World War II system. The new era is not characterized by steady evolution towards a “new world order”, as prophesied by George Bush Senior, but by dramatic disorder and upheaval in almost all areas. Domestic challenges are every bit as great as those caused by international terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. As in past transatlantic disputes, complex interests and emotions are at play. Neither Europeans nor Americans are completely unified in their views among themselves. Not every leader is acting with wisdom or even competence. The new situation harbors many dangers and they should be faced openly.

But before assuming that all is lost, would it not be more logical to assume that a more than 300 year old community of cooperation and values is not likely to disappear overnight? Rather than giving up the ship, is it not more reasonable to pursue a strategy built on the historic accomplishments of the past fifty years and to work harder to preserve the partnership as well as to serve particular interests?

Rather than being caused by the drifting apart of old partners, current transatlantic conflicts are more likely a reflection of the divisive effect of widespread uncertainty caused by a radical restructuring of our nations and our lives. Fears rooted in the tragic results of the 20th century run deep. Americans remember Hitler and Pearl Harbour.

The post-war goal of evolution through stability remains well suited to European nations who continue to suffer the trauma of war and destruction.

Most Europeans have traditionally viewed power politics and military force as the cause, and unshakable structures and multilateralism as the antidote to what for them was a tragic 20th century. Americans and a smaller number of Europeans believe that the threats to our security, be they Nazism or Communism were conquered by the common will of free peoples to defend themselves, with force if necessary, in pursuit of our joint ideals. Their model is not Schuman or Monet, but Churchill.

During the past fifty years, Europeans have often felt powerless in the face of dramatic American initiatives. The visions of George Bush and Jimmy Carter represent two poles of the same problem. Both Carter and Bush embody the push of American idealism against the growing frustration in the United States with an unacceptable status quo. The efforts of each President were viewed as being destabilizing and were met in Europe with a mixture of fear and derision.

In fact, since 1970, there has been a surprising regularity to emotional outbursts across the Atlantic such as we are experiencing today. Mutual condemnation which began with Vietnam and the oil shock were succeeded by recriminations during the INF debate and Star Wars in the 1980s. The Gulf War and Bosnia arrived ten years before the war in Iraq. Franco-American tensions during the Washington Energy Conference of 1974 were every bit as high as they are today. And Chancellor Helmut Schmidt missed no chance to state his disagreement and even disdain for “that preacher in the White House,” Jimmy Carter.

Most surprising is that even after September 11, neither Americans nor Europeans seem to have anticipated the divergence in reactions to the crisis of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. There has been no moral mutation in Europe. Nor is the United States suddenly grasping for world domination. The two sides of the Atlantic are not drifting any further apart than they have always been. They are behaving completely in character.

Lacking immediate answers, both Americans and Europeans are behaving in a very human fashion. Rather than looking at the issues, we are putting emotions and the psyches of our partners under the microscope. Blaming each other is often emotionally satisfying, but it does little to solve the problems pressing upon us. Instead, the current debate should be treated as being essential in helping to put in sharp focus the implications of a new era.

An important implication for Europeans is that the channels of influence of Cold War times no longer work. This is especially the case for Germany. With the end of the Cold War, Germany has lost its central strategic position. A changed world economy

has weakened Germany's dynamic financial and trade role. Germany in particular needs to define its interests more clearly. It needs to find new ways to exert its will and overcome a growing sense of powerlessness in a deconstructed world.

The problem is that Europe is still very much a work in progress. Despite the brilliant institutional success of the European Union, European states have not yet regained the sense of manifest destiny which gave them a joint purpose before World War I. It is this lack of purpose rather than the absence of formal unity, or even of defense spending, which hinders Europe's efforts to become more influential in the post-Cold War world. No matter how loudly one says no to America, the growing gap in power and influence will remain.

What is needed now is a sort of transatlantic reality check. Europeans need to face the painful question of where their current directions are leading them. Is the fixation with regulating change both at home and abroad really a step towards international responsibility, or does it represent a sort of post-modern Biedermeier which tries to shield Europe from unpleasant truths? Do Europeans really believe that a so-called multipolar world would better serve their interests than a firm Western community, even accepting American dominance? On the other hand, has the American vision become so narrow that its appreciation of Europe is limited to its strategic significance, its defense spending or its votes in the UN?

These questions should have been asked soon after September 11. We know each other well enough to have been able to anticipate the problems, exactly as they have arisen. For whatever reason, we didn't. But the Atlantic world remains the only framework with both the means and the values to lead worldwide change in a democratic direction. Neither Europe nor America can afford to go it alone. Taking a deep breath and working hard to understand these simple truths is the most important first step to success.

John Kornblum is Chairman of Lazard Deutschland. He served as Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs, and as Ambassador to Bonn/Berlin in the Clinton Administration.

Is there a West? Changes in the Western Alliance

Guillaume Parmentier

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union fundamentally altered the international system in ways that are only now beginning to be understood. The debate amongst transatlantic relations experts initially focused on the legitimacy of the Western alliance in the post-Soviet era, then turned to the supposedly growing rift between the United States and Europe in social values on issues such as the death penalty, gun control and the environment. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 refocused the transatlantic debate on security issues as the West began to grapple with how to deal with the threat of international “strategic” terrorism.

In contrast with the Cold War era, the West currently operates in the absence of a visible threat to all of its members. Whereas Soviet expansionism and the communist ideology represented a threatening competitive alternative to liberal democracies, particularly in Western Europe, the threat of terrorism fails to unite the West because the magnitude of its threat is not equally perceived. During the Cold War, the idea of Soviet expansion into Western Europe was not unreasonable in light of Soviet control over Eastern and Central Europe and particularly following the Soviet invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia in 1956 and 1968. Today, in spite of the presence of growing Muslim populations in Western Europe, few would argue that Osama bin Laden’s radical brand of wahhabite Islam presents a viable alternative to liberal democracy as a system of governance in Europe. In the United States on the other hand, both the catastrophic magnitude and the powerful symbolism of the targets attacked on September 11 contribute to the perception that the very existence of the United States is threatened. Thus while most European states have proven vital partners to the United States in its war on terrorism, terrorism fails to unite the United States and Europe in the same way that the Soviet threat did due to the difference in perception of the nature and magnitude of the terrorist threat.

The United States has changed greatly since the end of the Cold War and continues to change. Demographic shifts, not only in the ethnic community balance but also in the domestic geopolitical equilibrium, are playing an increasingly influential role. The cleavage during the 2000 presidential election between “red” States and “blue” States illustrates the increasingly distinct ideological lines which have developed over the course of the past ten years. In line with long term trends, while the coastal States, urban centers, and industrial Midwest voted for Democrat Al Gore, Republican George Bush carried the vote in rural areas, southern States, and western States. Religious forces continue to play a much more influential political role in the United States than in Europe, having continuously gained influence within the Republican

Party over the course of the last twenty years. In contrast to a more religious and more conservative United States, religious practice continues to decline in Europe and more progressive social values prevail.

More significantly, the impact of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 varied greatly between the United States and Europe. The United States continues to suffer from a veritable “rape trauma” following the attacks, a factor not widely understood within Europe. The American government, as well as to a certain extent the American population, operate under the assumption that the United States is at war. From this perspective, the “War on Terrorism” declared by President Bush represents not just another political slogan such as the “War on Poverty,” or the “War on Drugs,” but, in the minds of many American officials and citizens, an actual and ongoing state of war.

Because military power is the pre-eminent expression of American global power, the United States has quite naturally responded to the terrorist threat through military means. Due to the peculiarities of the American federal budgetary process, funding for defense is much easier to obtain than funding for civil diplomatic activities. The United States Congress largely controls the budgetary process, and members of Congress are much more likely to vote for military funding, which is spent within the United States and often provides a “deliverable” to their home constituencies, than for civil international affairs programs which are much more difficult to explain and defend during election campaigns. The difficulty of funding civil diplomatic programs is apparent when one considers that international affairs, including international aid, accounts for less than 1% of the US federal budget while military expenditures account for 17% of the budget.¹

Concurrent to the post-Cold War evolution in the United States, changes on the European side of the Atlantic are also significant. The accelerated pace of EU enlargement and integration during the ten years following the collapse of the Soviet Union and German reunification have contributed to an increasingly self-centered Europe. France and Germany have largely retained their traditional roles as the key players in motivating change within the EU, but both are currently preoccupied with European enlargement and integration. This preoccupation is largely a result of the significant obstacles facing Europe as it attempts to accomplish the dual goals of unification and integration. Foremost among these obstacles is time. The United States took over one hundred years to fully integrate, and fought a bloody civil war in the process. The integration process in the United States was lengthy and difficult despite the fact that the United States started from a more level playing field culturally, politically and economically. Viewed from this perspective, Europe has made unprecedented progress during the last fifty years, given not only the cultural, political, and economic diversity of its constituents, but also the long history of rivalry and violent conflict between its members.

The other major obstacle to further European unification is the emphasis on compromise in the European decisional process. While the emphasis on compromise creates institutions, legislation, and policies which validate all member states as stakeholders in the European system, and thus strengthens their commitment, it also acts as a brake on the process. For better and for worse, the intense negotiations necessary to establish a universal consensus among member states both slows the decision making process and tends to dilute the eventual product of that process. As Robert Kagan astutely pointed out first in his article “Power and Weakness”², and then in his book *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order*, the mechanics of the European decision making process tend to influence the way Europe views the international order: Europe exercises a preference for civil rather than military means to resolve conflicts, and wishes to transplant the methodology of compromise and negotiation favored in inter-state relations within Europe to the global level. Because Kagan tends to view Europe through the prism of Brussels, where he resided when he wrote his article and book, he often overstates the European proclivity for compromise in order to render his argument more spectacular. His paradigm of a “Venusian” Europe oversimplifies the complexity of the European reality, and misinterprets as pacifism the European preference to exhaust all political options prior to the use of force in the resolution of a crisis. The United Kingdom, France, or indeed other EU member states are hardly pacifist, however, Kagan’s basic thesis remains valid: that the United States favors unilateral or military solutions which maintain its freedom of action, whereas Europe prefers working towards solutions through negotiation and deliberation within the framework of international law.

While the political conditions which influence the selection of foreign policy tools within the United States and Europe are certainly pertinent, their examination will not necessarily shed any light on the future of the transatlantic alliance without a more thorough understanding of the alliance’s meaning. Quite simply, the current political context forces us to ask the question: “What is the West for?” During the Cold War, the response to this question was obvious as the West existed in opposition to Soviet expansionism. The West was defined in negative terms as that which the Soviet Union and its satellites were not, that is “the free world.” Varying cultures, political systems and perspectives on the international system were less relevant, because the West was an open political concept which one could join if one so chose. The three successive waves of expansion following NATO’s creation exemplified the political openness of the West: first with the integration of Greece and Turkey, then with the reintegration of Germany into the European security equation, and finally with the accession of a post-fascist Spain. Turkey’s accession was perhaps most significant out of these waves since it signified the partial accomplishment of Kemal Atatürk’s dream of Westernizing Turkey. The West was so open (perhaps in its desperation to contain the Soviet Union) that even an overwhelmingly Muslim nation, indeed formerly the seat of the Islamic caliphate, could join.

Despite the continued expansion of NATO into the formerly Soviet controlled regions of Central and Eastern Europe following the collapse of the Soviet empire, the concept of the West has become increasingly cultural. The West is now commonly considered worldwide to be a rich white man's club, and therefore largely unexpandable. While Russia and a limited number of other near but non-Western nations may eventually choose to integrate into the West by virtue of economic development and weak but valid cultural proximity, the West is for all practical purposes closed to most other nations. No matter how rich or democratic Pakistan becomes, it will never be considered part of the West. Indeed Turkey's failure to secure its entrance into the European Union symbolizes this closure. When facing an existential threat the West was happy to accept Turkey as a member in exchange for its strategic importance in containing Soviet expansion. That acceptance has become decidedly more tepid in light of the disappearance of the Soviet Union and rising concerns about immigration and radical Islam in Western Europe, as well as for reasons pertaining to fundamental changes within Turkey itself.

Samuel Huntington pessimistically described the West as a civilization in opposition to other civilizations.³ It is probably currently more accurate to consider that other civilizations now define themselves in opposition to the West. The West was always a challenging concept, but is becoming more so due to its cultural significance, and risks evolving into the North. While the West has always been defined by its political specificity and opposition to a common enemy, the concept of the North is marked by the economic dominance of an industrialized North over the resource rich but underdeveloped South. Of course, this paradigm is overly simplistic and fails to account for the myriad of complex relationships within and between the North and South. However, the more the West cedes its unifying political characteristics, the more it becomes defined simply by a common level of economic development.

The divide between Europe and the United States is no doubt less pronounced than the heralds of the demise of the transatlantic alliance such as Kagan would admit. However, a real challenge persists in realigning the divergent concepts of international action as perceived by Europeans and Americans. Many of the challenges confronting the United States today, such as a provocative and nuclear-armed North Korea, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, or a resurgent China, cannot be effectively resolved through force. The Balkan experience demonstrated that Europeans and Americans were ready to take action on behalf of predominantly Muslim peoples. However, it also showed Europeans that diplomatic strategies have limits beyond which effective use of force becomes necessary. To this extent, the transatlantic partners must mutually move their conceptions closer together. Before talking about making Europe a strong international power, its members need to strengthen and unify their military means. On the western shore of the Atlantic, the United States must not become a prisoner of its military might, but must strengthen its capacity to contribute to crisis solutions by other means. If the United States

continues to allow the Europeans to reconstruct the devastated battlefields that they leave behind, it will cede to Europe the “moral center” of the world. American leadership will become a greater object of contention as a result, and therefore more fragile.

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Notes

1. Anne C. Richard, *Superpower on the Cheap? Funding US International Engagements*, The French Center on the United States, IFRI, December, 2002.
2. Robert Kagan: “Power and Weakness”, *Policy Review*, Spring 2002.
3. Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York, 1996).

Changes in the Transatlantic Relationship after 9/11, and the Impact on Germany's Role

Helga Haftendorn

- I. Instead of a “clear and present danger” from military aggression or war by miscalculation as during the East-West conflict, there now exist new security risks:
 - emphasis on “war on terrorism”,
 - “small wars” (Balkans!) and non-state violence,
 - proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

- II. But of even grater consequence are the changes in the power relationship which follow from the end of the East-West conflict. 11/9 (1989) is more relevant than 9/11 (2001).
 - The United States is now the world's only super power – a “hyper puissance” (Vedrine) – challenged by none. The United States now is, in the words of Sam Huntington, “a lonely superpower in a uni-multipolar system”, not checked or balanced by a powerful competitor. It acts as “a lonely sheriff”, safeguarding law and order wherever peace and stability are in danger, or American interests are affected. If necessary, the United States is prepared to use military force to enforce its interests.

 - Russia, instead of a hostile power to be deterred and contained, has been integrated into the US dominated Western system, it is now a co-player within that system.

 - A shift of attention, away from Europe, has taken place.

 - With its unification, Germany has overcome most of its post-war constraints (division of the country, presence of large numbers of NATO and Soviet troops, special four-power as well as allied rights and responsibilities (which constrained Germany's room of maneuver in foreign relations. As a consequence, Germany now leads a more self-assured and autonomous foreign policy. With the outside threat gone, domestic politics, including reshaping its economy, are now more important than foreign considerations.

- In order to contain Germany, and to make their voice felt *vis-à-vis* the United States, the West European countries have accelerated their process of European integration. With CFSP, ESDP, and joint military capabilities they want to build a strong European pillar, complementary, not competitive to NATO.
- Both EU and NATO have admitted a large number of new members from Eastern and Central Europe. These states now belong to “Europe”, and impact on the transatlantic relationship though some of their interests and priorities differ.

III. The terrorist attacks, the Afghanistan and Iraq wars – especially the latter – have had a deep impact on American and European policy priorities and styles.

- They have strengthened American unilateralism. This trend is supported by US actions as a global hegemon, and aided by the Bush Administration’s belief system of America’s manifest destiny.
- They brought to the fore deep disagreements between the United States and a number of European states:
 - In international conflicts, the Europeans argue that the United Nations should be the supreme arbiter, while the United States wants to set the agenda on action to be taken.
 - In the Iraq case, Washington formed “a coalition of the willing”, led by the United States, to intervene in Iraq to enforce disarmament and depose of Saddam Hussein while UN weapons inspectors were still at work. They argued that Security Council Resolution 1441 of October 2002 gave them a mandate for military intervention.
 - The United States and the United Kingdom maintained that their military intervention was in accordance with international law, while the Europeans challenged this assumption and argued, that there was neither an explicit UN resolution authorizing the use of force, nor was the coalition’s action based on a broad international consensus.
 - Though the Iraq war was swift, it was only moderately successful. Saddam Hussein’s regime was deposed within three weeks, but no weapons of mass destruction were found and democracy (Bush’s third war aim) has not yet been established. No consensus has yet been reached on the future order of the Iraq, nor on the United Nation’s role. The war has strengthened Arab fundamentalism and anti-Americanism; but also gave new impetus to search for a solution on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict along the lines of the quadripartite “roadmap”.

- Among Security Council members, France and Germany, together with Russia and China, were the most vocal opponents to military intervention in Iraq, especially since the UN weapons inspections proved moderately successful.
 - France’s opposition was based on the interpretation of its own role in world politics. It had its own, strong interests in the region, and wanted to be consulted on par by Washington. As it was not, it challenged America’s agenda setting power on Iraq. The result was a policy of obstruction.
 - German chancellor Schröder’s position was primarily governed by domestic concerns, especially as he was facing federal elections which didn’t seem to go well. As the German people were adverse to military conflict, he would have needed a convincing cause to win the elections with a pro-war position. Instead, Germany followed a policy of abstention and of verbal anti-Americanism while silently cooperating with the United States.
 - Russia tried to play it both ways: it challenged – as did France – the US prerogative to set the agenda on Iraq unilaterally, and thus opposed military intervention in Iraq. At the same time Moscow took care not to damage beyond repair its relations with Washington.

IV. American unilateralism as well as the conflict about military intervention in Iraq had detrimental effects on NATO; the alliance now lacks joint purpose, cohesion and effectiveness.

- The United States sees NATO as an element of its global strategy – or a tool box. It wants NATO to be effective without circumscribing American room of maneuver.
- The majority of “old Europeans” look at NATO as an organization for collective security (not defense, as during the East-West conflict), and wish to transform it into a political association for policy coordination with the North American partners,
- The new members continue to see NATO as a collective defense pact, and the United States as their main ally. They seek protection against a potential Russian threat that could endanger their newly won independence.

How can cohesion and common purpose be maintained given these different priorities? Only pragmatic solutions, and nursing NATO’s culture of cooperation, will help.

- V. In order to shore up NATO's effectiveness and cohesion, the United States has initiated a substantial program of alliance reform which NATO has adopted in Prague last November. Their major purpose is to make NATO fit for deployment "out of area", wherever the challenge is. Its major elements are:
- A NATO Response Force (NRF), a commitment from NATO members to improve their military capabilities in key areas (PCI), and the adoption of a new command structure. These measures are in the process of being implemented.
 - Washington wants to enable the alliance to meet the new threats of terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Also, a reformed NATO will conform better with US interests and play a more effective role in a US global strategy. At the same time, it could weaken an autonomous European defense capability as agreed upon in Helsinki – which might have been part of the American agenda.
- VI. Similar rifts exist in the EU; and they have been brought to the fore with the famous "letter of the eight", voicing criticism at French and German opposition to the war, and expressing their support for the United States. As France objects to American hegemony, these countries resent a Franco-German condominium within the EU.
- In the future it will be both more urgent *and* more difficult to have a strong European pillar with an effective CFSP and ESDP; rather, a tendency of national sovereign rights being reasserted.
 - To have a strong CFSP and an effective ESDP will be essential for Europe to be able to speak with one voice and to act jointly – and to be taken seriously by Washington. Display of resolve with Macedonia and Congo missions, as well as Luxembourg decisions on fighting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
 - At the same time, the United States is looking with increased suspicion at a strong ESDP. Before, the United States had argued for greater European military capabilities, though closely coordinated with NATO; now Europe finds itself in a situation in which increased common capabilities could be counterproductive and undermine transatlantic relations. Therefore, NATO should have the right of first choice.
 - Given the structural fault lines, it is even more urgent to search for cooperative solutions to the conflicts between the United States and the

Europeans while conceding that interests and priorities will continue to differ.

VII. Germany will sustain both its European and its NATO commitment without prioritizing among them (though basically using the same capabilities).

- The reform of the German *Bundeswehr* (initiated by Scharping and continued by Struck) is geared both to European and to global contingencies. In spite of a severe budget crisis, the *Bundeswehr* is transformed from a stationary army for territorial defense to an intervention force for crisis prevention and crisis management.
- Among the most important tasks on the reform agenda are to increase the *Bundeswehr's* interoperability, readiness, flexibility and mobility. Its deficiencies in intelligence, command and transport capabilities will be remedied. Unlike domestic anti-terrorist measures, Ballistic Missile Defense is only a side issue. To increase its effectiveness with scant resources, the *Bundeswehr* will deactivate many of its heavy armor and close bases. Transformation will take time and require substantial resources – which are in short supply because of pressing demands from other sectors, e.g. for reforming the health and social systems.

VIII. Perspectives on Germany's future role:

- Germany will continue to act as a central power in Europe and in the transatlantic network, committed to the realization of a European Political Union and to the maintenance of a stable European security space, capable to perform in as a global actor together with other European powers, and in close coordination with the United States
- But in order to do so, it first has to bring its house in order, e.g. restore the competitiveness of its economy and the viability of its social system. Otherwise, it cannot live up to its commitments.

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Clash over Iraq – Incident or Indicator?

Heinrich Vogel

The wake-up call

Military action against Iraq, led by the United States and supported by Great Britain, ignored fundamental stipulations of international law, embarrassed the United Nations, and drove a wedge into the feeble structures of the unfinished European Union. Washington's insistence on a military quick fix at all cost caused a diplomatic clash among major nations, ending wishful disbelief in the relevance of some neo-conservative policy planners' agenda and revealing a consistent undercurrent in official US foreign policy – with dramatic impact on world-wide public opinion. The Bush Administration's open contempt for the European wimps, sentimental accusations of ungratefulness, and delightfully divisive plots against their ambition to a new role in international relations fanned emotional heat in an unprecedented way. If in anything, Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz succeeded to destroy the last doubts about their perspective of NATO as a mere tool-box for global US ambitions. Disillusionment with the scandals surrounding the invasion of Iraq now leaves no further room for transatlantic business as usual.

Anti-Americanism

The often heard blame of anti-Americanism serves as a killing-argument in defense of nostalgic Atlanticism, but it cuts too short. To be sure, negative opinions in Europe held by those on the left and in large swathes of the older generation toward “those Americans” have enjoyed a resurgence, as has traditional cultural arrogance. Old stereotypes alone, however, cannot account for the extent of public protests against the Pentagon-driven unilateralism. These were rather fuelled by frustration with the United States that went well beyond the traditional anti-American spectrum. The single-minded march to war against Iraq squandered the spontaneous global sympathy and solidarity with the United States after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and it ruined the image of the United States as a stronghold of respect for freedom and justice in international relations.

