In aanloop naar de NAVO-top organiseerden Jonge Atlantici in samenwerking met de Universiteit Leiden een essaywedstrijd, waaraan studenten van alle hogeronderwijsinstellingen in Nederland konden deelnemen. De opdracht: schrijf een essay over de toekomst van de NAVO. De jury bekroonde twee essays die zich wisten te onderscheiden met een unieke en goed onderbouwde visie voor de toekomst van de trans-Atlantische veiligheid.

Het winnende essay van Sam de Groot, student ‘Economics, Public Administration and Management’ aan de Universiteit Leiden, getiteld: ‘Why does Mark Rutte not have the nuclear codes?’ is hieronder te lezen.

The world is no longer in the changing phase – it has changed. The war in Ukraine continues with no end in sight, and hopes for a peaceful resolution grow smaller by the day. At the same time, the United States is no longer the, unconditional partner it once was. Trump’s remarks encouraging an invasion if allies don’t “pay up,” threats directed at Canada and Greenland, the suggestion to stop providing NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander, and perhaps most critically, the sidelining of Europe in discussions on Ukraine’s security all signals a shift that can no longer be ignored (Kaplan, 2025).

The question of whether the U.S. still stands as NATO’s unwavering ally is, in some ways, beside the point. What truly matters is how our enemies perceive it. And it is safe to assume the signal they’re receiving is one of division and decline.

By the time we know for certain, it will be too late. What’s at stake is the very foundation of NATO: cooperation and deterrence. In a world of multipolar threats, why rely solely on one ally’s nuclear arsenal when the alliance itself could stand stronger together?

This essay argues that the path to securing NATO’s future is surprisingly simple: give Mark Rutte the nuclear codes. This essay outlines how this structure would look like, and argue why collective control over nuclear weapons are not only necessary, but the only way to assure a future with a working NATO in it.

What Should It Look Like?

Giving NATO its own nuclear weapons will shatter many sacred cows, and won’t happen without resistance, but hard times ask for hard actions. It would begin with the creation of a NATO Nuclear Command Authority, comparable to the existing nuclear command structure of the United States.

Decision-making would proceed through Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) to bypass vetoes like Hungary’s and to shorten the bureaucratic process during crises (Landsbergis, 2025). In emergencies, the Secretary General should be granted presidential authority, including direct control over the launch codes just like Macron and Trump. This will give the Secretary-General and therefore NATO ‘hard’ power. This is even more important in the age of power politics. Rutte should stay with his strategy of being a bridge builder with kinds words, but as Theodore Roosevelt would say:’’ speak softly and carry a big stick- you will go far’’.

In the first stage, NATO would need to purchase nuclear weapons from the U.S., France, and the UK, later building its own program. This isn’t about increasing the number of nukes it’s about restructuring. The current model, with the U.S. disengaging and France offering itself as the alternative, still leaves NATO dependent on one member. A NATO where 31 countries collectively decide is safer than trusting one ally’s word or their judgment of what constitutes a threat.

These nuclear weapons would fall under a renewed nuclear sharing agreement. The hardest part would be the political phase. Nuclear states will want to preserve their privilege, and non-NATO actors will see this as provocation. But clear communication and careful diplomacy can address that. More on this below.

A B-2A Spirit bomber assigned to the 509th Bomb Wing and two F-15C Eagles assigned to the 48th Fighter Wing conduct aerial operations over the North Sea Sept. 16, 2019. The 48th Fighter Wing and the Royal Air Force routinely train with integrated 4th and 5th generation capabilities to deliver full spectrum air combat support to European allies and partners. (U.S. Air Force photo/ Tech. Sgt. Matthew Plew)

Deterrence

Deterrence is a military concept, and since the Cold War, one of NATO’s core principles. It simply means: the action of discouraging an action because the other side fears the consequences.

But deterrence isn’t just about the potential threat, it also relies on the credibility of using the threat. NATO currently relies on the U.S., UK, and France for nuclear deterrence. But those are sovereign actors. NATO itself owns no nukes, controls no launch authority, and has no joint decision-making mechanism (NATO, 2023). Simply put, the Baltic states have no idea if these powers would go all-in if Russia attacked. Given Russian aggression, growing Chinese assertiveness, and a less stable U.S. partnership, this is a serious problem.