Growing incompatibility

Demands for gratefulness *vis à vis* the American hegemon pushed debates in Germany's political class about “normal country”-status into higher gear. On the other hand, friendly condescending empathy for the German's remorseful pacifism is verging on provocation in view of the open cult of the military US society. Being confronted with an attitude of “America above all in the world” is quite an experience

for Germany's political elites who after unification had been denounced by the rest of the world as prime candidates for nationalistic recidivism. In a German perspective, US foreign policy no longer reflects the enlightened self-interest that inspired the generosity of the Marshall Plan, the Berlin airlift, and the building of democratic institutions that stabilized post-World War II Europe. Irrespective of the recent compulsive posturing of Christian Democrats who criticized the ruling red-green coalition for lack of solidarity with the US, no future conservative German chancellor will be able or willing to turn the clock back to the submissive style of "going along – right or wrong." This is not heralding a future German *Alleingang* (going-it-alone) but rather the closing of ranks with neighbors in a new and distinctly European self-consciousness.

The Rubicon has been crossed

For most critics Chancellor Schröder's blunt refusal of any German military engagement in Iraq implied a loss of influence in Washington. In retrospect, however, there was no influence for the allies and least of all for Germany. Beyond any doubt the French and German warnings in the UN-Security Council were irrelevant for the planners of intervention and, despite his eloquent pleading, Colin Powell must have been aware of the fact that, although more followers in the docile coalition of the willing would have been welcome, more allies were dispensable. It was the kaleidoscope of dubious justifications, i.e. the constant shifting of Washington's arguments in favor of invasion and the dearth of evidence that Saddam Hussein was producing weapons of mass destruction or actively collaborating with the al Qaeda terrorist network, that destroyed the fundament of cohesion among major Western countries – confidence in American foreign policy. The invasion thus became more than one of those diplomatic accidents, due to a lack of chemistry between the leaders on both sides of the Atlantic. On 20 March, 2003, the day when George W. Bush announced his decision to invade Iraq, he crossed the Rubicon, heading towards the destruction of a great empire – the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The disciplining appeal to solidarity beyond the formal obligations of Article 5 has ceased to work.

The end of the old West

In a seasoned alliance the unconditional compliance of new members is not necessarily better than the critical solidarity of the old. Donald Rumsfeld's tactical move playing off a new against an old Europe was only too transparent in its manipulative intent. In the medium term, however, this approach will not manage to alienate the new NATO members' orientation from their sponsors in the EU. Their docile support for Washington's empire building will hardly last much longer simply because American financial support will at best ease the burden of modernization of their military. The rest is up to EU structural funds and the benefits of economic

integration. This is why nostalgic believers in “the Alliance” tend to underestimate the dynamic of long-term interests when they dismiss the explicit skepticism against American unilateral policies as a temporary infection. In any case, the casualty is the elaborate system of common political experience and emotionally reinforced mutual trust, i.e. the “old West”.

Diverging political cultures

Contrary to the desperate lyrics of high-level meetings which pretend to mend the fences, it is an open secret, revealed in many studies of recent years, that the fundamental orientations of societies and the political cultures in the United States and in Europe are following diverging trajectories. Continental drift is at work, no matter how strong the standardizing impact of globalization driven by technologies, economic interdependence, and popular culture. Before long, analyses in the categories of social change uncover a growing perceptual distance between the politically aggressive Christian fundamentalism in the United States and persistent secularism of European societies. In a German perspective the Americans’ unquestioning deference to authority is rather reminiscent of Wilhelmine Germany on the eve of World War I. The cult of the presidency, driven by a huge media effort, and an unconditional patriotism which blurs the distinctions between political parties also shows embarrassing parallels to that pre-democratic phase of German history. The same is true for the fate of attempts to initiate a serious parliamentary debate about the limits of security controls and the wisdom of military action in Iraq: they are being smothered as politically incorrect. The contrast between the distinct anti-war (not necessarily pacifist) reflexes of an overwhelming majority of Europeans and the creeping militarization of American society are no longer to be overseen. The magic formula of “common values” is about to lose its substance.

Questions to ask

Domestic politics in the United States invite unpleasant questions that can no longer be stifled by taboos:

- What about the standards of democracy in a country electing its president with procedures that, had they taken place in the “new democracies” of Central and Eastern Europe, would have been condemned by any observer team from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe?
- How reliable are the democratic institutions if the Administration can scare the legislator into passing an enabling act, under which combat operations in Iraq are initiated without parliamentary debate?
- Are there any limits to manipulation, when the hypnotic repetition of official disinformation alone suffices to convince half of the American

public that Iraq had direct ties to al Qaeda and therefore shared in the responsibility for the 9/11 attacks?

- Will the American people resist continued manipulation by official information, opportunistic media, and carefully calibrated security alerts?
- Will the political elites of the United States break free from the siege mentality cultivated in the “War against Terror”, will they bring run-away imperial patriotism under control, and will they reactivate the constitutional system of checks and balances?

The underestimated partner

Europe’s capabilities are obviously out of sync with its global responsibilities, not to speak of visions. Bitter self-reproaching, particularly about the lack of military muscle is perfectly justified, but it covers only half of the story. Contrary to fashionable mockery, Europe’s soft power is already considerable when it comes to crisis management, nation building, and the pursuit of humanitarian standards on a global scale. The long-term winner in the Iraq-crisis might well be the EU, if it manages to institutionalize the Common Foreign and Security Policy, to muster its by no means negligible military potential, and to demonstrate a new capacity for cooperation and competition with the United States driven by strategic ambition. The new type of partnership will have to be demonstrated in the refusal to go along with American decisions at all cost, and by the willingness also to act independently on a global scale. In retrospect, the Iraq-crisis may well turn out as yet another proof for the dialectics of Hegel’s “trick of history”, when *hubris* turns into embarrassment.

Doomed to cooperate

Whatever degree of warmth may be measured on the gamut of emotions between Europe and the United States, both sides have to acknowledge mutual dependencies in the confrontation with nasty issues on the global agenda: international terrorism, economic recession, anti-globalism, regional instabilities, and lack of governance. None of these challenges can be met unilaterally and, whether the neo-conservative designers of a “New American Century” like it or not, there is no way to ignore or to substitute the critical role of the United Nations. On the other hand, new declarations, even explicit programs for enhanced cooperation of the G-8 will not heal the dramatic loss of trust which continues to cloud relations between the United States and its allies. This transcends past the repetitive skirmishes about burden sharing, compatibility of weapons systems, and division of labor in regional crisis management. NATO is not and will not go back to normal, whatever that means. But its members are doomed to more cooperation than ever, if in a new political setting.

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Combating Transnational Terrorism: American and European Threat Perceptions and Strategies

Roy W. Stafford

The September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon have had a dramatic effect on the Bush Administration's foreign policy and the American public's willingness to support military intervention abroad and accept restrictions on civil liberties at home, and understandably so. Before that tragic day, terrorism was viewed by much of the American foreign policy establishment as just one of the many transnational problems – a cost of global engagement, but not a major challenge to that engagement or pressing threat to the homeland.¹ The sheer scale of destruction and loss of life from the near simultaneous terrorist strikes dwarfed by nearly a factor of eight that of any previous terrorist incident.² The war on global terror immediately became the priority, one might argue exclusive, focus of the Bush Administration.

What prior to 9/11 had been central concerns, including a harder line toward China, the North Korean nuclear program, and working more closely with Mexico on immigration, moved to the back burner. With Moscow's support for future operations in Afghanistan critical, criticism of Russian brutality in Chechnya became muted; needing bases in Central Asia for military operations in Afghanistan, assistance to repressive regimes became more important than political and economic liberalization; and securing the southwestern border of the United States and restricting immigration dashed prospects for improved relations with Mexico. What had been a sharply divided Congress quickly approved a 48 billion dollar increase in defense spending, broadened the surveillance, arrest and detention powers of government investigators and prosecutors, created a new Department of Homeland Security,³ and established a new military command for homeland defense.⁴ All of this with minimum debate in a body usually known for its deliberate pace.

Bush Administration's National Security Strategy

The Bush Administration's first National Security Strategy, with its rejection of containment and deterrence as inadequate and emphasis on preemptive military action to deal with threats posed by terrorist groups and so-called "rogue regimes" reflects the impact of 9/11 on American threat perceptions and strategies. The roots of key concepts in the 2002 National Security Strategy can be traced to the ideas outlined in the draft Defense Policy Guidance⁵ of a decade earlier and the influence of "neo-conservatives" in the Bush Administration. It is unlikely, however, that the assertive strategy promulgated in 2002, with its emphasis on preserving American

hegemony,⁶ forceful defense of national interests, and activist goal of spreading democracy everywhere would have emerged full flower, absent the attacks of September 11 and the sense of insecurity they fostered. A parallel may be drawn to the impact that the Korean War had on the adoption of a previous transforming strategy document – the strategy of containment embodied in NSC 68. This document, prepared under the direction of Paul Nitze in the spring of 1950, provided the blueprint for the defense buildup and multi-fold increases in defense spending adopted following the North Korean invasion in June 1950. Had Pyongyang not invaded South Korea only months after the NSC 68 drafters had completed their work, it is unlikely that the major strategy, budget and force posture changes advocated in that document would have been implemented.⁷

Reflecting the judgment that terrorist groups, unlike states, do not have valued assets that can be threatened,⁸ the Bush Administration strategy states: “Traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy whose avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents.”⁹ The document asserts that the new and dominant security threat facing the United States is the danger posed by transnational terrorist groups, which aim to inflict mass casualties, armed with weapons of mass destruction. In this context the United States cannot afford to wait until such a threat is imminent, but must deal with such dangers before they emerge. “If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long.”¹⁰ In light of this situation, the Bush Administration asserts the right, in fact the duty, to take preemptive action.

The attacks of September 11 shattered the feeling of invulnerability that Americans had enjoyed for most of their history and brought a sense of insecurity not felt since the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. The geographical blessing of two large oceans and weak and friendly neighbors that had protected the continental United States from foreign attack for nearly two centuries were no defense against terrorists determined to kill thousands of civilians using not arms but hijacked commercial airplanes. Even the “Day of Infamy” in December 1941 took place over 2,000 miles off the Pacific Coast of the United States, was directed exclusively at military targets, and with the exception of a few errant shells fired by a submarine at an oil field north of Santa Barbara, was the closest war came to America’s shores. Al Qaeda had launched synchronized bombings of American embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam some three years earlier and attacked the *USS Cole* in Aden the preceding October, but these attacks were overseas, not on the homeland, reinforcing the perception that American interests abroad, not at home, were the most likely targets of terrorists.

Following the 1998 embassy bombings in Africa, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) George Tenet placed al Qaeda among the intelligence community’s highest priorities, stated that “we are at war” with Osama bin Laden’s network, and directed the preparation of a plan of attack against al Qaeda. Addressing the nation after the

United States launched cruise missile strikes against terrorist facilities in Afghanistan and Sudan in August 1998, President Clinton declared: “Our efforts against terrorism cannot and will not end with this strike [...] and we must be prepared for a long battle.”¹¹ Yet, despite the use of the term “war” by both the President and DCI, neither the intelligence community nor any other government institutions were put on a war footing. Nor did this change under the Bush Administration before 9/11.¹² There were other pressing priorities – Iraq, China, North Korea, Indian and Pakistani nuclear concerns – and intelligence warnings pointed toward attacks on US interests overseas rather than on the homeland.¹³

All this changed after September 11. The war on terrorism became the principal – and one might argue sole – foreign policy focus of the Bush Administration. In his speech to a Joint Session of the Congress nine days after the attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon, President Bush committed the government to a total war effort. “We will direct every resource at our command – every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war – to the disruption and to the defeat of the global terror network.”¹⁴ The United States had been attacked and America was at war. The American sense of security had been shattered and the public, which before the attacks had shown a declining interest foreign affairs and weariness with seemingly endless military deployments, was now willing to spend whatever blood and treasure was necessary for the war on terror. The strong American public support for the war in Iraq, in marked contrast to popular opposition throughout the rest of the world, can only be explained in the context of September 11. Despite the paucity of convincing evidence linking the Iraqi regime to al Qaeda, much less to the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon,¹⁵ a large majority of the American people continues to believe Saddam Hussein was culpable in the attacks.¹⁶

By contrast, for the rest of the world relatively little changed. In the immediate aftermath of the attacks, overwhelming sympathy of the United States was expressed – “We are all Americans” – but as the initial shock of that fateful day wore off, for most Europeans “the zone of peace” that had been created in Europe since 1945 had not been disturbed. As evidence emerged that planning for the attacks had taken place in Hamburg and that the European Union’s open borders, different legal systems, and reluctance of police and intelligence services to share information allowed terrorists to move about freely, European governments took steps to boost police and judicial cooperation, enhance intelligence sharing, close off terrorist financing, extend the reach of arrest warrants, and improve external border controls.¹⁷ Key initiatives adopted by the EU include: agreeing upon a common definition of terrorism and standardized penalties for participating in a terrorist group; establishing a common arrest warrant that would expedite apprehension and extradition of terrorists; giving Europol a greater law enforcement role and more personnel, to include creating a special anti-terrorism unit within that body;

developing joint investigation teams of police and magistrates; and drying-up terrorist funding through expanding the EU's money-laundering directive and establishing a common asset-freezing order.¹⁸

Implementing these actions has been uneven. Justice and intelligence powers reside in national governments and the changes agreed at the European Union level require implementing legislation through national parliaments. As a consequence, there is considerable lag time between agreements reached by leaders in Brussels and enforcement at the national level. For example, ratification of the common arrest-warrant and enacting asset freezing measures by member states are unlikely before mid-decade.¹⁹ Europol staffing will have increased by nearly 50 percent by year's end to just short of 500. By comparison, however, the FBI has 30,000 personnel and a budget of 3 billion dollars, contrasted to 50 million dollars for Europol. While steps have been taken to enhance law enforcement collaboration, political, legal and cultural barriers limit police and judicial cooperation. Moreover, European governments have different evidentiary standards from each other and from the United States.

Most important, as noted above, threat perceptions with regard to terrorism are different between the United States and Europe. The United States was the victim of September 11, not Europe, and Europeans see America as the most likely target of future al Qaeda attacks. In the words of the German Ambassador to the United States: "You are a country which has decided to consider itself at war. Most European nations do not consider themselves at war."²⁰ In this differing threat context, European governments do not have the political support to undertake the kind of aggressive counter-terrorism measures, including tightened border controls, restrictions on personal liberties and realignment of government departments, and expend the level of resources that Washington has been willing to do. For example, the 48 billion dollar increase in the US defense budget for countering terror, adopted following September 11, is greater than the total defense budget of any European state.

Terrorism and the challenge posed by al Qaeda

Terrorism can be defined as the calculated use of violence, primarily against civilians, to create fear and, thereby, coerce governments to obtain political goals.²¹ The key concepts here are that the violence is not mindless, but rather fits within the terrorist group's strategic logic, that is: violence is the means used to obtain specific goals. Terrorism is not new. Roughly one thousand Americans had been killed in terrorist attacks in the preceding three decades.²² Europe, moreover, had been dealing with terrorism longer and at greater cost than had the United States prior to the attacks of September 11, 2001. "Traditional" terrorist organizations, such as Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) and the Real or Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) operate primarily within the target state with "limited", secular goals – an

independent Basque state in the case of ETA and unification of Northern Ireland with the Irish Republic for the various factions of the IRA. The targets of their attacks largely have been against police, military and other symbols of state authority, not an effort to create mass casualties.²³ As Brian Jenkins observed, traditional terrorists “want a lot of people watching and a lot of people listening, not a lot of people dead.”²⁴ Moreover, negotiation to reach a settlement is possible with such terrorist groups, however difficult such negotiations have proved.²⁵

The perpetrators of the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were, however, a different kind of terrorists than those that have plagued Europe for decades. What is new with al Qaeda is the transcendental nature of its goals and religious motivation behind its aims and actions, the sheer scale of destruction and death it has perpetrated, the extent and sophistication of its global network, and non-negotiable nature of its demands – nothing less than the withdrawal of the United States from the Middle East, the overthrow of “heretical” regimes in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and elsewhere in the region, and the destruction of Israel. As Bruce Hoffman comments, analysts of “traditional” terrorism had concluded that “terrorists were more interested in publicity than killing and therefore had neither the need nor the interest in annihilating large numbers of people.”²⁶ For Osama bin Laden as, ironically, for Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh, the intention was to kill large numbers of innocent victims. Bin Laden asserted that it was the duty of all Muslims to “comply with God’s order to kill Americans and plunder their money” in his February 1998 *fatwah*.

“The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies – civilians and military – is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosques in their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam...”²⁷

This religious motivation, based on a radical interpretation of Islam, and emphasis on mass civilian casualties characterize this new form of terrorism. Less than six months after the *fatwah*, al Qaeda operatives launched near simultaneous truck-bombings of United States embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, killing twelve Americans and more than two hundred Africans, including many Muslims. Then, in November 2000, came the attack on the *USS Cole* killing seventeen sailors and, ten months later, the attacks of September 11.

What motivates al Qaeda and radical Islamic terrorist groups linked to al Qaeda, such as Jemaah Islamiyah in Indonesia,²⁸ to carry out such horrendous attacks on non-combatants and for individual terrorists to be willing to sacrifice their own lives to slaughter not just Americans, but other people of many nationalities and religions who just happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time? “Why do they hate

us?” asked President Bush in his address to Congress after the New York and Washington attacks. Bernard Lewis argues that the frustration and anger is rooted in the failure of the Muslim world to recapture the greatness of the early centuries after the Prophet Mohammed when Islam was the greatest civilization on earth. Instead of dominating the world and spreading Islam far and wide, Muslims find themselves poor, divided, ruled by corrupt regimes, and dominated by the infidels led by the United States. It is the United States that is the principal supporter of an Israeli government that occupies Arab lands and suppresses its Palestinian residents, and it is American military forces, by their presence in Saudi Arabia, that desecrate Islam’s holy sites. Not only have the unbelievers reversed natural and divine order, but also Western culture with its secularism, materialism, television and films is a corrupting influence on Muslim societies, seducing Muslims from the correct path.²⁹ In the 1998 *fatwah*, bin Laden asserts that he and his followers are acting in God’s name and therefore are justified in their killing of non-combatants. In bin Laden’s mind there are no innocents. His radical interpretation of Islam provides the moral justification for the horrendous acts al Qaeda perpetrates.³⁰ Moreover, the success of bin Laden and his fellow Mujahedin in defeating the Soviet forces in Afghanistan, which in his view led to the end of the Soviet Union, may have convinced bin Laden that killing Americans and destroying the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the symbols of American economic and political power, would have a similar outcome.³¹

American strategy for combating global terrorism

The Bush Administration counter-terrorism strategy, developed in the course of the campaign against al Qaeda and reflecting the actions taken during this effort, was released in February 2003, nearly 18 months after the attacks of September 11.³² This strategy calls for simultaneous action on four fronts, to wit:

Defeat terrorist organizations of global reach by attacking their sanctuaries; leadership; command, control, and communications; material support; and finances. **Deny** sponsorship, support and sanctuary to terrorists. **Diminish** the underlying conditions that promote despair and lead people to embrace terrorism. And, **defend** against attacks on the United States, its citizens and interests around the world.

The most visible element of the counter-terrorism strategy has been the military operations in Afghanistan, featuring integration of special operations forces and indigenous fighters on the ground combined with airborne sensors and air-delivered precision weapons. Within two months of the opening air strikes in October 2001, the Taliban regime had fallen, al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan had been destroyed, and the remaining Taliban and al Qaeda fighters had scattered. The rapidity with which these objectives were achieved with minimal coalition casualties may have given a false sense that this aspect of the war on terror had been won, and at low cost, through extraordinary advances in airborne sensors, precision munitions,

and close, near instantaneous, synchronization between ground forces and long-range airpower. Afghanistan now has a government committed to political and economic reform, over two million refugees have returned, and security is improving. However, as the following two years have shown, Afghanistan remains a dangerous place, particularly the southern half of the country; the international peace keeping force (ISAF) is limited to Kabul and is unlikely to be extended to the outlining provinces,³³ war lords, notably Ismail Kahn in Herat, continue to exercise real political power; Osama bin Laden and the Taliban leader, Mullah Omar remain at large, most likely in Afghan-Pakistan border area; and the Karzai government's powers are limited. In this still insecure environment, an international security presence will be needed for at least another decade.³⁴

As the operations in Afghanistan demonstrate, military force is a very important instrument in countering terrorism, but it is not the only or even principal tool in the wider conflict with terrorism. The Afghanistan context was unique. The Taliban regime and al Qaeda were closely linked and had a mutually supportive relationship. Osama bin Laden provided funding and combat forces for the Taliban in fighting the Northern Alliance, and the Omar regime provided al Qaeda sanctuary, weapons, equipment and training camps – the clearest possible case of state-supported terrorism.³⁵ With the Taliban unmoved by diplomatic entreaties or economic sanctions to end its support of al Qaeda, military force was the only effective means to remove the Taliban and the facilities and terrorists the regime harbored. Unlike the al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan, however, most terrorist organizations are dispersed in small cells, present few suitable military targets, and thus are not susceptible to military operations. Ironically, the destruction of terrorist facilities in Afghanistan and scattering of al Qaeda fighters makes targeting remaining assets more difficult.

Moreover, despite the major advances in precision weapons and efforts to minimize non-combatant casualties, military force remains a blunt instrument and military operations in populated areas run the risk of rallying the local population behind the terrorists. The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), perhaps one of the most successful terrorist organizations, regularly used the tactic of killing Serbian officials and civilians on the expectation that Serbian forces would lash out indiscriminately at the Albanian populace and generate additional popular support and recruits for the KLA.³⁶

As demonstrated in Afghanistan, military measures are a key element of the war against global terrorism, particularly in eliminating the sanctuary that al Qaeda enjoyed in Afghanistan, hunting down remaining Taliban and al Qaeda fighters, and providing security for rebuilding efforts in Afghanistan. Police and intelligence work, however, are the main tools in the long-term counter terrorism campaign. And, unlike the bulk of military actions in Afghanistan, which were dominated by

American forces, gathering and sharing intelligence, law enforcement cooperation, and cutting terrorist financing require much greater international support and cooperation in these areas than achieved prior to the attacks of September 11.

Within the United States this has required fundamental changes, changes in culture, for intelligence and law enforcement organizations. The Congressional Report on Intelligence and 9/11 documents the different approaches to countering terrorist threats and barriers to sharing information between intelligence and law enforcement agencies. The United States does not have a domestic intelligence service comparable to MI-5 in the United Kingdom or the *Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz* in Germany. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is restricted to foreign intelligence collection. The National Security Act of 1947 prohibits the CIA from domestic law enforcement or internal security functions.³⁷ At the federal level these internal functions are responsibility of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The culture and expertise of the FBI, accordingly, center on law enforcement and criminal prosecution, not intelligence collection.

Following the bombing of the Marine Barracks in Beirut in 1983, a Counter Terrorism Center (CTC) was created in the CIA to integrate counter-terrorism analysis and operations within the agency to target and take down terrorist cells overseas. As the terrorism threat grew in the 1990s with the bombings of Khobar Towers and the American embassies in Africa, the CTC became more multi-agency in character as officers from other intelligence agencies and from the FBI were added to the center.³⁸ After September 11, the number of personnel assigned to the CTC nearly doubled and was further broadened to include analysts from the Federal Aviation Administration. These and other measures have improved information sharing and inter-agency coordination, but different organizational cultures cannot be overcome overnight or by fiat.

The critical intelligence and law enforcement sphere is the really hard part of the war on terrorism. Al Qaeda is a truly transnational organization with cells in 60 or more countries. Uncovering the extent of this network, tracking down and capturing or killing key al Qaeda leaders, operatives and associates, taking down terrorist cells across the globe, and cutting funding that supports terrorist activities are long-term, labor intensive efforts. While Osama bin Laden and his principal deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, remain at large, the Bush Administration reports that nearly two-thirds of the top al Qaeda leaders and operatives have been captured or killed in past two years, including most of the planners of the September 11 attacks; over 3,000 terrorists have been detained in over 100 countries, including 500 in Pakistan; and the international community has frozen more than 136 million dollars in terrorist assets.³⁹ On the surface these figures appear impressive. They raise, however, the fundamental question of what we do not know. What are the financial assets of al Qaeda and does the blocking of this funding represent a major portion of such assets

and a serious blow to the financial network or an inconvenience that can be overcome through other sources? Maintaining the base and training structure in Afghanistan required significant funding, but individual terrorist attacks are relatively inexpensive undertakings. It is worth recalling that the estimated cost of the planning, training, logistical support and coordination of the September 11 attacks was less than 250,000 dollars.⁴⁰ Analyses of al Qaeda's leadership structure and information gained from the capture of key individuals,⁴¹ suggest that the claims of success in removing most of the top leadership are accurate. Again, however, the question is what is known about the second and third or lower echelons of leadership, and the ability of the organization to reconstitute its top cadre. As the series of bombings attributed to al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia and Morocco last May reveal, in spite of the above arrests and cutting of financial links, the organization remains capable of carrying out major attacks. In sum, the counter-terrorism campaign has weakened al Qaeda and made it more difficult for the terrorists to operate, but al Qaeda learns and adapts. As President Bush has emphasized, the counter-terrorism effort will be a long campaign, the accumulation of small victories.

There has been less progress in diminishing the underlying social, political, and economic conditions in the Arab world that lead to the despair that terrorists exploit. The catalogue of ills include economic decline, young, rapidly growing populations with meager prospects for employment, authoritarian regimes, endemic corruption, and lack of basic freedoms. As Bard O'Neill notes, the expectation or, more accurate, hope that addressing these underlying causes is the key to eliminating terrorism is the most seductive and difficult principle to implement.⁴² The lack of political and economic development and freedoms produces the despair behind some cases of terrorism, notably among Palestinians, who see no future for themselves and are willing to carry out suicide bombings. But, it is difficult, if not impossible, to make fundamental, near-term changes in societies that would eliminate the bitterness felt in much of the Muslim world. Additionally, the despair and rage that Muslims feel because of their status in life is not something the West can solve; the fundamental sources of reform must come from within their societies. Moreover, political and economic reforms may have little effect on hard-core terrorists. We do well to recall that the leaders of al Qaeda and the pilots of the hi-jacked airplanes on 9/11 were not from the Arab poor, but had relatively high levels of socio-economic status and education.

On top of these conditions is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the occupation of the West Bank by Israel. The Israeli government's rejection of the Oslo accords, harsh occupation of the West Bank, blunt military attacks on Palestinian targets, and continued building of settlements on Arab land is the dominant source of bitterness toward the United States, which is viewed as an uncritical supporter, politically and financially, of the government of Ariel Sharon.⁴³

What role for NATO in countering terrorism?

The day following September 11, the North Atlantic Council invoked the Atlantic Treaty's Article 5 for the first time in the Alliance's history, declaring that the attack on the United States was an attack on all and committing to assist Washington in the counter-terrorism campaign. The Alliance's actions were a welcome symbol of solidarity with the United States and recognition by allies that this form of transcendental terrorism presented a threat to their societies as well. Allies agreed to take a number of actions, including enhanced intelligence sharing, deploying NATO's Standing Naval Forces to monitor shipping in the Eastern Mediterranean, dispatching airborne early warning aircraft to the United States to replace American assets sent to the Afghanistan theater, offering troops for operations in Afghanistan and, most important, providing bases and blanket over-flight rights.⁴⁴ These were important measures, but the Alliance has not played a major role in the fight against al Qaeda. The Bush Administration chose not to use Alliance forces and procedures for the war against terrorism. This was to be "America's war" not NATO's. While fourteen allies eventually were to participate in military actions in Afghanistan, Operation *Enduring Freedom* was an American conceived, planned and led effort that included selected allied units through bilateral arrangements rather than through NATO channels. The United States has insisted on retaining sole authority over combat measures in the counter-terrorism campaign and has no intention of relying on the Alliance's consensus process in a case where vital American interests are at stake.⁴⁵ In the Bush Administration's judgment, the allies could offer only very limited military capabilities in the high-tech surveillance, target acquisition, and precision strike realms and the Administration did not want to repeat the constraints it believed NATO decision-making had imposed during the Kosovo conflict.⁴⁶

The United States welcomed allied leadership of the peacekeeping and nation-building responsibilities in Afghanistan, functions the Bush Administration wished to avoid. In his criticism of Clinton Administration use of military forces in post-hostilities missions in the Balkans, then candidate Bush argued that President Clinton had over-stretched the military in peacekeeping efforts and that American troops should not be used for nation building.⁴⁷ The nation's military forces would concentrate on their central mission of fighting and winning wars, not escorting children to school. The plans for post-conflict peacekeeping and reconstruction in Afghanistan reflected this division of effort between the United States and its partners. American forces would conduct the continuing military operations against Taliban and al Qaeda fighters, and NATO allies and partners would take responsibility for peacekeeping. This kind of separation of functions in NATO – US forces fight short, high-intensity wars with advanced technology solutions and allies handle the low-tech and seemingly endless post-war peace operations – is not sustainable, especially when the Alliance has not been involved in the decision to use force, as is the case in Iraq.

Because combating terrorism primarily involves intelligence and police work, counter-terrorism is not the Atlantic Alliance's new core mission. As the Afghanistan experience indicates, NATO will not direct future combat operations in the fight against terrorism. Selected allied forces will contribute to such activities, but in "coalitions of the willing" under American not Alliance command. NATO's pattern of multilateral training, joint command structures, and habit of working together provide the foundation for assembling such coalitions of the willing, and European, especially British and French, troops provide the most capable and readily available military forces for the United States to draw upon as needed. "As needed", however, is the operative phrase. In light of the large and growing gap in military capabilities, and little indication that European governments will provide the funding needed to close that gap, the United States can conduct future high-intensity combat operations largely alone.

Summary and conclusions

Two years on, the war on global terrorism has been well begun, but only begun. The Taliban regime that repressed its people and provided safe haven for terrorists to plan, train for and conduct operations was dismantled, base camps were destroyed and al Qaeda leaders and fighters scattered in a short and nearly casualty free military campaign. The Bush Administration mobilized an international counter-terrorism coalition that has produced impressive results in preventing attacks, tracking down terrorists, taking down much of the al Qaeda senior leadership, and drying up funding for al Qaeda and other groups. Security at America's borders has been tightened; airline passengers and baggage are being screened more thoroughly and airline crews are better prepared to prevent a repeat of 9/11; coordination among federal, state and local authorities has been improved; and there have been no further terrorist attacks on American soil. As President Bush warned at the beginning of military actions in Afghanistan, victory against terrorism would not come in a single battle but would be measured in the "patient accumulation of successes."

So much for the good news: there have been successes, but also setbacks and much remains to be done. Afghanistan is still a work in progress. As the continued attacks on government officials, aid workers and coalition troops by reported Taliban elements, the limited nature of reconstruction of that country's largely destroyed infrastructure, and the absence of government authority in much of the country, nation-building in Afghanistan has a long way to go. This means that a major security and economic assistance effort will be required for years to come to ensure that Afghanistan does not again become a safe haven for terrorists.

Although al Qaeda has been weakened, Osama bin Laden is still at large and the multiple attacks in Indonesia over the past year and those last May in Saudi Arabia and Morocco provide painful proof that al Qaeda and groups allied with it remain

serious threats. While the number of terrorists captured and assets seized may appear impressive, we need to be aware of what we do not know. In the shadowy world of terrorism, it is difficult to determine the strength of al Qaeda and affiliated organizations, their financial resources, their ability to recruit new members and active supporters, and their ability to conduct sophisticated attacks. As Paul Pillar points out, no matter how many resources are devoted to counter-terrorism and how aggressively known terrorist organizations are pursued, “some of what terrorists do will remain, for all practical purposes, unknowable [...] and some terrorist attacks, including some major ones, will occur.”⁴⁸

If America is more secure, can the same be said for Europe? Reflecting the perception that the United States remains the main target of al Qaeda’s form of indiscriminant global terrorism, European states have not moved as quickly or aggressively to improve their defenses against this threat. The steps agreed at the European Union level to improve police and intelligence cooperation and tighten border controls have run into the reality that Europe is a collection of sovereign entities, not a unitary state, and implementation of such measures by member states takes years, not months. Since terrorists seek weak points, and given that al Qaeda has repeatedly singled out not only the United States but also its allies for attack, Europe may well be the next target of indiscriminant terrorism.

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Notes

1. For Bush Administration views of how 9/11 changed foreign policy priorities see Richard Haass, “Reflections a Year After September 11”, Address to the International Institute for Strategic Studies 2002 Annual Conference, London, September 13, 2002. The Clinton Administration, particularly after the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, placed terrorism among the top intelligence priorities. After the embassy bombings in 1998, al Qaeda was seen as the principal threat to American interests.
2. The largest casualty toll from any previous terrorist incident was in 1978 in Abadan, Iran, in which 440 persons perished. The previous most lethal terrorist attack on American soil was the 1995 destruction of the federal building in Oklahoma City by an American citizen that resulted in 168 deaths.
3. The establishment of the Department of Homeland Security was the largest US government reorganization since the creation of the Department of Defense and the National Security Council system in 1947.
4. Stephen Walt argues that the al Qaeda attacks “triggered the most rapid and dramatic change in the history of US foreign policy.” Stephen Walt, “Beyond bin Laden: Reshaping U.S. Foreign Policy”, *International Security*, Winter 2001/2002.
5. The 1992 draft guidance was prepared under the direction of Current Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz. See John Lewis Gaddis, “A Grand Strategy of Transformation”, *Foreign Policy*, Issue 133 (Nov.-Dec. 2002), pp. 50-57.

6. Although the term “hegemony” is not used in the document, it forms the basis for the proactive strategy proclaimed in the 2002 National Security Strategy. The document asserts: “Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States.” President Bush’s West Point speech put it more bluntly: “America has, and intends to keep, military strengths beyond challenge.” George W. Bush, Speech to the Graduating Class of the US Military Academy, West Point, New York, June 1, 2002.
7. For an analysis of NSC 68 see John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Strategy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982).
8. Where religious motivations and martyrdom play prominent roles, it is hard to determine what the terrorists’ value that might be threatened – the terrorists’ families, perhaps, but this would present fundamental moral and legal issues.
9. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, September 2002.
10. George W. Bush, Speech to the Graduating Class of the US Military Academy.
11. Cited in Art Pine, “Clinton Hints at Future Strikes in Anti-Terror Battle”, *Los Angeles Times*, August 23, 1998.
12. Barton Gellman, “A Strategy’s Cautious Evolution: Before Sept. 11, the Bush Anti-Terror Effort Was Mostly Ambition,” *The Washington Post*, January 20, 2002. Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Hugh Shelton, said that policy makers did not have any serious plans to use the military in any significant way before September 11. *Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001*, Report of the US Senate select Committee on Intelligence and the US House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, December 2002, p. 223.
13. In the months preceding 9/11 the US Intelligence community issued a number of warnings of a terrorist attack against American interests. The general view, however, was that such an attack was most likely to occur overseas. *Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001*, pp. 203-209.
14. George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of the US Congress, September 20, 2001.
15. The initial claims of a meeting between attack leader Mohamed Atta and an Iraqi intelligence official in Prague in April 2000 appear to have been bogus. The extensive review by the US Congress intelligence committees was unable to establish that Atta had left the United States or visited Prague during that time frame. *Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001*.
16. Dana Milbank and Claudia Deanne, “Hussein Link to 9/11 Lingers in Many Minds”, *The Washington Post*, September 6, 2003, p. A01. The issue of a possible Iraqi linkage to the September 11 attacks was discussed in the Bush Administration’s deliberations at Camp David immediately following the attacks.
17. For an analysis of European Union actions to improve law enforcement cooperation to deal with terrorism, see Kristin Archick, “Europe and Counter-terrorism: Strengthening Police and Judicial Cooperation”, Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, July 23, 2002.
18. For the specific counter-terrorism measures agreed by the European Union see “EU response to 11th September”, Commission Briefing of 9 September 2002, <http://europa.eu.int/comm./110901>.
19. Kristin Archick, “Europe and Counterterrorism”, p. 8.
20. Wolfgang Ischinger, “The US and Germany: Damaged Partnership?”, Speech before the Commonwealth Club, San Francisco, April 2, 2003. On differing threat perceptions, see Jonathan Stevenson, “How Europe and America Defend Themselves”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 82 No. 2 (March-April 2003), pp. 75-90.
21. The definition used by the US Department of State is the definition contained in Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f(d): “Premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.”
22. Bruce Hoffman, “Rethinking Terrorism and Counterterrorism Since 9/11”, *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 25 No. 5 (2002), p. 303.
23. ETA targets almost exclusively have been Spanish officials, especially the military, to include moderate Basque political figures. ETA, however, has threatened to attack tourist sites and killed five civilians in one such attack in 2002. Militant IRA factions, likewise, have targeted police, British military facilities, and their Protestant counterparts, but also civilians, with the Omagh bombing in 1998 resulting in 29 deaths. Moreover, similar to the cycle of Palestinian violence, terrorist incidents increase when progress is being made in negotiations.

24. Brian Michael Jenkins, "International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict", in David Carlton and Carlo Schaerf (eds.) *International Terrorism and World Security* (London: Croom and Helm, 1975).
25. The Turkish government's handling of Kurdish Worker's Party (PKK) terrorism is perhaps one of the more successful examples. After decades of attempts to suppress the PKK through brutal military action and tens of thousands of deaths, Ankara's efforts to improve economic conditions in the Kurdish region, acceptance of the use of the Kurdish language in local media and schools, plus the capture of the PKK leader Öcalan have greatly weakened the appeal of the PKK among the Kurdish population. The Spanish government's provision of considerable autonomy for the Basque region of Spain meets the demands of most Basques and has driven a wedge between more moderate parties and ETA. Yet, the line between Herri Battasuna, the political wing of the Basque independence movement, and ETA often is fuzzy at best, not unlike that between Sinn Fein and the Provisional IRA. While there have been international links among traditional terrorist groups, to include connections among the IRA, ETA and terrorist elements in Colombia, the targets of their violent acts have been local.
26. "Rethinking Terrorism and Counter-terrorism Since 9/11", p. 306.
27. The full text of the *fatwah* urging *jihad* against Americans, published in *Al-Quds al-'Arabi*, February 23, 1998, is available at <http://www.ict.org.il/articles/fatwah>.
28. Jemaah Islamiyah has been implicated in the bombing of a nightclub in Bali, Indonesia that killed 202, including a large number of Australian tourists.
29. Bernard Lewis, "Targeted by a History of Hatred", *The Washington Post*, September 10, 2002. See also Peter Ford, "Why do they hate us?", *The Christian Science Monitor*, September 27, 2001.
30. On this subject see, Mark Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).
31. Ironically, the Reagan Administration used the Mujahedin as surrogates against Soviet forces in Afghanistan, providing money and weapons to the insurgents. The success of this insurgency with the final withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan in 1989, only two years before the implosion of the Soviet Union, created the myth that bin Laden and his fellow Mujahedin had brought about the collapse of the Soviet Union.
32. *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, The White House, Washington D.C., February 2003, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/counter-terrorism/counter_terrorism_strategy.pdf.
33. With their forces already stretched with other peacekeeping missions, there is no political support among the contributing nations to expand the current 5,000 plus ISAF force, which came under formal NATO command in August 2003. Instead, the United States and several coalition partners have deployed relatively small and mobile Provincial Reconstruction Teams to provide security and assist in rebuilding the country's infrastructure.
34. Separate from ISAF a 12,000 strong American-led coalition force remains in Afghanistan.
35. On the symbiotic relationship between al Qaeda and the Taliban regime, see Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002).
36. One of the purposes of insurgent group's use of terrorism as a tactic is to provoke the opposing government into responding in ways that will alienate the population and increase sympathy and recruits for the insurgents. There is a danger that the number of "friendly fire" incidents in Iraq, in which American responses to attacks on US forces have resulted in unintended killing of non-combatants, will further increase opposition to the US troop presence and attract recruits to the opposition elements.
37. The NSA 47 states the CIA shall "have no police, subpoena or law enforcement powers or internal security functions." The intent of this provision was to prevent the CIA from collecting information on American citizens.
38. Paul R. Pillar, "Intelligence and the Campaign Against International Terrorism", in Audrey Kurth Cronin and James M. Ludes (eds.) *The Campaign Against International Terrorism* (Washington: Georgetown University Press, forthcoming).
39. Cofer Black, Testimony before House Select Committee on Homeland Security, Washington, D.C., September 4, 2003.
40. The FBI estimated that the cost to carry out the attacks was between \$ 175,000 and \$ 250,000. Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, Report of the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the US House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Washington D.C., December 2002.

41. Reported top-level al Qaeda leadership in custody includes Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Abu Zubaydah, and Ramzi bin al-Shibh.
42. Bard E. O'Neill and Donald J. Alberts, *Terrorism and National Security Strategy*, unpublished manuscript.
43. An American ambassador in the Gulf with long experience in the Middle East remarked to the author that the Palestinian issue dominated every one of his meetings with host country officials to the effect that they would not even discuss other topics upon which they actually agreed with the United States. The author's personal experience with senior military officers from the region is similar.
44. For a list of the measures taken by NATO in the wake of the September 11 attacks, see "Statement to the Press on the North Atlantic Council Decision on Implementation of the Article 5 of the Washington Treaty following the 11 September Attacks against the United States", October 4, 2001.
45. The United States consistently has insisted on freedom of action in conducting military operations. The "coalition" for the 1991 Gulf War was for political and economic reasons and did not represent any relinquishing of complete American command of combat operations. The planning and direction of the war effort, the timing of operations, and the decision to end the war with the Hussein regime still in place were strictly US decisions.
46. The perception that the requirement for allied consensus imposed serious limits on target selection and limited the effectiveness of the 1999 bombing campaign in Serbia is inaccurate. The debate over the conduct of the military campaign among allies mirrored that in Washington. And, the British were more willing to commit ground forces than was the Clinton Administration. On the differences among allies and within the Clinton Administration over military actions in Serbia, see General Wesley K. Clark, *Waging Modern War* (New York: Public Affairs, 2001) and Ivo Daalder and Michael O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 2000). For a discussion of Pentagon views of limits imposed by allies, see Thomas A. Keaney, "War and Terror: US Perspectives and Policies", in Michael Geyer (ed.) *War on Terror in Historical and Contemporary Perspective* (Washington: American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, 2003).
47. This objection to use of American forces for post-hostilities missions was a recurrent theme in the 2000 campaign. In the second presidential debate in Winston-Salem, candidate Bush said: "I don't think troops should be used for what is called nation-building."
48. Paul Pillar, "Intelligence and the Campaign Against International Terrorism", p. 1.

An Agenda for the New Europe as a Global Player and Partner of the United States

Margarita Mathiopoulos

Europe has a success story to tell. The launch of the European Monetary Union in 1999 and the introduction of the Euro laid the foundation for future competitiveness for Europe's economy and prosperity for its citizens. By the same token, the introduction of the Euro laid the political and economic fundamentals for the European Union to become a global player and an economic powerhouse.

The Euro, after a weak start against the dollar, is gradually evolving into a respected world currency. Internally, a strong Euro will put the necessary pressure on the countries to follow through with overdue reforms. It is the Euro and the Stability Pact that impose fiscal discipline on member states. The Euro is much more than just a currency. It is a symbol of European integration, one of the most significant political and economic accomplishments of the 20th century.

The new, enlarged Europe has the potential to become a major force in world affairs as a partner to the United States. To achieve this, all European states must pursue a common strategy. The prerequisite for this is the definition of our interests, answering the questions: "What world do we want to see twenty-five or fifty years from now? What should be Europe's political, economic and military contributions to achieve such a world? And does it have the political will to invest in the necessary means and capabilities for that endeavor?"

With the enlarged New Europe bringing in new dynamism into the EU – with a fresh mind, fresh visions and new interests – it is now the time for the EU to become what it has failed to become after 1990: a global player and responsible strong partner. The following issues must be addressed in order for Europe to take up a responsible role in world affairs.

Completion of EU enlargement

When ten countries – Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Malta, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia – signed the EU accession treaties on 16 April 2003, they decided to join what [Greek Foreign Minister] George Papandreou called the "largest, most fascinating peace project in the world and possibly in mankind's history."

The new EU members signed a contract to become part of the most innovative economic and political project of the last fifty years. Too often, we tend to take what has been achieved in this regard for granted, discussing this process in terms of the problems ahead rather than in terms of the enormous achievements done. The signing of the Treaty of Accession in Athens should be seen as a new beginning, a new chance for Europe to complete what the EU's founders had envisaged for the organization: to foster peace and stability in Europe and beyond.

The challenges after EU enlargement 2004

The EU and the current candidate countries have been debating the future of Europe, concentrating on how the EU will operate after the inclusion of ten new members. But with few exceptions – the UK government as well as Chris Patten and Javier Solana – there has been little discussion of EU policy toward the *new* neighbors of the EU. These, of course, refer to the Eastern Europe/post communist countries that will *not* become members of the EU after the Grand Enlargement. In 2004, the countries bordering the EU will include Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia and Croatia. Only a stone's throw beyond these new borders lie Moldova, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania, Georgia and Armenia.

The new neighbors have different perspectives of entering the EU. While Croatia, Serbia, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro need to be pushed for stronger reforms and democratic stability in order to be given a perspective for EU-accession in the medium term, Romania and Bulgaria in particular should be held to a tight schedule. These are the countries most at risk in any slow-down of EU-enlargement. They need to follow closely the roadmap spelt out at the Copenhagen Summit so that no excuses can be made to keep them out and so that their elites take a more radical approach to reform.