Credible deterrence requires credible infrastructure. In NATO’s perspective you do not what your nuclear infrastructure solely based on Macron’s or Trump’s mood that day, but one backed by NATO as a whole. If NATO truly embodies collective defence, why doesn’t it have the means to ensure that defence itself?

Deterrence is not the final step, it is a ladder. A credible escalation sequence is essential, beginning with conventional weapons, followed by tactical nuclear options, and, only if absolutely necessary, the use of strategic nuclear weapons. This structure allows NATO to respond to any form of aggression with a measured and proportional reaction. At the moment, however, NATO does not have this flexibility. The majority of nuclear weapons available through the alliance are strategic (around 85%) and are mostly under American control. And if the Americans decides to not participate the present ‘nuclear umbrella’ would almost solely exists out of strategic nuclear weapons. This limits NATO’s ability to respond at different levels of conflict.

Effective deterrence depends on having a range of options, not just the threat of ‘destroying the world’. A future NATO Nuclear Command Authority must therefore include all categories of nuclear weapons. If the only available response is a strategic bomb controlled by leaders who are unlikely to be targeted first, opponents may view NATO’s deterrence as either unrealistic or dangerously aggressive.

Also, NATO’s legal foundation for solidarity Article 5 is often misunderstood. Article 42(7) of the EU Treaty clearly demands support with “all means,” but NATO’s Article 5 gives each member discretion. In theory, assistance could be as little as sending one bullet. If even the main credibility of NATO is so loosely defined, how can we expect threats such as Russia to take NATO’s nuclear promise seriously (Bob Deen, 2022)?

That’s why NATO needs its own nuclear command, under collective control and based on consensus. Not to own more nuclear weapons, but to gain real control over the deterrence that underpins our security. The threat is serious. So must be the response.

Strategic Autonomy

A NATO without nuclear control is a NATO without strategic autonomy. As long as the alliance depends on the U.S. nuclear umbrella, it lacks strategic autonomy in a period of crisis, and all the decisions before that. Strategic autonomy doesn’t mean cutting off the U.S, it means building a joint capacity that lets NATO steer its own course when needed. Thats not a luxury, its a necessity.

The truth is that European and American interests are increasingly drifting apart, not only when it comes to Russia, but especially in relation to China. Europe’s economy is far more intertwined with China’s, making it more vulnerable to pressure or coercion from Beijing (Mary Lovely, 2024). Yet despite this exposure, Europe operates within a nuclear strategy that it does not control. NATO’s nuclear posture is still overwhelmingly shaped by the United States, leaving European members without real influence over the most critical tools of deterrence.

This dependence undermines NATO’s ability to develop a credible and autonomous approach to China. Every signal of deterrence or strategic presence in the Indo-Pacific must flow through Washington. This not only limits NATO’s ability to respond to new realities, it also weakens Europe’s position at the negotiating table with Beijing. One of the main reason NATO was founded was to secure Europe, but the only one who does not benefit from this status quo right now is Europe.

Ironically, this shift toward greater autonomy is exactly what Trump once demanded: that European allies take more responsibility, invest more in their own security, and stop leaning so heavily on American power. Therefore, Strategic autonomy is not a betrayal of the alliance, it is a long-overdue response to that call (The White House, 2025). A NATO that controls its own nuclear capabilities does not weaken the transatlantic bond; it strengthens it. It replaces one-sided dependence with balanced, mutual commitment.

Without strategic autonomy, NATO becomes a bystander alliance. With it, it becomes a global actor, making its own course, assessing its own threats, and responding to an ever more complex world. Real security begins with real strategic choice.

The U.S. would not accept being ‘weakened’

One of the main critiques one could have to a NATO-led nuclear arsenal is that it is naive to assume that the United States would allow it. American nuclear capability remains a cornerstone of its global power, and Washington has historically been reluctant to share or ‘give away’ control over such strategic assets (Pierre Yared, 2024).

There is concern that if NATO allies were to operate independently, the United States would lose its central role within the alliance, and with it, a key source of political leverage. After all, if European allies no longer feel dependent on American protection, the U.S. would lose a major part of its influence.