While Grand Enlargement has been successful in prompting and sustaining a revolutionary transformation of eight formerly communist countries, the picture is rather different for the rest of the post-communist world. Those states that failed to enact deep and wide-ranging reforms are plagued by metastasizing corruption; their societies inadvertently export organized crime, illegal immigrants and little else. The new neighbors, especially those with few prospects at this time for EU membership have advanced little since the collapse of communism. The challenge is to prevent that border line from becoming an economic, social and political dividing line, constructed, bolstered and maintained by EU policies, resulting in what [former Estonian Foreign Minister] Toomas Hendrik Ilves has called a "Great Wall of Europe."¹ If Europe is unwilling to entertain the idea of a Ukraine or a Belarus as EU members, then it is necessary to develop a new, alternative strategy and also make it clear that membership during the next quarter century is not possible.

The European Union could seriously consider other forms of relations with its new neighbors, a form of association less than membership but considerably more substantial than what is currently offered by the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements or the even more substantial Association agreements. A new, expanded Association agreement would have to offer far more generous economic support, market access as well as access to various EU programs from e-Europe to Sapard and ISPA, but without an accession perspective. Such an approach would make it clear to the new neighbors that membership is possible in a distant future, but that until then, serious reforms are expected.

As for Turkey, the EU decided not to offer a concrete date for the beginning of accession talks at the Summit in Copenhagen in December 2002 and merely promised that if Turkey fulfilled the so-called Copenhagen criteria on human rights and democracy by December 2004 these talks could then begin “without further delay.” Going forward, the EU needs to encourage Turkey to pursue its reform process in order to enhance its chances to start accession negotiations by 2004. Turkey knows that it only can become a member if it shows greater respect for human rights and a reduced role in government affairs for Turkey’s military. Ankara must also demonstrate sustained economic growth to minimize the flood of Turkish emigration that many Europeans fear will result from its admission to the EU.

If Turkey fulfils all the requirements necessary, the fact that it is a Muslim country should not be a counter-argument against accession. Quite contrary, the EU should apply a geostrategic perspective and see Turkey’s immediate closeness to the Islamic world as a major advantage. With Turkey as a member, the EU would be much better positioned to establish sustainable relationships with the Greater Middle East.

Turkey’s Foreign Minister Yasar Yakis is right in the long-term, when he claims, that the EU needs Turkey to become a truly global player influencing world affairs meaningfully. Turkey is stabilizing the Black Sea region, builds a counterweight to Russia, controls the passage between Black Sea and the Mediterranean and plays an important role on the Balkans. In addition, Europe’s gas and oil imports are covered to 60% by countries that are neighboring Turkey.

The US puts special emphasis on its geostrategic partnership with Turkey. Establishing serious cooperation with the conflict regions of the Broader Middle East and its Islamic culture is one of the prime goals of European foreign policy. Fostering the integration of this region will be much easier when Turkey will be admitted a key role of serving as a European-Muslim bridge, thereby contributing to the prevention of Samuel Huntingtons “Clash of Civilizations” to expand into Europe.

Completion of the Constitution of the European Union – more Monnet, less Metternich

The Presidency of the European Convention has just presented the first draft for the first 16 articles of the first Constitution of the European Union which can be expected to be completed soon. Greece, the origin of the oldest democracy in the world, is holding the EU presidency in this defining moment of the Union and might see the finalization of the European Constitution. Should it happen within Greece's term then the signing-ceremony of this epochal moment can only take place at the true cradle of democracy – the Acropolis.

A Constitution serves since centuries as a nucleus in which institutions of democratic decision-making processes are always laid down. And a federation of nations states is necessary, as Carl Bildt pointed out: "Since this is the way in which we can ensure that the powers of the regions and of the nations are preserved and protected, thus furthering the diversity in cultures, traditions and experiences that gives Europe a richness others can only envy."² This process today is a unique moment in history – a Union of independent national states voluntarily commit themselves in writing to further unity, a unity that might one day become a truly supranational European power. The EU should strive for "more Monnet and less Metternich" (to quote Elmar Brok), for more European Integration and less nationalistic behavior, because single national states are ill equipped to meet the new challenges and threats of globalization.

With regard to foreign policy, the Iraq crisis has shown that Europe is still characterized by national interests. The rules laid down more than ten years ago on a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the Treaty of Maastricht are often openly infringed or ignored. Europe does not speak with one voice in the world – because there is no common voice.

The creation of the European Convention lends a tremendous opportunity to make a decisive step forward towards a united foreign policy of the European Union that deserves this name. The draft articles on external action in the Constitutional Treaty of 23 April 2003 already demand that the members of the European Union need to define the common interest in all foreign and security policy matters and develop an institutional process for streamlined consultation and decision making. In particular, a European Minister for Foreign Affairs is suggested, who speaks and represents the entire EU when it comes to foreign affairs.

Also, Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) is suggested. Here, it should be added that QMV would apply in all matters of foreign and security policy with the exception of subjects with military implications, where Member States that are willing to cooperate

more closely may do – on the clear premise to do so without excluding other members.

The draft for the European Constitution also suggests, that the diplomatic missions of the Member States and the delegations of the Union shall cooperate in third countries and in international organizations. To enhance the efficiency of European Foreign and Security Policy, the pooling of diplomatic staff could be furthered and most national representations could be easily transformed into “EU Embassies” staffed by EU representatives and diplomats from the member countries.

As for a future President of the European Union, the President of the European Convention, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, has recently proposed that the European Council shall elect its President for two and a half years, following the suggestion of the larger member countries like France and Germany, provoking immediately resistance from both the EU Commission and from smaller member countries. The fear is that EU policy will be stronger dominated by the national interests of the larger countries and pursue a less integrative approach.

While Giscard’s suggestion will allow for a better coordination of the Council’s decision-making process by ending the six-month rotating presidency and might be implemented into the Constitution, it does not address the problem of double structures between Council and Commission.

The position of Javier Solana, the High Representative, and the one of the Commissioner for External Relations, Chris Patten, will rightly be brought together in order to create greater coherence of EU action and clarity in EU representation as the EU has drawn lessons from the problem of over-representation in the field of Foreign and Security Policy. One has to ask, then, if a “double hat” would not make sense on the presidential level as well.

The European Union might consider to elect *one*, not *two* Presidents in order to overcome the inefficiencies in its decision-making process. As a suggestion, the leaders of the European Union should consider to combine the functions of the President of the Commission and the President of the European Council. The President of the Commission should also act as a Chairman of the European Council and coordinate and lead its meetings, without having a voting right.

Such a model would bring the same advantages as a permanent President of the Council: the decision-making process could be streamlined here as well since the six-month rotating presidency would end in this case, too, and with it the accompanying nationally-driven priority settings, thus creating stronger cohesion and continuity in EU’s policies.

Another added value of such a solution would be that the President of the Council already has its own secretariat and staffers that would be capable of coordinating the policy making process of the Council without having to create an extra administration. In contrast, a separate permanent President/Chairman would need to build up this capacity first leading to the creation of another bureaucratic body within the EU.

The future President of the European Union, who would need to be approved by the European Parliament, could act as neutral voice and mediator in conflict situations within the Council. And with the inauguration of a President of “United States of Europe” the EU will be closer to equal partnership with the United States of America as well as also closer to Jean Monnet’s vision.

Establishing an EU seat at the UN Security Council and reform of international law

As a result of a stronger European approach in the conduct of Foreign and Security Policy, the EU should find it easier to commit its member states to first find a common position and to forestall in the future a multi-voiced nationally driven diplomacy as it happened during the Iraq crisis at the United Nations and where the disagreements in the Security-Council not only reflected bad on Europe’s unity but also on the need to reform UN decision-making structures and current International Law. If no adaptation to the realities of a post 9/11 world order takes place, both institutions otherwise run the risk to lose their world-political relevance.

EU-seat at the UN Security Council

A common European position would need a qualified majority of the EU members as well and allow members to abstain if they cannot be convinced to follow the EU wide position. Such an agreement could serve as a prerequisite for a new initiative to establish an EU Seat at the UN Security Council and to speak with one voice to the world community. However, given that the reform of the UN Security Council has been postponed for years now, the EU should make use of the seats of Great Britain and France. Both countries are understandably not willing to permanently give up their seats. They could however, forego their seat every other year to the benefit of the EU. For example, in 2005 Great Britain would offer its seat to the EU; in 2006 Great Britain regains its seat and France steps back in favor of the EU. Such a bold step would demonstrate urgently-needed European leadership and set examples. As a permanent member, the European Union could push for the urgently required UN reforms.

Reform of international law

9/11 as well as the Iraq crisis made current International Law obsolete, which means that it needs to be changed substantially. The UN were once again unable to see their own decisions through when they failed to do what UNSCR 1441 had threatened as the consequence of non-compliance. As a result no one should expect that an American administration will turn to the UN again as long as the US believes to be at war. This, however, is the view in Washington since 9/11. But the issues at stake go beyond the UN, they aim at some of the fundamentals of International Law. One question raised by this crisis is whether an international order which treats democracies as equals of tyrannies and which therefore offers the same degree of protection against intervention to both of them is the order of the 21st century. Another issue to be debated is whether the extant definition of self-defense is good enough in a world in which weapons of mass destruction are spreading. There are no answers at this time but to cling to an order which was born in the 17th century and then heavily influenced by the outcome of WW II and the defeat of colonialism is definitely no answer as well.

For sure, after the Iraq crisis the attempt to impose binding International Law on the use of force has failed and the structure and rules of the UN Security Council reflect the hopes of its founders rather than the realities of the 21st century. Article 51 of the charter permits the use of force only in self-defense, and only “if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations.” 9/11 made clear that this rule alone is not sufficient anymore to rule the international system since it is based on the assumption of attacks from states – not from non-state actors like totalitarian terror groups, which cannot be classically deterred.

The US, after the crushing of the World Trade Center, concluded that under certain circumstances it must be allowed to defend itself before an “armed attack” occurs. Or, as the American *National Security Strategy 2002*, put it, Americans “cannot let our enemies strike first.” Therefore, “to forestall or prevent [...] hostile acts by our adversaries the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.”

Key in this regard is the definition of when an attack would be of “immediate imminence”. As Joseph Nye argues, generally, pre-emptive strikes would need to be backed up multilaterally and suggests to lay out the conditions when such a strike would be legitimized in Article 7 of the UN Charter, which defines cases of threat to peace. The difficulty is that such definition of conditions need to be an ongoing process since it will be difficult to anticipate future challenges and then strive to regulate in advance, before problems, which we do not know yet, develop. In times of major uncertainty and earthmoving shifts in the international political system it makes more sense to continuously develop International Law.

The legitimacy of pre-emptive strikes is debatable, but before portraying the United States as warmongering Rambo's, one needs to consider that the American President – George W. Bush or any other president – feels first and foremost committed to defend the American people. The US administration considered the danger coming from the combination of a mass-murderer and dictator who has produced and used weapons of mass destruction, and from terrorist groups with ambitions to acquire such weapons, a grave enough danger to legitimize self-defense, because it feared that the price for waiting – perhaps another thousands of Americans killed – would have been too high.

Those who blame a new US unilateralism for being the root cause of the undermining of International Law, should consider the following sentence: “We have to keep defending our vital interests just as before; we can say no, alone, to anything that may be unacceptable.” It may come as a surprise that those were not the words of administration hawks such as Paul Wolfowitz or Donald Rumsfeld. In fact, they were written in 2001 by Hubert Vedrine, then France's Foreign Minister. Similarly, critics of American “hyperpower” might guess that the statement: “I do not feel obliged to other governments,” must surely have been uttered by an American. It was in fact made by German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder on 10 February 2003. The first and lasting geopolitical truth is that states pursue security by pursuing power. After all, would China, France, or Russia – or any other country – voluntarily abandon preeminent power if it found itself in the position of the United States?

The greater danger after the second Iraq War is not that the United States will use force when it should not, but that, chastened by the war's horror, the public's opposition, and the economy's gyrations, it might not use force when it should. With all the unpredictable disorder and elements of anarchy in the world, Europe and the United States cannot afford to be at the brink of divorce over such overarching topics like International Law.

There are no two societies so close to each other sharing the same history, values and culture. The West has to take the initiative for reform of International Law. A joint commission of American and European Legal experts should be asked to make suggestions to be presented at the United Nations and to be discussed in the UN General Assembly.

Creation of a Transatlantic Free Trade Area – TAFTA

Economically, Europe and the United States are the two most closely bound regions in the world. Globalization is happening faster and reaching deeper between Europe and the United States than between any other two continents. This high degree of transatlantic interdependence gives strong potential of future cooperation. Europe and America could probably not find a better moment to turn the severe crisis in

their relationship into a promising economic success story. What is needed now is a re-launch of TAFTA, an idea that was brought forward for the first time in 1994: a Trans-Atlantic Free Trade Area.

The then Commission-Vice-President Sir Leon Brittan as well as former German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel were the strongest supporter of this idea, which found its first expression in the “New Transatlantic Agenda” (NTA), signed in December 1995 at the EU-US Summit in Madrid, and which commits the EU and the US to “progressively reducing or eliminating barriers that hinder the flow of goods, services and capital between us.” Much of this work has since then been carried out within the “Transatlantic Business Dialogue” (TABD), pursuing a step by step approach of harmonizing regulations and standards. However, initiatives like the NTA or the “Transatlantic Economic Partnership” (TEP) have been of limited success and a new, more ambitious approach, a single comprehensive agreement, is needed.

The creation of a Transatlantic Free Trade Area (TAFTA), linking the United States and the European Union together and establishing the world’s largest free trade zone, would not only guarantee the free movement of goods, capital, services and persons but would also bring a new dynamism in both the transatlantic relations and global trade, a dynamism, that is so urgently needed in the transatlantic relationship.

Foreign Direct Investment – not trade – is the backbone of the transatlantic economy. Although transatlantic trade disputes steal the headlines, trade itself accounts for less than 20% of transatlantic commerce, and US-EU trade disputes account for less than 1% of transatlantic commerce.

The total output of US foreign affiliates in Europe (\$333 billion in 2000) and of European affiliates in the US (\$301 billion) is greater than the total gross domestic output of most nations. In 2001, and throughout most of the 1990s, Europe accounted for *half* of total global earnings of US companies, as measured by US foreign affiliate income. Vice versa, the United States is the most important market in the world in terms of earnings for European multinationals. US affiliate income of European companies rose more than fivefold in the 1990’s to nearly \$26 billion.

Corporate America’s foreign assets tallied over \$5.2 trillion in 2000. The bulk of these assets – roughly 58% – were located in Europe. America’s asset base in the UK is almost equivalent to the combined overseas affiliate asset base of Asia, Latin America, Africa and the Middle East. US assets in Germany alone – \$300 billion in 2000 – were greater than total US assets in all of South America.

Europe’s investment stake in the US, on an historical-cost basis, grew to a whopping \$835 billion in 2000, which is nearly one-quarter larger than America’s stake in Europe. European firms have never been as exposed to the US economy as in the first

decade of the 21st century. In addition, Europe profits strongly from the fact that two-thirds of US corporate research and development conducted outside the United States is conducted in Europe.

In sum, the years since the fall of the Berlin Wall have witnessed one of the greatest periods of transatlantic economic integration in history. Our mutual stake in each other's prosperity has grown dramatically since the end of the Cold War – and the importance of Europe for the American economy is greater than ever. As an economic giant the EU is taken seriously by the US and seen as an equal partner. In contrast to international security issues, it is in this area that the EU can take the lead in developing the transatlantic relationship further – especially after enlargement.

Given the data mentioned above, it seems logical that the two leaders of the world trading system could work together to resolve their remaining trade problems and in the process set powerful precedents for the rest of the world to follow. In doing so, they would accelerate progress toward the ultimate goal of global free trade. Already, a large proportion of bilateral trade takes place free of any restrictions, but major exceptions remain, e.g. non-tariff trade barriers. To overcome this, a powerful new initiative such as TAFTA would be well suited.

The EU should set up a timetable for TAFTA's implementation. Since the majority of the US leadership recognizes that it benefits from fair and healthy relationships with the EU in trade questions, it should be possible to find support in Washington.

Ideas like TAFTA have been raised several times over the last years. Maybe they would have been discussed more sincerely had there been more frequent and stronger institutionalized discussions between European and American political and business leaders on how to improve EU-US relations in practical terms. Let's make TAFTA an economic transatlantic imperative, now, by developing – for example NAFTA and EMU into a new Transatlantic Free Trade Area.

Make a Common European Foreign and Security Policy a strategic reality

To be a strong partner and a serious player in the transatlantic security partnership with the United States, as well strategically relevant in a new global security environment, the European Union not only needs to speak with one voice, but also to fulfill its pledges to build up military capabilities, strengthen its intervention and crisis management capabilities and commit its forces to more power projection in order to meet the security challenges of the 21st century: fundamentalism, ethnic strife, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and new and old forms of terrorism.

After the embarrassing performance of EU troops in the management of the Balkan crisis and in particular in Kosovo, the EU initiated the European Security and

Defense Policy (ESDP) at the Helsinki Summit in 1999. EU member states committed themselves to the Headline Goals. It was agreed to be able to deploy by 2003 forces up to 60,000 personnel capable of the full range of the Petersberg tasks.

These forces should be militarily self-sustaining, with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat-support services and air and naval elements. Member states should be able to deploy in full at this level within 60 days, and to provide smaller rapid-response elements more quickly than this. They must be able to sustain such a deployment for at least one year.

The reality looks darker: even after 9/11 and the Iraq crisis the sum of the capabilities committed to the Headline Goal will probably not be met by late 2003. This means that the EU's first serious attempt to reduce the growing capability gap towards the United States has failed.

The gap between words and deeds with regard to ESDP, led Washington repeatedly to ask Europeans either to underpin their new strategic claims both financially and militarily or just forget about it. Unless specific and binding convergence-criteria and fiscal discipline similar to those imposed on the European Monetary Union are put into effect, Europe will never be able to manage crises without heavy dependence on the United States.

Another key to the fulfillment of the EU Headline Goals will be the establishment of an "Agency for Armaments and Strategic Research" as suggested in the draft articles for the European Convention in order to encourage the improvement of military capability. Such an effort can build on experiences made in already existing defense cooperation forums such as the Organization for Joint Armaments Cooperation (OCCAR), whose participants Britain, France, Germany and Italy account for 80% of EU spending on research, development and procurement already. The Netherlands, Spain and Belgium have applied to join and Sweden has expressed serious interest, which would bring most of the EU's defense industry within the ambit of OCCAR.

There is also need for closer cooperation of defense industries across the Atlantic. The policy should not be to *buy American* or *buy European* but to *buy transatlantic*, procuring the most advanced systems at the lowest cost. Political will in Washington to share US technology with European Allies is a precondition for transatlantic defense-consolidation. There is only one way to gain influence on the United States and that is to acquire capabilities that really matter. Sectors where the United States could need the European contributions to sustain operations or be able to operate in more than one theatre include ground surveillance, air-to-air-refueling and air transport. European willingness to launch such a modernization program should be matched by increased American preparedness to share technology. Close industrial

and military transatlantic cooperation can become a strategic component of both CFSP and ESDP – in particular after EU-enlargement.

To make a Common European Foreign and Security Policy a strategic reality, the EU could develop a coherent foreign policy strategy towards the major countries and regions in the world. Such thinking is unfamiliar to most European countries, with the exception of Great Britain and France. Further, the EU should project an image of unity to the outside world. The European disunity during the Iraq crisis harmed European interests, damaged the relationship with the United States and paralyzed NATO. All the more reason to speak rather sooner than later with *one* voice and not with *two* voices to the outside world.

In most EU countries, geostrategic planning has been replaced by extensive multilateralism. This applies in particular for Germany. However, dialogues, multilateral discussion-groups and frameworks for cooperation with other countries will not position the EU as a strategic player on the world stage. For CFSP and ESDP to be acknowledged as a driving force in the world, the leaders of the European Union need to set clear priorities as to what kind of relationship they want to maintain with the most important countries and what the European Unions' interests in that relationship should be.

Of course, political dialogue is maintained with all key countries and regions of the world and the efforts have resulted in progress in both the development of the respective countries and the relationship towards the EU. However, the EU policies towards these countries are mainly based on trade and business dialogues and efforts to integrate these countries multilaterally. But who could name clear interests and goals the EU pursues in China or India – two of the largest countries in the world? If the EU does not want to leave global strategic-alliance-making to the US, a precise strategy combined with a precise message to the outside world is imperative. A common EU approach on politically restructuring Iraq would be a beginning.

A Marshall Plan for the Greater Middle East

A common set of driving forces across the region from Northern Africa to Pakistan is contributing to the toxic combination of radical anti-Western ideologies, terrorism, rogue states, failed states, and the drive to acquire weapons of mass destruction.

A first concrete step towards a common action – that should be shared by UN and safeguarded by NATO – would be an American-European initiative “to make the Greater Middle East safe for democracy”. A Marshall Plan against the “Talibanization” of the Near and Middle East are necessary in order to dry out the soil for the recruiting of Islamic terror.

In the medium term, such a strategy must aim to provide work, dignity, and livelihoods for the people of the region. The regional societies need to come to grips with modernity and create new civil societies that allow them to compete and integrate in the modern world. Fighting against analphabetism and youth unemployment are the most important steps to be taken. The drivers for such process are democratization, free market economics, rule of law, and progressive education.

In this respect, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe could provide special expertise. A fresh voice of a new Member of the European Union, former Polish Minister of Finance and former Deputy Prime Minister, Leszek Balcerowitz suggests:

“Iraq’s present condition is no more difficult than that of the Central European countries twelve years ago. Iraq has high inflation, variable rates of exchange (official versus unofficial), one dominant economic sector, rationing of foodstuffs, and a large percentage of young people. All of this is similar to what the first post-communist Polish government inherited in 1989. Central European and Baltic countries could share these experiences with the Iraqis, especially with regard to the privatization of small and medium-sized enterprises.”

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Notes

1. Toomas Hendrik Ilves, “The Grand Enlargement and the Great Wall of Europe”, Tallinn, 2003.
2. Carl Bildt, “Is Europe Ready for the Future?” MENS Lecture at Humboldt University, Berlin, 14 February 2003.

A Special Role for Europe, a Special Role for Germany?

Anne-Marie Le Gloanec

In the past months and years much has been said, often polemically, about a so-called division of labor between the United States of America and Europe: the Americans, it was argued, would go to war while Europeans would at best serve as their foot-soldiers or clean up after them and do the nation-building business discarded by their American counterparts. In other words, it meant that the Americans were the real global players and Europeans mere global payers. With the war against Iraq, the debate has somewhat changed as the conservative Administration has been taken over by neo-conservatives and turned to a grand strategy of regime change and nation-building without much help from allies. Yet the terms of the debate have not been fundamentally altered since the United States remains the sole power in the world to entertain a truly global strategy and to throw its military and technological weight in the arena. Beyond polemics, the question then is whether a division of labor between the United States and Europe may be sound, whether it can turn from a division of labor based on constraints to a kind of burden-sharing based on consent, whether Europe can find a role both suited to its needs and resources and to the needs of the world, while last but not least one may wonder whether Germany, one of the main nations in Europe, has a special role to play in this game.

In a world which is increasingly smaller because it is globalized and which becomes at the same time increasingly complex, tasks are being undertaken by networks of actors, states and societies, governmental and non-governmental organizations. To that extent a kind of division of labor between various actors is more or less unavoidable and this may even be desirable if understood correctly: military interventions in the former Yugoslavia epitomized at first the worst possible division of labor since the United Nations took part in military decisions for which they are ill prepared while governments interpreted the Charter, an analysis which actually is rather the attribute of the Security Council.¹ In the protectorates which were later established in the former Yugoslavia, a more logical division of labor took place, implying that actors acted more or less according to their competences, even if Condoleezza Rice deplored in 2000 that American soldiers had to accompany children to their kindergartens. A well thought through division of labor between Europe and the United States would probably be based on a pattern which is not entirely different from the current one, with the former projecting more of a security based on governance, law and norms (through the enlargement of the EU, through nation-building) while the latter would provide the last resort of military power. It would however not be a strict division: the EU should have to arm itself to some

extent and the United States should emphasize multilateral procedures, both to enforce their credibility. In any case, a desirable division of labor would not entail competition: it would rather mean complementing one another, reinforcing one another e.g. to cajole, threaten and thwart enemies or to pursue a robust kind of nation-building.

However desirable a well thought-through division of labor between actors may actually be, a number of problems arise. It pertains to ambition, that is to the conception a country or a union of countries may have of its role in the world; to strategy, i.e. the grand vision it has to shape the world, coherence of means and actions, and last but not least resources. In the case of Europe, the definition of a role – in terms of ambition and of a strategy – and its pursuit – in terms of coherence and resources – is still left to constraints – to resort to the word used earlier, i.e. to outside circumstances, facts and actors, while the EU lacks will. In other words it is more or less the result of a combination of various ambitions, lack of strategy, absence of coherence and limited resources. Not all countries entertain the same conception of what its role in the world should be. Apart from the United Kingdom, France and to some extent Germany, most European countries do not have a global view of the world, even if they have deep concerns for and an active policy in overseas areas – such as Portugal whose government played a crucial role in bringing the issue of East Timor to the fore – or the near abroad – such as Finland which is more sensitive to the question of relations with Russia than most other members of the EU.

Not only does the assessment of what national interests are and how they are best defended diverge, but so do political cultures in Europe. By political culture, we mean historical experiences, values and beliefs often shared by large segments of a population, including often elites. Political culture may amount to a culture of reticence – or not – *vis-à-vis* military intervention, loyalty *vis-à-vis* the United States or on the contrary criticisms which may partly draw on anti-Americanism etc. Diversity means that a common denominator is hardly within reach. Add to this that those who take the decisions, who *make* foreign policy (a very small number of individuals in each country) use foreign policy as an instrument to polish their profile and gain in legitimacy, domestically and/or internationally. Though political cultures vary on the European continent, public opinions in most countries opposed the war over Iraq, but most leaders espoused American policy while few resisted it. As a result of diversity, there hardly is agreement inside Europe on what a division of labor between the United States and Europe should be all about and, of course, so far there is no agreed strategy and little coherence in action. One may at best speak of bits and pieces of European foreign policies, and coherence is more to be found in long-term processes such as reconstruction in the former Yugoslavia than in responses to acute crises, such as the wars in the Balkan peninsula. The adoption of a common strategy for which Javier Solana paved the way may forge a more common line in certain areas. It will however do little to bring together political cultures. Yet a well thought-through

division of labor between Europeans and Americans requires a European foreign and security policy which is absent so far. To that extent only a division of labor by constraint or by accident may occur, to the dismay of a number of Europeans.

Unity absent, is it thinkable that Europeans might set up a division of labor between themselves, i.e. some resorting to more robust policies while other countries would be more on the soft side of power (something which is more or less the rationale for enhanced cooperation?). This approach begs two remarks: first, it might run the risk of reproducing existing cleavages between for instance so-called big powers and smaller ones, nurturing animosities between EU members. Second, it would not necessarily make up for coherence as it might lead to a policy of each for oneself instead of each for all: there is nothing in it which might make up for cement. Yet whatever a division of labor between EU members might be, each country plays a special role inside Europe and within the transatlantic dimension. Some countries have a world strategy, as said earlier, some others have more sequential foreign policies, others again have a niche in the sense that some small and medium-sized enterprises may have a niche, based on an extreme specialization tooled for a segment of the world-market. Norway is such an example: in spite of its small size – or precisely because of it – it has specialized in mediation, mediating between warring parties in the Middle East, and in Sri Lanka. Can it be said that Germany has a niche or more broadly speaking a special role to play?

Endowed with more weight than Norway, with an economy which even in dire straits is still one of the most formidable ones in the world, a hub with a high number of neighbors, it has played a major role in recent years as an intermediary between small and big states in Europe, between Eastern and Western Europe, between Israel and Palestine. While mediation implies a certain codification of procedures, by intermediation we mean a political process in the course of which the intermediary is not neutral but defends his own interests. This policy evolved from the Cold War era where the German government turned constraints into virtue and increased the number of its interlocutors to alleviate the pressure of commitments.² After the demise of the Soviet empire, German governments pursued this policy, allowing Germany to act both as a small state and as a bigger state, as a member of the EC/EU and as an advocate of Eastern European applicant countries etc.

Changes in both the domestic economic, social and political climate and in the European environment have made the exercise very difficult – have turned into *Spagat*, a word Germans so often use. The cost of unification, the need to adapt to globalization and to both enlargement of the EU and deepening of monetary and budgetary integration, in short the necessity to defend short-term economic interests, e.g. to rescue the *Landesbank* or to prevent stringent European rulings constraining the chemical industry, the need to protect German agriculture or industry against Eastern European products etc. have led it to side with one of the main European

bullies, and at least the most arrogant one, France, turning its back on small states and on Eastern Europe. For the time being, Chancellor Schröder is trying to restore the balance but in a more cosmetic than substantive manner: while both France and Germany break the rules of the Stability Pact, the German government does it in a more polite manner, just as it tries to accommodate Washington, changing the tone rather than the music.

The question however remains as to whether beyond the short-term policy goals of the current head of government, Germany can resort to its former policy as an intermediary. Signs are contradictory. On the one hand, German actors, both state and non-state actors, have hoarded political credit through sustained relations of mutual confidence, such as the relations entertained by political foundations.³ In spite of political setbacks, this resource may certainly be drawn upon. On the other hand, a united though less consensual and certainly less rich Germany at the core of Europe may have outgrown this policy, having to defend short-term interests whatever the Chancellor's style may be. The role of intermediary was certainly facilitated by money and side-payments which current and future German governments will not have and cannot make. This means that Germany's position is quite ambiguous and it does add any coherence to what the European Union is lacking most.

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Notes

1. On this particular point, see Pierre Hassner, "Ex-Yougoslavie: le 'maintien de la paix' sans paix", in: Marie-Claude Smouts: *L'ONU et la guerre: La diplomatie en kaki* (Bruxelles: Editions Complexe, 1994), in particular p. 115.
2. See Anne-Marie Le Gloannec, *La nation orpheline. Les Allemandes en Europe* (Paris: Calmann-Lévy et Point, 1989 and 1990), Chapter 4.
3. See Anne-Marie Le Gloannec ed., *Non-State Actors and International Relations: The Case of Germany*, forthcoming.

After Iraq: Transatlantic Relations, NATO, and Germany

Michael Rühle

The months preceding the war on Iraq have not been kind to the transatlantic relationship. As Iraq moved to the front burner, the immediate wave of solidarity after the terrorist attacks of “9/11” seemed to peter out, as the transatlantic dialogue degenerated into a mutual sniping fest. The US was disappointed about what it saw as only qualified European support for its “war on terror”, and some Americans scoffed at European military weakness. Many Europeans, in turn, were disappointed about what they perceived as a US fixation on military means, and resented Washington’s approach of casually lumping together the “war on terror” with the issues of weapons of mass destruction or regime change in Iraq.

NATO, the manifestation of the transatlantic security relationship, could never have remained unaffected by such discord. Although the real debate on Iraq was played out in the halls of the United Nations, and although NATO was not expected to play a direct role in a war on Iraq, sooner or later the Atlantic Alliance was bound to be hit by the fallout. In February 2003, a short but agonizing disagreement erupted over the timing of planning for the defense of Turkey in case of war on Iraq. Only a few Allies held the view that the initiation of NATO’s planning should be made contingent on further developments in the UN, yet for almost two weeks, NATO appeared to be blocked. That the disagreement was indeed one over timing, and not over substance, helped to bring the crisis to an end before any permanent damage was done. As NATO’s Secretary General, Lord Robertson, put it, the Alliance had taken a hit above, not below, the waterline.

One of those countries deemed responsible for inflicting this damage on the Alliance was Germany. By taking a principled stance against a war on Iraq, irrespective of any UN Resolution authorizing the use of force, Chancellor Schröder moved beyond merely voicing his discontent with Washington’s policies. Instead, Germany joined France and Russia in what appeared like a counter-coalition of sorts, trying to extend the UN inspection regime in order to gain time for a political solution. Due to its own inherent shortcomings as well as the determination of the Bush Administration, this approach by the “axis of weasels” was doomed from the start. However, the course Germany had embarked upon soon developed a dynamic of its own: in trying to avoid the impression that war was inevitable, Berlin felt that it could simply not allow NATO’s planning for the defense of Turkey to move ahead of deliberations in the UN. As a result, Germany was charged by some with having taken the Alliance’s credibility hostage to developments in the United Nations, thereby causing NATO’s

“near-death-experience” of February 2003. In short, Germany paid a hefty price for having chosen to ignore the advice Donald Rumsfeld had offered early in the Iraq crisis: “If you’re in a hole, stop digging!”

As soon as the war ended, both sides of the Atlantic started repair work, looking for ways to mend their relationships, and in doing so carefully avoiding signs of triumphalism or regret. But the political fallout of the war on Iraq will be felt for a long time to come. After all, even in many European countries supportive of the US the Iraq crisis seemed to vindicate those who had long been making the case that transatlantic estrangement is an inescapable fact of life. To those who had been arguing all along that Europe was “fading slowly in the US rear view mirror”, the crisis over Iraq was a perfect example of European irrelevance. For those, on the other hand, who have long harbored hopes that a more powerful EU will check US hegemonic ambitions, European opposition to the war on Iraq now serves as the ultimate proof that their vision of an assertive Europe is finally coming to fruition.

Confronting the new realities

Clearly, a return of the transatlantic relationship to the status quo pre-9/11 and pre-Iraq has become inconceivable. Too much has changed to allow for a continuation of business as usual. To remain vibrant, the transatlantic community will have to readjust its approach to partnership. This requires, first and foremost, that the community acknowledges some basic realities of the new security environment post-9/11 and post-Iraq.

First, 9/11 has turned the US into a “revisionist” power; it no longer accepts a political status quo it considers intolerable. Moreover, as the war demonstrated, the US can change the political status quo by force. This has far-reaching consequences for the conduct of US foreign and security policy, which thus far have not been fully understood by a Europe that remains essentially inward-looking and status quo oriented.

Second, the US can go it alone, at least as far as the fighting is concerned. Europe can no longer hope to prevent US action simply by withholding its military support. Washington, to use the term frequently used in an EU context, is “autonomous”. This raises the question of the future of permanent alliances, such as NATO. They will not become superfluous, yet their value is going to be determined even more by the degree of their usefulness to the US.

Third, the US not only surges ahead of its European Allies in military power, but also in conceptual terms. The operations in Afghanistan and Iraq predictably demonstrated US military-technical prowess. However, they also revealed how far US military thinking had advanced. Europe, which never shared the US enthusiasm

about transformational concepts, is faced with a military reality for which it is insufficiently prepared. In addition, 9/11 has led to a military spending surge in the US, which now spends almost twice as much on defense than all other NATO Allies combined.

Fourth, in a transatlantic crisis, a unified and distinct European position does not exist. Not only does “new” Europe remain on an Atlanticist course, but also large parts of “old” Europe. Their reasons for siding with Washington on major security issues may differ according to geography and history. What unites them, however, is a desire to see the US continue its unique role as a “European power”, which means that they attempt to avoid frustrating the US too much. The formal expansion of NATO and EU in 2004 will further increase this Atlanticist pool of countries, thus further constraining Franco-German initiatives on security policy.

Fifth, The United Kingdom continues to play a key role with respect to building an effective European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The British shift towards Europe at Saint Malo in late 1998 has allowed progress in ESDP hitherto considered unthinkable. However, this shift had always been highly conditioned. It would only apply as long as London was not forced to choose between Europe and the US. The Iraq crisis confronted Britain with such a choice. Predictably, London chose the US over Europe. Obtaining British agreement to far-reaching EU defense initiatives will thus require these initiatives to contain a fair amount of “Atlanticism”.

None of these factors is likely to change in the short term. Indeed, several factors, in particular those relating to US-European military asymmetries, are likely to remain for decades to come, i.e. they will far outlast the current US Administration. Ritualistic calls for greater European self-assertion to “balance” the transatlantic relationship thus miss the mark. The real task for the transatlantic community may be quite different: to generate coherent security policies *despite* continuing asymmetries.

Consequences for NATO

It is here that NATO comes into play. While NATO inevitably suffers when there is bad transatlantic chemistry, it is nevertheless more than a passive and vulnerable object. As an institution that still enjoys a considerable amount of US trust and goodwill, NATO still manages to square the circle of multilateralism and effectiveness. This makes it an instrument to achieve more transatlantic coherence, and a catalyst to help facilitate a new transatlantic security consensus post-9/11 and post-Iraq. To play this role requires both military and organizational changes. These changes are already being effected – independent of disagreements over Iraq.

First, the Alliance is accelerating its military adaptation. For the past several years, the priority within the Alliance has been to improve the “European pillar”. September 11

and the Afghanistan campaign demonstrated, however, that “Europeanization” is not enough to ensure transatlantic security. The events since 9/11 demonstrate beyond a doubt that a European priority must remain the ability to cooperate militarily with the United States. This does not diminish the strategic rationale for a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) within the European Union. Yet for the EU countries to concentrate solely on acquiring “autonomous” capabilities means de facto to concentrate on acquiring capabilities for low and medium intensity conflicts. This would lead to a division of labor which neither side of the Atlantic wants, whereby the US does the fighting and the Europeans “do the dishes”, as a French observer once put it. This would be politically unsustainable – both across the Atlantic as well as within Europe.

NATO’s November 2002 Prague Summit made it clear that this rationale has been understood. In line with the requirement to enhance NATO’s ability for power projection, the Allies set in train a reform of NATO’s command structure, agreed to create a NATO Response Force, and adopted several initiatives to enhance defense against weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, at Prague, individual Allies made specific political commitments to improve their capabilities in areas key to modern military operations. Once fully implemented, these commitments would quadruple the number of outsize aircraft in Europe; establish a pool of air-to-air refueling aircraft until additional new tankers will be available; ensure that most of NATO’s deployable high readiness forces will have chemical, radiological, biological and nuclear defense equipment; and significantly increase the non-US stocks of air-delivered precision-guided munitions. These commitments could mark a turning point in transforming the defense capabilities of the non-US Allies.

Second, NATO is widening its geographical area of responsibility. Terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are global challenges requiring global responses. This means, in essence, that NATO’s future role can no longer lie solely in protecting Europe’s political order. The imperative to adopt a functional over a geographical understanding of security has already been recognized. Indeed, it was already inherent in the decision to invoke Article 5, the collective defense obligation, on September 12, 2001. By agreeing that a terrorist attack by a non-state actor could trigger a NATO response, the Allies had in effect made NATO part of a global struggle. At its November 2002 Prague Summit, NATO built upon this realization, by adopting a military concept for the defense against terrorism that states that Alliance forces should be enabled to “deter, disrupt and defend” wherever required, i.e. without geographical restrictions. As one NATO Ambassador had put it cogently, the “out-of-area” had collapsed with the Twin Towers.

In August 2003, NATO took on the command, coordination and planning of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. The debate about widening ISAF’s mandate to extend beyond Kabul indicates the ambitious, long-term

nature of this operation. NATO also provides support to Poland in commanding a sector in post-Saddam Iraq. This role, too, is likely to evolve, as the rebuilding of Iraq turns into an exercise of mending transatlantic rifts. With these decisions, NATO has almost simultaneously become a military player in Central Asia and the Middle East. This could have profound implications for NATO's future. For example, should the "Roadmap" eventually lead to a tangible agreement between Israel and a new Palestinian state, it would be difficult to dismiss the suggestion that NATO should play a role in policing such an agreement. The benefits of institutionalizing a common transatlantic approach by using NATO may well outweigh the risks of such an assignment.

Third, the Alliance has started to reform its working methods. NATO's working methods must reflect the requirements imposed by the new strategic environment. Although the Alliance will soon have 26 members, the organization's working methods have remained largely unchanged from those developed in the early 1950s for an Alliance of twelve. In a nutshell, NATO needs to be less bureaucratic, and more flexible. Almost unnoticed by the broader public, the Prague Summit has made a strong start in this direction. Heads of State and Government agreed to reduce the numbers of NATO committees (currently 467) by 30 percent.

But more changes may be waiting further down the road. For example, one could foresee arrangements whereby troop contributing nations "run" the operation, and decide on the targeting, while the North Atlantic Council confines itself to providing overall strategic guidance. This model, which resembles the EU's "committee of contributors", may be seen by some as an assault on the cherished rule of consensus. But it need not be. Clearly, a shift to "majority voting" in NATO remains out of the question. However, a modification of NATO's working culture that includes the possibility of setting up flexible coalitions, or that includes the possibility of "constructive abstention" certainly appears feasible.

The evolution of NATO since 9/11 demonstrates a tangible willingness by the transatlantic community to develop a viable consensus on the new security threats and on the appropriate responses. Iraq represented the proverbial "bridge too far" for this new transatlantic unity, threatening to blow it apart before it had fully developed. In the end, however, it appears that even the Iraq debate could not eclipse the consensus that had been forming since 9/11.

Consequences for Germany

Whether Germany will play a major role in facilitating this new transatlantic security consensus is currently impossible to answer. On the one hand, Germany's acceptance of far-reaching NATO reforms and its lead in championing a greater NATO role in

Afghanistan suggests a continued awareness of the need for close transatlantic cooperation in “out-of-area” contingencies. On the other hand, Germany’s support for an EU military headquarters independent from NATO appears to reflect a desire for “emancipation” from the United States, very much in line with the stance taken on a war on Iraq.

This ambiguity is likely to continue. After all, it is indicative of a country confronted with a vast array of political, economic, social and military change. Thus, while some have been quick to interpret Germany’s stance on Iraq as a permanent departure from past policy traditions, other powerful factors mitigate against interpreting Germany’s stance on Iraq as an irreversible policy shift.

First, Germany has to face the fact that there is a new Alliance hierarchy emerging. Although the division between “old” and “new” Europe should not be overdrawn, it brings home the fact that, from the point of view of the US, the *political* stance of an Ally in a crisis may matter much more than its actual *military* capabilities. This limits Germany’s political room for maneuver: even a sizeable German contribution to the peacekeeping mission in Afghanistan cannot “compensate” for confronting the US on an even more critical issue such as Iraq. The fact that Germany no longer occupies the central role in US strategic thinking as it did in the Cold War only exacerbates this problem. As one angry high-level US Administration official allegedly put it after the war on Iraq, while Germany was not going to be “punished” the way of France, Germany was at least going to be “ignored”.

Second, Germany must resist the temptation to construct a European Security and Defence Policy as a “counterweight” to the United States. A militarily more capable EU will not be able to prevent the US from doing what it deems to be in its vital national interest. Moreover, a significant majority of European nations are simply not ready to follow the Franco-German lead in European integration in security matters, let alone on matters transatlantic. Reviving old ideas of a “core group” or “avant-garde” in order to rejuvenate ESDP is a dead end. Military integration cannot be a catalyst for political integration. And the military credibility of any such “core” that includes Germany but excludes the UK remains highly dubious.

Third, Germany will have to accept that institutions like the UN are not simply about freezing the status quo, but about delivering results. European criticism of US unilateralism will be of little avail as long as Europeans appear unwilling to enforce the very resolutions to which they themselves have agreed. Nor will the widely deplored marginalization of the UN be arrested by attributing to the UN almost mythical qualities as the world’s sole arbiter, or even the world’s “conscience”. Such an elevation is factually and legally wrong – and threatens only to hasten the gradual withdrawal by the US from the organization.

Fourth, Germany must put a premium on maintaining military “co-operability” with the United States. This means embracing the notion of transformation in both its technical as well as intellectual dimensions. This does not rule out defense initiatives in an EU context, yet for demanding military operations there will be no alternative to close cooperation with the United States. Since budgetary restrictions will prevent Germany from making significant improvements across the full spectrum of capabilities, a sensible focus on certain key capabilities (such as strategic airlift, C³I, and chemical and biological defense) would ensure US interest in having Germany as a viable military – and hence political – partner.

Finally, the conscription in Germany is coming to an end. Thus far, Germany has avoided drawing one major conclusion that follows from embracing a functional view of security: the obsolescence of the draft. With the end of the Cold War invalidating much of its rationale, conscription has become a liability rather than an asset. Although both major German political parties are still supporting conscription, there is a growing awareness that it is partly responsible for the low “usability” of German armed forces, despite the high numbers of soldiers. For the time being, the draft continues to serve as a convenient pool from which to draw long-term soldiers, thus avoiding some of the recruiting problems observable in other countries. However, the increasing number of military operations abroad – both in the EU and NATO framework – will make an all-volunteer force inevitable. Germany’s neighbors to the West and South have already drawn that conclusion. It is only a matter of time until Germany will have to follow.

Conclusion

The crisis over Iraq demonstrated that the transatlantic relationship suffers from structural dilemmas that cannot be overcome solely by institutional fixes. For example, much of the current transatlantic divergence on security stems from the simple but powerful fact that since 9/11 the US is psychologically at war, whereas Europe, including Germany, is not. Thus, Americans and Europeans will almost certainly continue to argue over the origins of, and the response to, terrorism. Nor will there be complete convergence in threat perceptions regarding weapons of mass destruction. Although the European Union is trying hard to adopt a tougher stance against proliferating states, most Europeans share neither the US urgency to act nor the American proclivity to write off deterrence as unworkable against many 21st century threats. And transatlantic asymmetries in military capabilities will remain, even if Germany and its European neighbors would somehow manage to substantially increase their defense expenditures.

All this suggests that the transatlantic relationship will require even more maintenance work in the years ahead. But a transatlantic divorce will not happen. The Iraq debate has indeed been painful, but it has obscured the fact that a

transatlantic adaptation effort is underway. For example, Europeans have widely accepted the need for addressing extra-European threats and are developing projection forces for such contingencies. Both sides of the Atlantic have understood the need for cooperation on long-term peacekeeping and nation-building, and both are going to move proliferation higher up on their agenda. And, although almost eclipsed from the public interest, transatlantic cooperation in the fight against terrorism continues to proceed smoothly.

Thus, in retrospect, the disagreements over Iraq may well have been the birth pains of a new transatlantic security consensus – a consensus Germany will ultimately be part of. Even if the German political class may still be reluctant to sign on to what appears to many like a security agenda drawn up by Washington, Berlin cannot escape the conclusion that 21st century security problems cannot be met with 20th century strategies. In the end, Germany's foreign and security policy will be determined less by fuzzy notions of a "German Way" (Chancellor Schröder) but by the "normative Kraft des Faktischen".

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US Strategic Concepts: Implications for NATO

David S. Yost

Given the title assigned to this session – “New Security Concepts and Consequences for NATO” – it may be useful to consider some of the new US concepts in the *Quadrennial Defense Review*, the *Nuclear Posture Review*, and the *National Security Strategy* and to explore what these concepts imply for transatlantic relations. The concepts include ideas that have been highly controversial, such as preemptive action, and ideas that have received little attention, such as dissuasion.

The precise meaning and practical significance of these concepts are evolving, and learning is underway, because no country has all the answers; and that is, to be sure, as true of the United States as of any other country. No final answers have been found regarding some fundamental issues in international security – for instance, how to prevent war through deterrence. Various definitions of deterrence are still in competition, as are analyses of the circumstances in which they may apply. The NATO Allies and the rest of the world are still trying to understand the origins of the new threats, particularly terrorism, and still striving to identify the most effective ways to deal with them.

Although the European Allies have not adopted the phrase “global war on terrorism” that is now widely used in the US government, European governments clearly agree that today’s threats include terrorist networks capable of operating on multiple continents, including Africa, Asia and South America as well as Europe and North America.

It was in fact a Dutch expert, Rob de Wijk of the Royal Netherlands Military Academy, who was quoted in the US press in September 2001 about NATO’s decision to invoke Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty in response to the terrorist attacks against New York and Washington. De Wijk said that “The activation suddenly crossed a threshold and turned NATO into a global organization.”¹ The old “out of area”-debate, which had persisted even during the Balkan wars of the 1990s, was overtaken by events, at least in this case.²

NATO Allies have made many security contributions in Afghanistan since October 2001, in actions in support of the US-led Operation *Enduring Freedom* and in other activities. For example, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in and around Kabul, Afghanistan, was commanded by a series of NATO Allies – the United Kingdom, Turkey, and Germany and the Netherlands – until August 2003, when NATO itself took over this responsibility.³

The NATO Allies have recognized the necessity of adopting a functional concept of defending Alliance interests wherever they are threatened, not simply a geographic concept focused on Europe, as during the Cold War.⁴ It is significant in this regard that Peter Struck, the German Defense Minister, declared in February 2003 that Germany's security is being defended in the Hindu Kush – in Afghanistan.⁵

However, reaching agreement among the Allies on how to deal with specific cases has sometimes involved arduous effort. It was not until 16 February 2003 that the Alliance, in the form of the Defense Planning Committee, a body in which France chooses not to participate, approved the precautionary steps to protect Turkey in the event of an Iraqi attack. Belgium and Germany had finally dropped their objections, so 18 of the 19 Allies agreed in the Defense Planning Committee to initiate the planning and related work for deployment of AWACS aircraft, theater missile defenses, and Allied chemical and biological defense capabilities to Turkey.⁶

While the NATO Allies clearly see themselves as engaged in a common struggle, and took several decisions at the Prague Summit in November 2002 to equip themselves to better conduct this struggle, they are still refining some of their policy choices as they respond to events. In the US case, the policy-refining process has been influenced in part by the concepts articulated in the *Quadrennial Defense Review*, the *Nuclear Posture Review*, and the *National Security Strategy*.

Three of these concepts deserve particular attention: dissuasion, deterrence by denial, and preemption.

Dissuasion is of course the word the French use for deterrence, but the US Department of Defense gave dissuasion a specific definition in the *Quadrennial Defense Review* (QDR), a definition that has been used forward in subsequent documents:

“Through its strategy and actions, the United States influences the nature of future military competitions, channels threats in certain directions, and complicates military planning for potential adversaries in the future. *Well targeted strategy and policy can therefore dissuade other countries from initiating future military competitions.* The United States can exert such influence through the conduct of its research, development, test, and demonstration programs. It can do so by maintaining or enhancing advantages in key areas of military capability. Given the availability of advanced technology and systems to potential adversaries, dissuasion will also require the United States to experiment with revolutionary operational concepts, capabilities, and organizational arrangements and to encourage the development of a culture within the military that embraces innovation and risk-taking. To have a dissuasive effect, this combination of technical, experimental, and operational activity has to have a clear strategic focus.”⁷

In short, according to official definitions, “dissuasion” means to persuade other powers to refrain from even initiating an “arms race” or competition in military capabilities with the United States. The official strategy documents suggest that dissuasion is to be achieved by convincing the adversary of the futility of competition with the United States, either on a general basis or in a particular category of military power, which could be nuclear weapons or fighter aircraft or attack submarines or anything else. The goal is to lead the adversary to conclude that it would be pointless to compete in the acquisition of military capabilities. US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld described the logic of the concept by giving an example:

“[W]e must develop new assets, the mere possession of which discourages adversaries from competing. For example, deployment of effective missile defenses may dissuade others from spending to obtain ballistic missiles, because missiles will not provide them what they want: the power to hold US and allied cities hostage to nuclear blackmail.”⁸

If we consider the example set forth by Secretary Rumsfeld, the NATO Allies clearly have a role in dissuasion. According to this theory of dissuasion, the Allied role in dissuading potential adversaries from seeking ballistic missiles will grow to the extent that Allies and the Alliance as a whole develop and deploy missile defenses.

Some NATO Allies have been pursuing shorter-range missile defenses for years. The United States has been working with Germany and the Netherlands on *Patriot* PAC-3 and with Germany and Italy on MEADS, the Medium Extended Air Defense System. The French-Italian *Aster*-system, also known as SAMP (*sol-air moyenne portée*), has been deployed on the French aircraft carrier, the *Charles de Gaulle*, and the French and the Italians plan to deploy the first ground-based versions in 2005.⁹ Some Allies are also acquiring (or intend to acquire) *Aegis* radars and Standard Missile 3 interceptors for sea-based missile defense.

Moreover, the Alliance as a whole has completed various Theater Missile Defense (TMD) studies. In November 2002 in Prague the Allies went beyond TMD for the protection of deployed forces when they decided “to examine options for protecting Alliance territory, forces and population centres against the full range of missile threats.”¹⁰ The feasibility study for this is expected to be complete in the first half of 2005, which is rapid movement indeed by NATO standards.¹¹

The fact that NATO Allies are pursuing missile defenses – actual capabilities as well as studies – does not, however, mean that they accept the American theory of dissuasion. In fact, a number of Allied observers, like some American observers, have expressed caution, if not actual skepticism. The usual comment is that, even if the United States or NATO dissuades adversaries from pursuing one type of military capability, determined adversaries will pursue other options, including asymmetrical

warfare; and we must be as well-prepared as possible to deal with this threat. The US administration has, however, been concerned about this risk as well, as discussions of asymmetrical threats in the United States indicate.

With regard to Secretary Rumsfeld's specific example, critics have asked, to what extent will US or NATO missile defenses discourage missile-builders and missile-buyers that are interested in being able to launch missiles against non-NATO countries? If the immediate targets of their missiles are regional antagonists outside NATO territory, the strike capability that could be redirected on command against NATO is a bonus. By this logic, for NATO greater utility resides in the capacity of missile defenses actually to defend against missile attacks than in their potential effect on missile acquisition decisions. The US government is, however, interested in operational effectiveness as well as in trying to achieve dissuasion, if possible. Indeed, achieving dissuasion depends on attaining such practical effectiveness.

Critics have raised further objections. If the purpose of dissuasion is to persuade potential adversaries not to compete in the accumulation of military capabilities, could this not be achieved by methods other than – or in addition to – publicizing US and Allied military superiority? As various US and Allied observers have pointed out, other activities could contribute to the aim of discouraging arms competitions, and these activities generally involve cooperation with allies and other security partners:

- shaping the security environment by upholding export controls, legal norms, and nonproliferation regimes may help to prevent arms competitions;
- cultivating positive political relations may improve the chances that no motive for military competition with the United States or NATO as a whole will arise;
- promoting regional political stabilization and security may reduce motives for competition with neighbors; and
- nation-building and state-building, notably to support democratization and free-marketization, may also lower the likelihood of military competitions.

While such cooperative activities have not been highlighted in some US strategy documents, the US position has been evolving. In practice, it seems, the United States is increasingly disposed to accept an expanded definition of how to achieve dissuasion. The clearest signs of this include the interest in nation-building and state-building in Afghanistan and Iraq and the efforts to carry forward the peace process in Israeli-Palestinian relations.

If dissuasion does not work, arms competitions and conflicts may follow, and the goal then will become deterring aggression or coercion. US strategists have for years

advocated supplementing the Cold War's dominant form of deterrence – deterrence by threat of punishment – with deterrence by denial. Deterrence by denial means persuading the enemy not to attack by convincing him that his attack will be defeated – i.e., that he will not be able to achieve his operational objectives.

J.D. Crouch, the US Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, made a reference to this approach to deterrence when he discussed the findings of the *Nuclear Posture Review*. Crouch suggested that the United States could employ missile “defenses to discourage attack by frustrating enemy attack plans.”¹² In other words, if the missile defenses do not discourage an enemy from acquiring missiles (the goal of dissuasion), they might discourage him from using them (the goal of deterrence by denial).

The deterrence by denial theory is not limited to missile defenses, of course. The theory applies to any capability that can deny an enemy success in achieving his objectives. For example, passive defenses such as decontamination equipment and suits and gas masks for protection against chemical and biological weapons might help to convince an enemy not to use such weapons. The *National Security Strategy* suggests that “consequence management” capabilities for responding to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) attacks may contribute to both dissuasion and deterrence by denial: “Minimizing the effects of WMD use against our people will help deter those who possess such weapons and dissuade those who seek to acquire them by persuading enemies that they cannot attain their desired ends.”¹³

It is, to be sure, hard to prove the validity of any theory of deterrence or dissuasion. One cannot conclusively demonstrate why something did not happen. One cannot say that the absence of arms race activity proves that a competitor has been dissuaded, just as one cannot say that the absence of aggression proves that a hypothetical aggressor has been deterred. Moreover, even if we were correct about a deterrence arrangement in fact working for a while, no one could be sure of its permanent reliability.

In other words, deterrence efforts may fail. Or, to put it in less abstract and less passive terms, we may fail to deter. There are no guarantees that any theory of deterrence or any capabilities intended to deter will always work in every situation against every adversary.

In short, war may come with little warning or it may be in prospect. This possibility brings us to the controversial topic of preemptive action, which is linked to doubts about the reliability of any kind of deterrence. According to the *National Security Strategy*:

“Traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy whose avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents; whose so-called soldiers seek martyrdom in death and whose most potent protection is statelessness. The overlap between states that sponsor terror and those that pursue WMD compels us to action.”¹⁴

“We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries. Rogue states and terrorists do not seek to attack us using conventional means. They know such attacks would fail. Instead, they rely on acts of terror and, potentially, the use of weapons of mass destruction – weapons that can be easily concealed, delivered covertly, and used without warning.”¹⁵

“The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.”¹⁶

The concept of “preemptive action” is controversial partly because the US administration has elevated it to the status of a doctrine, instead of an option available to all governments in extreme circumstances. Moreover, definitional issues have exacerbated the controversy. The US government has chosen to call “preemptive” what many Americans, Europeans, and others would call “preventive” war. Many observers would make the following distinction: *Preemptive attack* consists of prompt action on the basis of evidence that an enemy is about to strike. In contrast, *preventive war* involves military operations undertaken to avert a plausible but hypothetical future risk, such as an unacceptable imbalance of power, a situation of increased vulnerability, or even potential subjugation – or the possibility of a transfer of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to a terrorist group. The latter risk was one of the main justifications advanced by the US government for the military campaign against Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq in March-April 2003.

This describes the distinction many observers would make. Moreover, on the whole, even Allied governments that opposed the US-led action to end Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq have no objection to the idea of preemption on the basis of evidence that an enemy is about to attack. In fact, that principle appears explicitly in the most recent and authoritative expression of French security policy, the military program-law for 2003-2008:

“Nuclear deterrence remains our fundamental guarantee. In parallel, the general military strategy consists of actions of prevention, protection, and power-projection in order to be able to deal with other types of threats with the necessary flexibility [...] Outside our frontiers, in the framework of prevention and power-projection, we must therefore be able to identify and guard against threats as soon as possible. *In this framework, the possibility of a pre-emptive action could be considered, as soon as a situation of explicit and known threat was recognized.* This determination and the improvement of capabilities for long-range strikes should constitute a deterrent threat for our potential aggressors, all the more so because transnational terrorist networks are being organized and prepared for action most often outside our territory, in zones not controlled by states, or even with the support of enemy states.”¹⁷

Allied and American critics of US policy argued that there was no evidence that Saddam Hussein was about to attack the United States or to transfer WMD to terrorists, so this was not a preemptive action but a preventive war – a war on the basis of a hypothetical future threat. Critics condemned the idea of preventive war as a violation of international law. Both critics and supporters of the use of force against the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq asserted the need to uphold the authority of the United Nations Security Council.¹⁸

Furthermore, critics argued that the US approach amounted to a prescription for permanent war, unless the United States could somehow dominate the entire world. In the words of Pierre Hassner, a leading French scholar on international politics,

“Certainly, the new American doctrine is based on a valid and urgent concern: the impossibility of deterring terrorists who welcome suicide and who offer no targets for retaliation. But, once again, to generalize out of this situation a *doctrine* centered around the idea of launching a unilateral first strike against any state that possesses or builds weapons of mass destruction, is suspected of helping terrorists, and hence may, one hypothetical day, facilitate the use of the former by the latter against the United States, means extending the notion of pre-emption to an arbitrary and open-ended ‘anticipatory defense.’ It means creating a situation of permanent or open-ended exception and insecurity – in practice, permanent war – since there will always be some terrorists and some weapons of mass destruction left, and since suspect states that have been deterred so far may themselves be tempted to pre-empt. Even conceptually, the only end in sight to such a war would be total and, so to speak, totally uncontrolled control by the United States.”¹⁹

Hassner’s critique is incisive and astute, but the United States and its Allies in NATO are still left with the problem that in some exceptional cases preemptive or even preventive action may be the wiser choice – that is, in some cases, notably involving

weapons of mass destruction, preemption or preventive intervention may be more prudent than waiting to be attacked.

The challenge is identifying which cases truly require preemptive action, and which cases may even justify preventive war. This is not a new problem. It goes back at least as far as Thucydides and the Peloponnesian War, and it has been rendered more acute by modern technologies. It was in 1962, for example, that President John F. Kennedy said that:

“Neither the United States of America nor the world community of nations can tolerate deliberate deception and offensive threats on the part of any nation, large or small. We no longer live in a world where only the actual firing of weapons represents a sufficient challenge to a nation’s security to constitute maximum peril.”²⁰

Karl-Heinz Kamp of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Berlin recently offered the following observations:

“Given the increasing dissemination of chemical, biological, or even nuclear weapons and of long-range delivery systems (missiles and aircraft), situations can arise today in which one would not expect an intended victim to wait until there was cast-iron evidence of the enemy’s intention to attack. In the worst-case scenario, waiting would imply that a country would have to suffer the explosion of a weapon of mass destruction on its own territory before being justified in striking back. [...] The [United Nations] Charter, written half a century ago, concentrates too much on the danger of inter-state conflict and does not address today’s dangers of intra-state conflict, threats from non-state actors (terrorists), or the extremely short time required to launch an annihilating attack.”²¹

Walter Slocombe, a former US Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, reached similar conclusions:

“The right of anticipatory self-defence by definition presupposes a right to act while action is still possible. If waiting for ‘imminence’ means waiting until it is no longer possible to act effectively, the victim is left no alternative to suffering the first blow. So interpreted, the ‘right’ would be illusory [...] The problem is not so much that WMD can be used with little warning – attacks with conventional weapons have all too often achieved tactical surprise – but that surprise use could be decisive and that the capability can be so successfully concealed that pre-emption is operationally impossible even if warning were available. On this basis, a strong case exists that the right of ‘self-defence’ includes a right to move against WMD programmes with high potential danger to the United States (and others) while it is still feasible to do so.”²²

It is noteworthy in this regard that a group of European and American experts agreed in May 2003 that:

“[I]n extreme cases, where the proliferating state or group clearly shows an aggressive intent, preventive military interventions may be needed. However, such actions should have the widest possible international support. To that end, UN authorization, though not a prerequisite, would be highly desirable.”²³

It is also significant that Javier Solana, the European Union’s High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, pointed out in June 2003 that WMD-armed terrorist groups could “inflict damage on a scale previously possible only for states and armies. In such cases, deterrence would fail.” By way of prescription, Solana suggested, among other points, that:

“Pre-emptive engagement can avoid more serious problems in the future. [...] With the new threats the first line of defence will often be abroad. The new threats are dynamic. Left alone, they will become more dangerous. The risks of proliferation grow over time; left alone, terrorist networks will become ever more dangerous (we should have tackled Al Qaeda much earlier). [...] This implies that we should be ready to act before a crisis occurs. Conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early. [...] We need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention.”²⁴

While some of Solana’s formulations are rather ambiguous, they could contribute to an Alliance-wide debate on strategy, notably with regard to preemption and preventive intervention.

There will, however, be no easy solution to the problem of assessment and choice. It is constructive to debate the issues in general terms. It is useful to discuss, for instance, questions such as the following: Under what circumstances may the resort to preemption or even preventive war be justified? Should the international legal regime be explicitly modified to provide in extreme situations for new defensive options, even preventive war, that take into account unprecedented vulnerabilities arising from modern technologies? How should the classical criteria for preemption of “necessity” and “proportionality” be construed in light of modern technologies and strategic options?²⁵ What principles in addition to “necessity” (or “imminence”) and “proportionality” should govern the decisions? What might be the consequences for international order of recognizing such new precedents and principles in international law? How could risks of precipitate and/or ill-founded actions be diminished? To what extent might policies of preemption or preventive intervention encourage adversaries to adopt similar policies and thus lead to more volatile crisis situations?²⁶ To what extent could the responsibility for undertaking preemption or

preventive intervention (and dealing with its consequences) be shared? While the US government has recognized the obvious desirability of multilateral legitimization, notably via the UN Security Council, for preventive or preemptive action, it might not be available in all circumstances. If such legitimization is not available, what constraints should states and coalitions observe in exercising the right to self-defense recognized in Article 51 of the UN Charter? To what extent, and in what ways, should the Alliance's decision-making structures and capabilities be modified to enhance the ability of Allies, acting under NATO auspices or in other coalitions, to assess evolving threats and to conduct preemptive actions?

Discussing such questions may well deepen understanding of the risks and responsibilities in policies of preemption or preventive intervention. The United States and its NATO Allies will nonetheless, at the end of the day, be forced to make decisions about specific cases.

The US *National Security Strategy* offers a point of departure for seeking the right answer in general terms. The beginning of wisdom in this regard is to recognize that “no nation can build a safer, better world alone. Alliances and multilateral institutions can multiply the strength of freedom-loving nations.”²⁷ NATO holds an exceptional role in US policy, because “There is little of lasting consequence that the United States can accomplish in the world without the sustained cooperation of its allies and friends in Canada and Europe.”²⁸ When it comes to contingencies in which “preemptive” action may be required, the *National Security Strategy* suggests three guidelines for action:

“To support preemptive options, we will

- build better, more integrated intelligence capabilities to provide timely, accurate information on threats, wherever they may emerge;
- coordinate closely with allies to form a common assessment of the most dangerous threats; and
- continue to transform our military forces to ensure our ability to conduct rapid and precise operations to achieve decisive results.”²⁹

The second guideline here – to “coordinate closely with allies to form a common assessment of the most dangerous threats” – is most important if we are to preserve Alliance cohesion. As we saw in the Iraq case, Allies may differ sharply in their assessments of the gravity of the threats in specific cases, and in their views about the right way to deal with them. Given the likelihood that the Allies will face more challenges of comparable gravity, the need for close coordination in making assessments and defining policy choices is increasingly imperative. Concepts will carry us only so far. In the end, we will be forced to deal with messy realities that do not fit into tidy conceptual categories.

The challenges posed by new forms of terrorism and WMD-proliferation may be expected to persist and even to worsen for various reasons, including technology diffusion. Aside from WMD and missile technologies, commercial off-the-shelf technologies – such as encrypted communications and cheap Global Positioning System navigation – are making it possible for small numbers of terrorists to kill more and more people.

Martin Shubik of Yale University has suggested that one could make a graph showing how over time the number of people that ten men could kill before being neutralized themselves has increased.³⁰ It is principally in the last century, owing to new technologies and the vulnerabilities of modern complex societies, that a few men have become increasingly capable of causing extensive carnage. This became evident in September 2001 without the use of weapons of mass destruction.

If deterrence and dissuasion appear unreliable or have evidently failed in particular cases, the dangers at hand may oblige the United States and/or other NATO Allies to consider preemption or preventive intervention. The new US concepts for dealing with such contingencies may help to foster what the Alliance needs more of – wide-ranging and thorough debate about strategy, including strategic concepts and their practical requirements and political implications.

As suggested above, the new US concepts raise definitional and legal issues, as well as political and operational challenges, for the United States and its NATO Allies. These challenges are, to be sure, ultimately posed not by US policy but by the new threats, including WMD-proliferation and terrorist networks capable of (and demonstrably interested in) conducting deadly attacks against US and Allied interests. The Alliance has embarked on the right path with the policies approved at the Prague Summit in November 2002, but subsequent events have demonstrated that pursuing this path will not be easy.

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Notes

1. De Wijk quoted in Steven Erlanger, "So Far, Europe Breathes Easier Over Free Hand Given the U.S.," *New York Times*, 29 September 2001.
2. As some experts on the Alliance have pointed out, the "out of area" concept could logically apply only to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty (the mutual defense pledge), because the geographical area of application of Article 5 is defined by Article 6 of the treaty. In contrast, the more generally worded Article 4 – the commitment by the Allies to engage in security consultations – is not subject to any geographical limitations. In other words, "non-Article 5 operations" might also be called "Article 4 operations."

3. ISAF I (December 2001-June 2002) was commanded by the United Kingdom, ISAF II (June 2002-February 2003) by Turkey, and ISAF III (February-August 2003) by Germany and the Netherlands. For an informative and incisive account, see Diego A. Ruiz Palmer, "The Road to Kabul", *NATO Review*, Summer 2003.
4. In May 2002, the Allies agreed that "NATO must be able to field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed, sustain operations over distance and time, and achieve their objectives." (North Atlantic Council, Final Communiqué, 14 May 2002, par. 5.) In November 2002, they added a reference to weapons of mass destruction threats to this formula: "NATO must be able to field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed, upon decision by the North Atlantic Council, to sustain operations over distance and time, including in an environment where they might be faced with nuclear, biological and chemical threats, and to achieve their objectives." (Prague Summit Declaration, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Prague on 21 November 2002, par. 4.)
5. Speech by the Federal Minister of Defence, Dr. Peter Struck, at the 39th Munich Security Policy Conference, 8 February 2003, available at http://www.bmvg.de/reden/minister/print/030208_sipo_konferenz_englisch.php. See also Struck's remarks on 5 December 2002, available on Deutsche Welle: www.dw-world.de.
6. See the Statement by the NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, after the NATO Defence Planning Committee Meeting on 16 February 2003, available at <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2003/s030216a.htm>.
7. *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington, DC: US Department of Defense, 30 September 2001), p. 12; italics added.
8. Donald H. Rumsfeld, "Transforming the Military", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 81 (May/June 2002), p. 27.
9. Jean Dupont, "Antimissiles: quelles stratégies pour l'Europe?", *Air et Cosmos*, 28 February 2003, pp. 16-19.
10. Prague Summit Declaration, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Prague on 21 November 2002, par. 4g.
11. The contract for the feasibility study is to be initiated by October 2003, with 18 months as the expected duration. See "NATO Missile Defence Advances", NATO Press Release (2003) 069, 12 June 2003.
12. J.D. Crouch, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, at the Special Briefing on the *Nuclear Posture Review*, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2002/t01092002_t0109npr.html, p. 4 of transcript. The 2001 QDR employed the phrase "deterrence by denial" in its discussion of missile defenses: "Integrating missile defenses with other defensive as well as offensive means will safeguard the Nation's freedom of action, enhance deterrence by denial, and mitigate the effects of attack if deterrence fails." *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington, DC: US Department of Defense, 30 September 2001), p. 42.
13. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: The White House, September 2002), p. 14.
14. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: The White House, September 2002), p. 15.
15. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: The White House, September 2002), p. 15.
16. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: The White House, September 2002), p. 15.
17. Loi no. 2003-73 du 27 janvier 2003 relative à la programmation militaire pour les années 2003 à 2008, section 2.3.1., "Les fonctions stratégiques", available at www.legifrance.gouv.fr; italics added.
18. While some nations argued that an explicit authorization of the use of force in Iraq by the United Nations Security Council in a new resolution was required, in March 2003 the United States sent a letter to the United Nations Security Council stating that the military operations in Iraq were necessitated by "Iraq's continued material breaches of its disarmament obligations under relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolution 1441 (2002)," and that these military operations were "authorized under existing Council resolutions, including its resolutions 678 (1990) and 687 (1991)." The United States government's letter is quoted in Marjorie Ann Browne, *The United Nations Security Council – Its Role in the Iraq Crisis: A Brief Overview*, RS21323 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 16 May 2003), p. 6.
19. Pierre Hassner, "Definitions, Doctrines and Divergences", *The National Interest*, no. 69 (Fall 2002), p. 32; italics in the original.

20. President John F. Kennedy, "Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Soviet Arms Buildup in Cuba", 22 October 1962, available at <http://www.cs.umb.edu/jfklibrary/j102262.htm>. President George W. Bush quoted President Kennedy's statement in his speech in Cincinnati, Ohio, on 7 October 2002.
21. Karl-Heinz Kamp, "Prevention in US Security Strategy", *Internationale Politik*, Transatlantic Edition, vol. 4 (Spring 2003), p. 19.
22. Walter B. Slocombe, "Force, Pre-emption and Legitimacy", *Survival*, vol. 45 (Spring 2003), p. 125.
23. "Declaration on Transatlantic Relations: How to Overcome the Divisions." This document, published on 20 May 2003, may be found on the website of the Center for European Reform: <http://www.cer.org.uk>.
24. Javier Solana, *A Secure Europe in a Better World*, pp. 5, 10-13. This paper, a draft European Union security strategy paper by the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy that was delivered at the European Council in Thessaloniki on 20 June 2003, is available at <http://ue.eu.int/pressdata/EN/reports/76255.pdf>.
25. In his comments in 1841 and 1842 on the *Caroline* case US Secretary of State Daniel Webster set forth the widely recognized key principles governing preemptive acts of self-defense: that is, such acts concern "cases in which the necessity of that self-defense is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation," and yet the action taken must involve "nothing unreasonable or excessive; since the act, justified by the necessity of self-defense, must be limited by that necessity, and kept clearly within it." Webster quoted in David M. Ackerman, *International Law and the Preemptive Use of Force Against Iraq*, RS21314 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 11 April 2003), p. 2.
26. In February 2003 a North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman, Ri Pyong-gap, said: "The United States says that after Iraq, we are next, but we have our own countermeasures. Pre-emptive attacks are not the exclusive right of the US." Ri Pyong-gap quoted in Jonathan Watts, "N Korea threatens US with first strike", *The Guardian*, 6 February 2003. Whether WMD proliferant states could actually carry out policies similar to those available to the United States is unclear, given the asymmetries in capabilities. The practical operational military difficulties in conducting preemptive attacks would be significant even for the United States. However, states armed with weapons of mass destruction could well threaten US forces and allies, if not the US homeland.
27. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: The White House, September 2002), cover letter by President George W. Bush.
28. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: The White House, September 2002), p. 25.
29. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: The White House, September 2002), p. 16.
30. Martin Shubik quoted in an interview with Andrew Marshall, the Director of Net Assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Douglas McGray, "The Marshall Plan," *Wired*, 1 February 2003.

How Reliable and Stable is Germany as a Partner in International Politics?

Maarten Brands

Looking back it is hard to understand how Chancellor Schröder, despite the bad results of his first term in office and despite his credibility gap, won the elections of September 2002. What are the big problems of the *Bundesrepublik*? Only after the re-election the public began to understand to the full extent the serious nature of the problems. The miserable condition of the domestic economic and social scene had subsequently destabilized the foreign policy. The breach with America was an unprecedented fact in a longstanding tradition of German foreign policy. Despite this desperate act which was widely applauded by the German people, Schröder is still rather unpopular – even within his own party – because of the budget cuts that come too late anyhow and are not even implemented yet. And, however much his so-called peace policy is widely acclaimed, the fact of the matter is that he has bartered the crown jewel of Germany's foreign policy for that. When their security was at stake, the Germans always chose the US rather than France. Now Schröder has broken this historical pattern, perhaps for good, as Charles Grant and Ulrike Guérot suggested.¹

With the elections of 2002 in mind the Chancellor – with low profile support from his Minister of Foreign Affairs – chose his “own German way”: an affront not only to Washington, but also to the United Nations, and the other European member states. None of these were consulted. What happened was an ultimate type of unilateralism. Apparently Schröder did not need the EU or the NATO-allies during election time. It was partly the East German anti-Americanism that seduced Schröder to his stand with regard to the war on Iraq. He drained the PDS by making this unorthodox step. Of all states that formerly were part of the Soviet imperium, East Germany is also in this respect a anomaly: it harbors a strong peace movement, and does not love the United States overly much.

“It is because they are poorer in the East [of Germany] than in the West, and there's a kind of anger at America for this. They blame America for their poor economic state. [...]. The relative absence of pro-American gratitude is obvious; they are poor and see future for their children. [...] The end of Soviet domination in East Germany did not come about because of the US.”²

In East-Germany protesters carried slogans like: “Man sei schon einmal Vasallenstaat gewesen.” “Man habe sich immer eine Regierung gewünscht, die so heldenhaft Widerstand leiste...”³

In a democracy one cannot make politics without support from the people. But neither can a democracy exist without a leading political shift that has the courage to make decisions that – of course – are carried by parliament but not necessarily always by the majority of the population. The Schröder government did not acknowledge that; it turned to pure populism. Had such populism been practiced in the past, it would have prevented e.g. the European Union, not to speak of the Euro, let alone the Eastern enlargement. The new divergent direction of German foreign policy cannot be compared to the sudden German recognition of Croatia and Slovenia in 1991. Just timing was the problem in that case, and it did not really damage a crucial pillar of the foreign policy of the European Community.

This German *Alleingang*, however, was in every respect a wrong signal, but most of all to the German people itself. It enhanced the idealistic and unreal German pacifism of former days. The attitude of: let the world do wrong without me, I will abstain from all evil. The idea of making peace without weapons, marching for love, not war. It is a pure type of *Gesinnungspazifismus*: a weird cult of denying evil its place in this idealistic German world view. It is “die deutsche Ideologie des Gutmenschen.”⁴

And all this at a moment that “the Germans must get beyond their reluctance to use force and become comfortable with the notion that military power is an essential ingredient of European cooperation in a jungle world.” Apart from the question of how one thinks about the war in Iraq, the road that Schröder chose is harmful for the networks of which Germany is a part. A German way in the Iraq question, without considering the moves of the UN or the European partners: what objections did he actually have against unilateralism?

German unilateralism

The “co-optive power” (a term used by Joseph Nye) of the German Republic in the EU depends on a diplomacy fine as filigree. The well known “shepherd doctrine” – Germany as the shepherd of European integration – means that “Berlin wants to make sure that all of Germany’s friends and partners remain in concert [...] if possible in agreement. [...] Above all else, that it will try to avoid isolation [...] to keep everybody in step.”⁵ But German unilateralism is in no respect conducive to European cooperation, and no example to the new member states. And considering the transatlantic relations: an alternative to Schröders unsophisticated “Nein, ohne mich” might have been found in the attitude assumed by Willy Brandt, when he declined to participate in the Vietnam war.

German unilateralism led to an isolation from which Schröder temporarily was rescued by President Chirac. However, this liberation led to a rather unfree Franco-German partnership: Berlin was tied, hand and foot, to Paris’ decisions. A French

journalist described it thus: “Chirac has hidden, behind his broad Gaullist shoulders, the rash Schröder who had forgotten that a statesman never should say never.”⁶ However, the autocratic way in which France (Germany in tow) tried to force its Iraq policy upon the rest of Europe, did divide and weaken the EU. French opposition to Washington’s policy went even further than could have been expected, in case Berlin had not unconditionally supported the French rejection policy in the UN.⁷ Besides, the French government itself had intervened 37 times in Africa without any UN legitimation. What was the problem with unilateralism again?

Schröder, who is after all a somewhat provincial politician, little versed in the ways of the world of international politics, is absolutely no match for Chirac. He stems from the “Gesinnungsgemeinschaft der 68’er”, prone to arguments like: let’s try something different, as now should be possible what used to be inconceivable. That a former *Sponti* – Fischer – used the so-called stability of the Near East – including the reign of the Saud family, the Iranian theocracy and the Sudanese killer commando’s – as main argument for his decision not to topple the dictator Saddam Hussein, is depressing, as Mariam Lau wrote.

As a consequence of this French adventure Berlin’s situation was very precarious indeed. As far as the relations with Washington are concerned: Berlin wasn’t even informed anymore about new developments. And France has consumed all Germany’s room for maneuvering. Berlin has hardly any influence at all in Paris, but at the same time it is held co-responsible for blunders of a type that only a French president can get away with. Rather devastating for Germany’s relations with its eastern neighbors were, of course, Chirac’s denigrating remarks about the East European partners. Schröder did not even have the guts to counter this example of political rudeness and/or stupidity. In this precarious situation he kept conspicuously silent.

In Schröder’s party only very few critical voices were heard. Hans-Ulrich Klose however, the leading – but outgoing – foreign policy expert of the party spoke up very clearly as “Einzelner” against this policy:

“Der deutsche Kanzler hat in der Irak-Frage ausschliesslich als Innen- und Parteipolitiker agiert.”[...] “Wenn der Kanzler sagt, er ‘kämpfe’ für eine friedliche Lösung, dann klingt das gut, ist aber in Wahrheit folgenlose Rhetorik, die mehr auf die Stimmungslage der deutschen Bevölkerung reagiert als auf die tatsächliche Bedrohungslage. Und es ist eben diese Rhetorik, die Verantwortung [für den Frieden] beansprucht, aber nicht wirklich Verantwortung übernimmt, der uns ins Abseits manövriert hat. Auch in Europa.”

European diplomacy?

In a discussion with Robert Kagan, Daniel Cohn-Bendit painted in vivid colors what European cooperation means: “Europe is a magic car. It has two steering wheels, at the one sits Chirac, at the other Schröder. In the back seat are a whole lot of others, discussing which way the two drivers should take.” Kagan: “But nobody could foresee that the French would adopt a totally new kamikaze diplomacy and endanger their vision of an international order. Of course, Washington needs to treat Europe with more sensibility, but on the other hand Europe should adapt to the mentality of the superpower America and spill less time and energy in vain attempts to block it. In these weeks, however, Schröder was certainly not at the steering wheel.

Where was the much praised European diplomacy in the weeks after the vote for resolution 1441 in the Security Council, in November 2002? Here I do agree with Fritz Stern who stated: “Was wir erleben, ist das absolute Versagen der Diplomatie und die Ignorierung diplomatischer Gepflogenheiten.”⁸ However, not only on the European but also on the American side there were slip-ups. The old Bush was much better at coalition building than the young one. Young Bush and some of his closest assistants tend to think that the American interests are best served by unilateral actions.

Are Europe and America now on a collision course? If that is the case, then Europe should build up its own defense force, instead of cutting the budgets of the military. However, in Germany the throughout low defense bill is, despite 11 September 2001, only further reduced, just as it is in other European countries. In matters of defense the EU is lagging behind the US by about a generation. Both Schröder and his minister Fischer discovered suddenly and belatedly during the war in Iraq that Europe lacked military power and that something should be done to make up the arrears.⁹ Schröder even claimed that his government had funds available for the necessary repairs. But in his “grundlegende” speech of 13 March 2003 defense was still conspicuously absent. He then spoke of an “independent Europe”, but he never sketched a clear picture of what such an emancipated Europe would look like, and now that he is trying to reach a reconciliation with Washington he hardly mentions the topic anymore. Only a month later he referred – for the first time – to the military powerlessness of Europe. But if Europe has no power, it can only play the role of a commentator of American politics. What can one believe of these suddenly arisen ideas about “an independent Europe” in a country where fears of, aversion towards a so-called “militarization of the EU” seems to be so strong?

Hypocrisy

But this is only one example of a broader policy that does not deserve the epithet of credibility. During the Iraq crisis the German government presented a dazzling show

of half truths and lots of hypocrisy with its “boy scouts” foreign policy that could not lead to the promised “Neuvermessung der Aussenpolitik”. It only taught the rest of the world about German “Realitätsverlust” and blowing bubbles. The so-called independent Europe is only one of them. It was followed by the effectiveness of weapons inspections in Iraq, and the united French-German-Russian-Chinese front for peace was another. And let’s skip the ridiculous mini-top of the four in Brussels, organized by Guy Verhofstadt, the Prime Minister of brave Belgium.

A government, of course, cannot always reveal all and everything. But the hemmed-in-position into which the German government maneuvered itself has been of very little help to the truth. After the short war it required a considerable effort from Schröder to proclaim that he was glad that Iraq was liberated from a terrible tyrant. Immediately after that, he added that now the UN should govern Iraq, as if Blue Helmets could take over the job GI’s were doing.

Chancellor Schröder kept referring – like his minister Fischer – to the success of the UN weapons inspection. He never referred in that context to the military “Drohkulisse”, the American power looming in the background. As if inspector Blix could have accomplished anything without the presence of that threat. As if a peaceful way to disarm Iraq would have been possible. Fischer told an interviewer of *Der Spiegel*: “Von einer Drohkulisse muss eine Drohung ausgehen und nicht ein Automatismus, der dann durch die militärischen Imperative und den möglichen Gesichtsverlust einen Krieg unabweisbar macht.”¹⁰ The presence of so many soldiers, of course, has by definition its own dynamics. It is forceful in all possible senses of the word, a predicament. One cannot leave all those troops in the desert without giving them something to do. And pulling back before any goal has been reached is asking a bit too much. And thus the weeks before the war were filled with half-truths on all sides.

Let me give a few other examples of German hypocrisy. The *Bundesrepublik* delivered *Patriot* missiles to The Netherlands, which subsequently sent them to Turkey. If this is not hypocrisy, what is? Mid February 2003 Germany joined the declaration of unity of the EU, boldly stating that: “Krieg ist nicht unvermeidbar. Gewalt sollte nur als letztes Mittel gebraucht werden. Es liegt beim irakischen Regime, diese Krise zu beenden, indem es die Forderungen des Sicherheitsrats erfüllt.” That was signed by Schröder, who months earlier already did declare that Germany under no condition would cooperate in whatever act of military force. Another example concerns international law. The German government did not dare to proclaim the Iraq war an illegal war, because in that case Germany itself could be accused of complicity; it had allowed American airplanes to take off from German bases and it had delivered drones.

Thus Schröder saddled many Germans with even more useless fixations, as if they did not have enough of those already. To find out by which topic the Germans are

particularly obsessed at any given moment, one has only to watch the talk shows on German television. International law and the UN were very much the leading items these last few months. International law was turned into a magic, static entity, a panacea and a clincher.

Angelika Beer, chairperson of the Green Party, was absolutely certain that America's trespasses against international law could never be justified. Read the following quote from a discussion between her and former US ambassador John Kornblum. Beer: "Why now against Iraq?" Kornblum: "How many more UN resolutions do you want to pile upon each other before Saddam Hussein may be taken to task?" Beer then keeps going on about respecting the rules of international law, "Prinzipienreiterei", and gets as a reply the counter-question: "Would letting go – after 17 resolutions – then really show respect for the rules of international law?"

Really refreshing were the comments of the well known theologian Richard Schröder – a man of outstanding moral prestige:

"Der Bundeskanzler hat dem amerikanischen Aussenminister soeben zugesichert, dass die Bundesregierung die Aufhebung der UN-Sanktionen gegen Irak unterstützt. Da meldet sich Angelika Beer namens der Grünen zu Wort: dabei dürfe aber nicht der Krieg nachträglich gerechtfertigt werden. So denken Ideologen oder Prinzipienreiter." [...] "Es ist sicherlich kein Vorzug, sondern ein Mangel des Völkerrechts, dass sich ein Massenmörder hinter der Staatssouveränität verschanzen kann, wenn er nur Staatschef ist, übrigens mit Sitz und Stimme in der UN-Vollversammlung. Gegen den internationalen Terrorismus, die Verbreitung von Massenvernichtungswaffen und Krieg gegen das eigene Volk ist das Völkerrecht höchst unzureichend gewappnet."¹¹

Dissenting opinions however find no buyers, as Richard Holbrooke discovered. In his opinion America's mistake was not the attack on Iraq but the attempt to gain UN approval. He was answered with endless litanies about the wishes of the "Weltgemeinschaft", as if something like that really existed. Concrete arguments were curiously absent when the question how to remove murderous regimes was raised. A large majority of the German population is against all kinds of military intervention anyhow, whatever the decisions of the United Nations may be. Is that also a way of respecting international law?

Has Schröder's unilateralism at all strengthened international law? Or the United Nations? The German "no" was pronounced after all before any decision was reached by the Security Council. This certainly is a very self-centered, parochial form of universalism. The verdict in a Berlin newspaper was very much to the point: in the Iraq business Schröder has gambled and lost all the ground he had gained in

reconciling the German left with the hard realities of this world. And: what should be avoided is stimulating that part of the German identity that feeds on aversion against America. Red and green should get hold of the spirits that they – on purpose – let escape from the bottle.¹²

What is so striking in today's German "Friedensselbstgefälligkeit" is the pretense that "we, Germans, know what war is." It is amazing how often grandmothers are quoted who still suffer from the stress caused by the bombing of German towns. It must be said that Fischer keeps more distance: "Who knows anything about the history of Europe, knows about the many wars fought here. The Americans have no Verdun on their continent. Nor is there anything resembling Auschwitz or Stalingrad by the way, those terrible names loaded with symbolic meaning."¹³ People who use the European wars as an argument against the war in Iraq cannot understand what freedom means to people who are cruelly oppressed. The misleading slogan "no blood for oil" should have been replaced by: "How much blood for the liberation of this terribly oppressed people?"

Frau Marianne Birthler, director of the Stasi archives, herself a former GDR-citizen, made a pertinent remark about this question: "Ich habe den Eindruck, dass die Deutschen überhaupt Probleme mit der Freiheit haben. [...] Während Friedenserziehung in aller Munde ist, scheint mir Freiheitserziehung zu kurz zu kommen."¹⁴ How often did I not read in recent editorials of German newspapers that Americans make a kind of fetish out of liberty? And how often has Bush not been compared to Hussein by speakers at recent demonstrations? Talk about "Realitätsverlust"! In Germany the polling institute Emnid found that 53% believe George W. Bush to be more dangerous than Saddam Hussein.¹⁵

A noteworthy pseudo argument against the use of force is the following: it were the Americans themselves who since 1945 taught us, Germans, to abstain from force after 1945. This demonstrates again that some Germans missed some of their history lessons, or that they failed to understand them. To this so-called argument often is added: was it not America who told Europe to forget about colonies and to stay away from the world theater, as they did when they warned France and England to get out of the Suez crisis? Here follows a nice example of this reasoning: it comes from Helmut Schaefer in the respectable *Süddeutsche Zeitung*:

"All those who brand our reticence as a lack of solidarity, as ingratitude, or even as pacifism should remember that we owe a great debt to the US for contributing to our transformation as truly democratic citizens after World War II and Hitler's dictatorship. They must forgive us if we have difficulty letting go some of the lessons we have learned."¹⁶

Hanns Maull wrote recently in “Deutschland im Abseits?”:

“Die VS, die wesentlich dazu beigetragen hatten, die Bundesrepublik als Zivilmacht zu sozialisieren und zu integrieren, verfolgten nun eine Aussenpolitik, die in mehreren zentralen Aspekten (Einstellung zum Völkerrecht und zu Internationalen Organisationen, Einschätzung der Relevanz militärischer Machtmittel, Neigung zu unilateraler Politik) den Leitlinien zivilmächtskonformer Aussenpolitik fast diametral entgegenstand.”¹⁷

Anti-Americanism

German anti-Americanism – not just anti-Bush sentiments – is surging from the far left to the extreme right of the political spectrum, not to mention anti-Semitism. As Richard Lambert noted: “Chancellor Schröder’s election campaign was a sign of ugly spirits rising again in Germany, and that anti-Semitism is endemic.”¹⁸

Although the government says it disapproves of anti-Americanism, it has through its political attitude given plenty of food to these sentiments. Anti-Americanism is a very unclear term, because those accused of being anti-American always can point out that they drink coke, love jazz, and wear jeans. In the French weekly *L'Express* a better description of the phenomenon was to be found: “L’antiaméricanisme se définit non par l’hostilité aux Etats-Unis, mais par la manière déraisonnable, irrationnelle, de l’exprimer: mépris des faits, de mesure, mauvaise foi, mensonge historique, injures.”¹⁹ “Un discours polémique débridé” according to Ph. Roger in his very broad study *L’ennemi américain*.²⁰ We have had more than our share of that in the media the last few months. The less the critics know about the American society, the more subject they are to prejudice.

German intellectuals hardly sang a critical note in the chorus of Bush-bashing anti-Americanists. Suddenly there was an enormous parrot-like consensus in a country where differences of opinion can always split communities. Wolf Biermann was – besides Geörgy Konrad as “Wahldeutscher” – the only one to sing a different song. Hans Magnus Enzensberger also tried to be enthusiastic about this intervention. But who would dare to challenge the king of German apolitical thought, Jürgen Habermas, who claimed that the American moral authority lay in shambles? He emphatically warned against excusing the Americans post factum, on the basis that they had liberated Iraq from its dictator. On the other side stood Enzensberger with his statement: “Eine der wenigen tiefen Freuden, welche die Geschichte bereithält, ist das Ende eines Gewaltherrschers.”

Most remarkable was the consensus among specialists in international law. Generally, the rule “two lawyers, at least three opinions” holds true, but in this case almost all specialists agreed that the United States did not have any legitimation for military

intervention. To use a cautious formulation: it looked as if their relatively young discipline did not yet allow diversity of opinion.

Completely deranged books have become bestsellers in Europe these days full of wonderful nonsense. The so-called French “clarté” contributed a lot to that madness (Tony Judt). Emmanuel Todd’s book about the approaching end of the United States for instance can be found in large quantities in German bookshops, not only in Berlin, also in a city like Quedlinburg.²¹ What are the standard ingredients of these works? Demonization of Washington, the liberation from American tyranny is near. From all this it is clear that the role of the EU and the UN is greatly overrated, and that the real dangers of the present-day world are overlooked. There also is, of course, an unflinching belief in dialogue. The general message is: the decline and fall of the United States are imminent, and this is a good thing given the fact that this hyper-power is a threat to world peace. A superpower like this cannot last anyhow. Comparisons with the Roman empire score high, never mind the historical differences. Wishful thinking is shamelessly presented as analysis. And if all this is not enough, Günther Grass will top it up with his fantasies about “the moral decline of a superpower.”

Not only the governing parties are confused. The war in Iraq has also disturbed the opposition. It was only with utter effort, and a lot of twisting and turning, that the leader of the CDU, Angela Merkel, could keep her sheep together. In Christian circles one cannot win from a peace-preaching Holy Father. In the FDP too, an uprising was threatening. The chair of the FDP representatives in Schleswig-Holstein, Wolfgang Kubicki, jauntily spoke threatening words: “Wir dürfen nicht zulassen, dass die grösste Militärmacht der Welt tun und lassen kann, was sie will.”²² How precisely he thought to tame this hyper-power he did not say.

Joschka Fischer

Generally Joschka Fischer’s creativity is highly praised and rightly so, but what are Fischer’s creative ideas about restructuring the UN in such a way that its sliding into greater irrelevance after this crisis can be prevented? And how does he think he can repair the relations with the US? What is left of Fischer’s clarity of thinking in general? Did that get lost too in this war? Fischer does not seem to understand, or to accept, that without the strong arm of the United States the UN is absolutely helpless in a crisis (look at his remarks about the success of the UN weapon inspectors in Iraq, without mentioning the military “Drohkulisse”). In emergencies – if no consent from the UN can be expected – the US will act of its own accord – just like France did in Africa again and again; Germany however would never consider actions like that. But Fischer refuses to take into account this state of affairs. Some are more equal than others is an adage that he would like to disregard. However, there is only one world power and in all great cases of emergency it will be called upon, rather than

Luxemburg or Liechtenstein. When humanitarian disasters require intervention, international law or the UN are still unable to intervene effectively. America operates along a different track, it just creates a supplement of its own law, there where the Security Council fails. Wolfgang Schäuble, a leader of the CDU, at least put forward some recommendations as to the revision of international law, among other things considering the right of self-defense and intervention for humanitarian reasons: "Völkerrecht kann kein Staatenrecht bleiben." The same did former French Foreign Minister, Hubert Védrine, in *Le Monde* (22 May) and Stanley Hoffmann in a recent issue of the *New York Review of Books*.²³

Just clamoring for more UN influence will have little effect. Is this episode not a "Weckruf" for the UN? How could it provide more collective security, and also be made more relevant for the one remaining superpower? His colleague De Villepin has been an ill-chosen companion for Fischer at this task of thinking about the UN's future. Is Paris already in a position to say that the French threat with a veto was perhaps not a sign of ultimate wisdom, as some in France have in the meantime concluded? "Gallien erteilt Rom keine Befehle."²⁴ Moreover, the idea of multipolarity is highly unrealistic: what are the other poles?²⁵

Of course, the UN should not play the role of rubber stamp for the plans of the US, but it should not become a nay-saying institute either. The Berlin based political scientist Herfried Münkler described the problem somewhat in abstract but not incorrectly: "Die entfesselte amerikanische Macht muss 'normativ wieder eingefangen' werden."²⁶ How to get the US and the UN to cooperate in such a way that on the one hand the growth of international law is not hindered and on the other, American power is used to take effective action where action is needed, in this unsafe jungle of a world? How to balance power and justice, that is the question. "Wer Recht will, muss auch Macht sagen", says Ulrich Speck in an outstanding recent essay.²⁷ A German flight into a dream of justice and peace will not help; that is just moral self-gratification.

Fischer's dreamy visions of developing stronger European institutions can be classified as *chutzpah*. Did Germany itself not recently contribute much to the deep rifts in the EU? What does remain of the image of Fischer as a *Realo*? Schröder is – as we know – a cheap-jack, a street vendor – "mehr scheinen als sein" – who – politically speaking – will sell anything according to the season. But what happened to Fischer's realism, the kind he showed during the Kosovo-crisis? As Schröder's helpmate he has been led into troubled waters, from which he may try to escape to the position of the first minister of foreign affairs of the EU. But will he be the right man for this impossible job which he himself helps to create at the moment in the Giscard Convention?²⁸ The *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* may be right in its analysis that: "Fischer sei aussenpolitisch an den Rand gedrängt? Er ist amstmüde. Der Bundeskanzler nahm

bei seiner Irak-Politik kaum Rücksichten auf den Aussenminister, der machtlos dem Konfrontationskurs Schröders gegenüber den USA zuschauen musste.”²⁹

The last few months almost make us forget that until only recently Germany’s Foreign Minister still could be heard declaring that an active American presence in Europe was necessary not only for reasons of security, but also “to balance the internal contradictions within European interests.” He meant of course that the very special type of friendship that Germany and France keep up, absolutely needs the American presence to curtail French pressure on the one hand and to counterbalance the German economic overweight on the other. As for the French pressure: it has never been attractive to Bonn or Berlin to share a foreign policy and security policy with France – that means: under French direction – given the great differences between the two countries concerning the Middle East for instance. During his recent mission to Israel and Palestine, Minister Fischer could once again ascertain that without American support peace missions are doomed to fail. Paris could never give Berlin the same collateral support that Washington could. And this Europe should counterbalance the United States? What an overestimation of one’s power!

Back to normal?

After this transatlantic crisis the German government will do its utmost to end this fit of exceptionalism. The Franco-German relations will have to return to the cordial distance, or distant cordiality, of old. Germany will try to return to Adenauer’s unavoidable splits between Paris and Washington. Relief from this “Spagat” (splits) is not to be expected in the near future, despite premature cheering from the side of ill-informed Dutch and other commentators.

And considering the French partner: Dominique Moïsi pointed out the sobering fact that, if the world had acted according to France’s ideas, Saddam Hussein would still sit in his palace. Moïsi continues:

“On balance, there is a growing feeling in France that its diplomacy not only went too far in confronting America head on, but that if the French arguments were right, the French conclusions were wrong. France went too far in using the weapon of its veto at the Security Council. It also miscalculated in behaving toward America as if the Cold War – which united French and American interests against the Soviet Union – hadn’t been over for nearly fifteen years, and as if September 11 didn’t constitute an emotional shock for the US. France has represented a marginal nuisance, as it cannot at the same time isolate itself from the Anglo-Saxon and Central European worlds.”³⁰

Note well the next phrase of an editorial in the *New York Times* on 18 March: “And France, in its zest for standing up to Washington, succeeded mainly in sending all the wrong signals to Baghdad.”

Europe harbors conflicting opinions on what to expect of the only world power: sometimes Europeans want the intervention of a world police – with or without approval from the United Nations –, as in the case of the massacres in Rwanda in 1994, when no help arrived. At other times, however, they reject the idea that America should act as the world’s policeman, or they simply deny that the United States is up to such a task. American isolationism is seen as completely wrong, but the same holds true for Wilsonianism – America has a mission in this world – especially since national interests are suspected to lurk behind this benevolent façade. Every American interference in the Middle East is *ipso facto* suspect, if it is not the oil, then it is the Jewish lobby, or a fixation on Israel and a complete neglect of the Palestinians which instigated it. According to Walter Russell Mead, no matter how, America is always wrong.

A new world

The Iraq crisis made it very clear that some European allies still do not fully realize that traditional Cold War relations are gone with the end of the Soviet Union: no solid alliances anymore in which allies could think they were equal to the US. They did not recognize the present American supremacy, and the fact that there is no common enemy anymore to bind all allies. The end of the Cold War has not only weakened the glue of the old alliance, Europe is no longer geopolitically contested and thus has ceased to be a principal cockpit of international relations for the United States.

Russia is no longer the great enemy. On the basis of a strategic alliance National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice does business with Moscow in a way that in Europe was considered to be impossible (e.g. abolishing the ABM treaty). America’s main security interests lie elsewhere now. Europeans are relevant only to the extent they support common endeavors in the Middle East and beyond. Those who are ready to accept America’s strategic choices – and buy the fact that the United States is a benign power – will be invited to join coalitions of the willing. Washington does not care about the rest. The new system is based on American primacy that has replaced leadership.

Germany especially had been spoiled by the abundance of American attention it got during the Cold War. It was for decades a center of a “Weltbürgerkrieg”. Germany during the Cold War was crucial to the United States. Bonn could have conflicts of opinion with Washington (e.g. on *Ostpolitik*, Genscherism, Helmut Schmidt’s fight against President Carter in the summer of 1978), the friendship remained very close.

There existed a clear division of labor and pleasure: security guaranteed by the United States, whatever differences in policies may come up. All that is no longer the case.

The vague and unfocussed nineties gave, during that first decade after the end of the Cold War, the impression that the old international game could go on forever. 9/11 ended that foggy idea, even though the discontinuity between Clinton and Bush is less acute than often assumed. Clinton had already started shifting his priorities. Looking back one can only conclude that the offers of partnership from Bush sr. and Clinton to Germany were rather unrealistic. The sheer fact that these offers were made showed already that the relations had changed. Kohl did not know how to handle these friendly offers but they seduced the experiment prone Schröder to an overestimation of the German position. He must have thought he could get away with his offensive behavior without having to pay the bill.

Because Germany was so spoilt by the United States for such a long time, the Chancellor had not understood that this stable partnership had come to an end. Schröder seriously overestimated his acting space for creating a German policy, as much as he overestimated the power of the glue that kept the transatlantic alliance together. He, however, still seems to assume he can talk to Bush on a basis of equality, "auf Augenhöhe". The man has to learn a lot about Germany's present place and that of Europe in the present world.³¹

What future role for Germany?

Which influence will this unhappy example of the Chancellor's policy have on future Europe? To what extent is Germany still at critical moments a trustworthy partner or ally in foreign policy? Is Schröder's foreign policy in general not rather unsuccessful? His leading role of this Germany certainly did not make the EU more effective. As if there weren't enough conflicts before this crisis, as the Nice summit proved. The quite urgent reform of the Common Agricultural Policy was also smothered by French blackmail. The relations with Eastern Europe have – because of this crisis – deteriorated. An impoverished Berlin has hardly anything to offer to these less affluent countries anyhow. The EU in general do with a German sugar daddy, but Germany cannot play that role any longer.

And how about the Stability Pact, that famous German invention? What kind of example does this Germany give to the less well-disciplined European countries? The German-Russian relations, what do they yield? There is no future in a Paris-Berlin-Moscow axis, and such an alliance would moreover fatally undermine the foundations of the EU. The crowds demonstrating against the war on the streets of Europe have no desire to see 19th century balance-of-power politics return. Distance to Paris also is necessary to repair the German relations with Central Europe. Too close a

liaison between Berlin and Moscow will not help there either. And for Mr. Putin, Washington remains far more important than Berlin.

As for Germany, if it changed its direction from its present stance, it could return to its role within American strategy (but without Schröder, “oder um ihn herum” (Mrs. Rice)). Certainly not France that is no longer seen as an ally in Washington. By the way: what risk does exist that Germany would be a “vassal” of the US, as Christoph Bertram suggested?³² One could be seduced to investigate also to what extent the clear thinking of this excellent commentator has been somewhat undermined too by the present rhetorical escalation.

Whatever Fischer says, theirs is a Germany that came out of the Iraq war with deteriorated relations with America, tarnished ones with an Eastern Europe where it did not quickly raise its voice to defend, and ties well short of full confidence with France. Blocking NATO aid to Turkey was not the right signal either. And when the same four countries that took that road, later organized a mini-summit meeting in Brussels, they sent a new ominous signal, not only to Washington but also the other EU partners.

To sum up: Germany had no influence on the war and its relations with Washington are seriously disturbed. There is no coherence to be found in Germany’s foreign policy, not towards the US, nor towards Europe, the Middle East, Turkey or the rest of the world.

What future role for Europe?

Nothing is as it used to be: for one, the old, close alliance will never be the same again. Its character will become much more ad hoc, it will depend on where new crises will be located and on the kind of crises that will have to be met. Now already NATO no longer is Washington’s first choice, because of its geographical and other limitations. NATO will rather become a forum for coalition building, a pool from which partners can be picked, together with non-NATO-members.

Europe should occupy itself with the question how to raise its international status. This cannot be done by mere declarations; substantial investments in the military budgets will be necessary: you cannot have a coalition of the willing without a coalition of the billing. But either way, that would carry huge disadvantages as Brent Scowcroft explained: ad hoc coalitions of the willing can give us (i.e. Washington) the image of arrogance and if you get to the point where everyone secretly hopes that the US gets a black eye because we’re so obnoxious, then we’ll be totally hamstrung.³³

Of course, Germany is Europe’s economic center of gravity. But to fulfill that role – and the obligation it carries – it will have to clear its economy from its many burdens

and impediments, and it will have to put its state finances in order and be prepared for demographic developments. But that will take a while, and is going to cause much pain. For the time being, Germany is Europe's sick man – but even in that negative role it dominates the European theatre. Germany got stranded in many respects and up till now its government has not been able to do much about it. In recent months we have witnessed a kind of “statt dessen” politics: find a substitute policy to cloak your ineffectivity. Schröder cannot stimulate the economy, nor can he reduce the unemployment or loosen up the stagnating labor relations. “So ist Deutschland Hemmschuh für das Wachstum von Euroland geworden.”³⁴ Super-minister Wolfgang Clement rightly said on 31 May: “Ganz Europa wartet auf uns das zu ändern.”³⁵ However, as a king of peace the Chancellor is applauded. (“Krieg und Flut stabilisierten diese Regierung”). How would Schröder have fared in the elections without Iraq?

Will this crisis eventually lead to more political European integration? It would be a miracle if a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) would now spring to life. For such an undertaking the European strategic interests still differ far too much. The Iraq crisis did teach us though that a future CFSP – if any – cannot be shaped after the French model. Such a model rather divides than that it binds.

And is Minister Fischer, after all his capers, still the most eligible person to become the EU's first minister of foreign affairs? How long did he not, together with his French colleague De Villepin, try to play the European card versus America? Is he really the one who will not only unify Europe, but will also repair the relations between Europe and America? He apparently survived the loss of stature, caused by his boss's tricks, so well that he has been for a while more and more mentioned for that position. As a reborn *Realo* he will be more needed at home than abroad, to liberate the Greens from their remaining ideological chains. Or is he the most suitable person for that impossible EU job, just because of his unrealistic “Eurogläubigkeit”? A certain unworldliness cannot be denied when he speaks about Europe.

The German Chancellor himself is hardly taken seriously in matters of international and security policy, at least not by the other two important EU colleagues, France and the UK, two countries that do have a military tradition. According to the French guru, Alfred Grosser, Schröder is in general a weak Chancellor who, just like some of his equally weak predecessors, does not know how to keep internal and external *Staatsraison* in balance. In his case maybe he failed on both accounts. In international politics one does not get far with nailed down opinions. And, a real statesman does not rule according to the results of polls.

But even after repairs are made – by this or by a next government – Germany will not easily get at eye-level with the United States, despite all Schröder's wishful thinking.

It will not become a “super ally” in the near future, as it is too little prepared for global tasks, and strategically too underdeveloped. According to Jeff Gedmin of the Aspen Institute: “Germany is a medium-sized country, which spends meagerly on defense, has deep-seated economic weaknesses and faces a serious demographic crisis in the years ahead. And this is Europe’s most powerful nation”.

Our conclusion is that the government in Berlin did not understand what was going on in the world, and had no idea what to do about it. But of course this criticism is one-sided and it could give rise to the idea that Washington is without sins. Of course that is not true. “Washington’s own destructive contributions were enormous: shifting goals and rationales, its increasingly arbitrary timetables, distaste for diplomatic give and take, its public arm-twisting and its failure to convince most of the world of any imminent danger.”³⁶

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Notes

1. Charles Grant and Ulrike Guérot, “A military plan to cut Europe in two”, *Financial Times*, 17 April 2003.
2. Richard Bernstein, “The Germans Who Toppled Communism Resent the U.S.”, *New York Times*, 22 February 2003, p. A7.
3. Mariam Lau, in *Merkur*, May 2003.
4. A term used by Bassam Tibi, professor of International Relations at the Universität Göttingen.
5. W.R. Smyser, *From Yalta to Berlin: The Cold War Struggle Over Germany* (St. Martin’s Press, 1999).
6. *Der Tagesspiegel*, 5 April 2003.
7. H.U. Wehler in *FAZ*, 27 June, 2003: “Unter dem Primat der Innenpolitik hat Schröder, das Auge starr auf den Wahlerfolg geheftet, die stimmenträchtige Kritik an Amerika zugespitzt, offenbar ohne jede Abfederung durch vertrauliche Gespräche mit Washington.”
8. *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 17 March 2003.
9. Robert Cooper in: *FAZ*, 27 May 2003: “Das Grundproblem der Europäer ist, dass es keine europäische Politik gegenüber Massenvernichtungsmitteln und ihrer Verbreitung gibt, obwohl das die wahre Bedrohung für uns in den nächsten Jahren ist. Man ist sich einfach kollektiv nicht bewusst, dass eine Welt, in der sich Massenvernichtungswaffen ausbreiten, eine fundamental andere ist als die, die wir kennen.” [...] “Die Einzelstreitkräfte sind kaum mobil” [...] “Eine europäische Armee wird es weder heute noch morgen geben.” [...] “Es gibt einen höchst instabilen und konfliktreichen Bogen, der sich um Europa schliesst, und um den müssen wir uns kümmern”. [...] “Es war ein Fehler [der deutschen Regierung]. Und es war dumm, die Anwendung von Gewalt kategorisch auszuschliessen, denn die Drohung von Gewalt gegenüber dem Regime Saddam Hussein’s war, wie wir in vielen Jahren erlebt haben, immer der einzige Grund dafür, dass es Bewegung und Zugeständnisse gab.”
10. *Der Spiegel*, 24 March 2003.
11. *Der Tagesspiegel*, 18 May 2003.
12. Robert von Rimscha in *Der Tagesspiegel*, 19 April 2003.
13. *Der Spiegel*, 24 March 2003.
14. *Der Tagesspiegel*, 4 May 2003.
15. In *International Affairs*, March 2003, p. 281.
16. Quoted in Richard Lambert, “Misunderstanding Each Other”, *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 2003, p. 67.

17. Hans Maull, Sebastian Harnisch and Constantin Grund (eds.) *Deutschland im Abschied? Rot-grüne Außenpolitik 1998-2003* (Baden-Baden, Nomos), 2003. On this subject, William Pfaff in the *International Herald Tribune* of 20 February 2003 said: "A very senior retired officer in the German army (and NATO) asked me, 'Why are they doing this?' He said: 'You Americans have been telling us for 60 years that we must never go to war. You have made the German pacifists. We have accepted that war is never a solution. We believe that even more because of our own history. Now you attack us because Germans are against war.'" Cf. also Otfried Nassauer, "Machtpolitik auf europäisch". In: *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik*, November 2002: "Waren es nicht die Vereinigten Staaten, Grossbritannien und Frankreich die in der Suezkrise 1956 unmissverständlich deutlich machten, dass Europa seine Rolle 'out of area' ausgespielt habe? Waren es nicht die VS, die Europa – und insbesondere die Bundesrepublik – das Denken in den Kategorien des Multilateralismus und der 'Rule of Law' lehrten und mit den UN und der UN-Charta jene Instrumente – einschliesslich der heute so oft beklagten Begrenzungen schufen? [...] Warum also Krieg gegen den Irak und Diplomatie im fernen Osten?"
18. Lambert, p. 63.
19. *L'Express*, 10 April 2003.
20. Philippe Roger, *L'Ennemi américain: Généalogie de l'antiaméricanisme français* (Seuil 2002).
21. Emmanuel Todd, *Après l'Empire : Essai sur la décomposition du système américain* (Gallimard, 2002).
22. *FAZ*, 19 April 2003
23. Stanley Hoffmann, "America goes backward", *New York Review of Books*, Vol. 50 No. 10, 12 June 2003.
24. Ralph Peters in *FAZ*, 15 May 2003.
25. The well known French analyst, François Heisbourg in the *Financial Times* of 4 June 2003: "Multipolarity is not only a reactive, defensive concept, but also an unrealistic one, since there is no prospect of a stable pole emerging between China, Russia, India and France. For each of them, the relationship with the US is more important than any other. Most seriously, the concept of multipolarity divides the EU, destroying any prospect of Paris's cherished aim of a Europe-puissance." [...] "The US tendency no longer to treat France as an ally can probably not be overturned by French diplomatic action and political and business lobbying alone."
26. *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 19 April 2003.
27. Ulrich Speck, "Macht und Widerstand. Amerikas Rolle in der unipolaren Weltordnung", *Merkur*, Mai 2003, p. 395-404.
28. Cf. His proposal against a veto concerning foreign policy and security affairs: the rejection of which – despite or because of the Iraq experience (vide French blackmail) – means a weakening of the position of the future EU foreign minister, because unanimity remains required. The EU has a "gemeinsame, auf gemeinsamen Interessen der Mitgliedstaaten beruhende, aber keine einheitliche Außenpolitik." (Chris Patten in *FAZ*, 28 May 2003.) Courses in scholasticism are still badly needed to understand EU transparency.
29. *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 14 May 2003.
30. Dominique Moïsi in *International Herald Tribune*, 18 April 2003
31. Some American ideas of Europe: "Here you have 15 tiny, inbred societies, suffering all the genetic calamities – xenophobia, lassitude, rampant accordion-playing – that inbreeding creates, facing possibility of irrelevance in a world of massive numbers: a billion Chinese, a billion Indians, 300 million Americans who live as if they were 3 billion". And "The European project is not an easy one. The project will grow more difficult very soon, as Eastern Europe is assimilated, and the social-service systems of the existing 15 come under fierce demographic strain", as the liberal American journalist, Joe Klein wrote after his European tour in: *Guardian Weekly*, 4 July 2002.
32. According to Christoph Bertram "Germany will not become America's vassal. [...] It is enough to assure that an America that treats Germany as a vassal will not make him budge". *Financial Times*, 28 May 2003.
33. Brent Scowcroft in *Financial Times*, 20 March 2003.
34. Helmut Schmidt in *Die Zeit*, 22/2003.
35. Wolfgang Clement at the SPD *Parteitag* on 31 May 2003.
36. *New York Times*, 18 March 2003.