But this challenge is no unsolvable. The proposal does not call for the United States to hand over its nuclear arsenal or give up strategic authority. Instead, it envisions a complementary NATO nuclear structure. A jointly controlled system that empowers the alliance to act collectively when needed, especially in a context where the U.S. does not want take leadership.

A blueprint already exists. During the Cold War, the United States and West Germany operated under a so called dual-key system, where nuclear weapons stationed in Europe could not be launched without authorization from both Washington and Bonn. This ensured joint responsibility and accountability (Walter, 2023). A similar arrangement today would allow NATO to maintain its nuclear posture without undermining U.S. oversight. The United States would remain involved and influential, but NATO would gain the ability to act as one actor when required. To summarize; the U.S. would be part of the process, but the big difference is that when a crisis hits Rutte can detonate the nuclear weapons, or probably more realistic: give the illusion to the enemies that he can.

Therefore, it is an answer to what the U.S. has asked for repeatedly. Successive U.S. governments, particularly under Trump, have demanded that Europe take greater responsibility for its own security. A NATO-led nuclear structure is not a break from the alliance; it is the logical next step in its evolution.

Non-NATO member would see this as provocative

A second argument one could raise is that a NATO-controlled nuclear force would be seen as provocative by external powers like Russia and China. Critics warn that it could escalate tensions, spark a new arms race, and ultimately make Europe less secure (Bukowski, 2025). From Moscow or Beijing’s perspective, it might appear as a deliberate attempt to expand NATO’s nuclear reach.

But this argument overlooks a basic reality. The nuclear threat already exists. NATO’s current deterrence is built on American weapons stationed in Europe and a nuclear strategy that depends entirely on decisions made in Washington. A NATO-led system would not create a new threat, but would instead shift the responsibility for existing deterrence from one ally to the alliance as a whole.

Such a structure would not necessarily be more aggressive. On the contrary, it could bring greater clarity, transparency, and credibility. A collective NATO command, with clear procedures and decision-making rules, would reduce uncertainty and delay. And while decisions could still be taken by consensus under normal circumstances, in moments of true crisis, the Secretary General could be granted the authority to act swiftly, ensuring that NATO remains credible and responsive when unity is difficult but action is essential.

This is not a call for reckless escalation. It is a call for a clear and functioning system that matches the reality of today’s threats. NATO’s nuclear response should not depend entirely on the political climate in Washington, Paris or London, nor should it be subject to paralysis from within. A structured NATO command with limited emergency authority would enhance deterrence by making the alliance more reliable in the eyes of both its members and its adversaries.

Rather than increasing the risk of conflict, this shift would strengthen stability. It would give NATO the tools to act decisively when needed, while making it less vulnerable to hesitation or internal discussion.

Conclusion

The world has already changed, but NATO has not changed with it. Its nuclear architecture still reflects a post-1945 reality, where Europe relied entirely on American protection and unity was taken for granted. That world no longer exists. Today’s threats are more complex, more unpredictable, and more distributed, and so must be the response.

If NATO is to remain credible, it must adapt. Strategic autonomy is no longer a luxury, it is a requirement. A NATO-led nuclear command structure would not only strengthen the alliance’s deterrent posture but also ensure that Europe is no longer left waiting for Washington’s permission in a moment of existential crisis. It is not about excluding the United States, but about sharing the burden it has carried for too long. It is not about escalating conflict, but about building a more stable, transparent, and realistic security structure.

This proposal will not be easy. It will face resistance from both within and outside the alliance. But the alternative is paralysis, dependence, and irrelevance. NATO cannot afford to be an alliance that only works when the mood in Washington allows for it. It must become an actor in its own right, capable of protecting its members with both resolve and responsibility.

Strategic autonomy does not weaken transatlantic unity. It redefines it. It shifts the alliance from a hierarchy of dependence to a partnership of equals, from symbolic solidarity to operational readiness. And it ensures that NATO is no longer held hostage by the uncertainty of any single leader, election, or national interest.

Henry Kissinger once asked, somewhat cynically, “Who do I call if I want to speak to Europe? “With a NATO Nuclear Command Authority, there is finally an answer. Maybe you still call Washington. But you will also have to call Brussels. And you may just have to speak to Mark Rutte.

Bibliography

Bob Deen, D. Z. (2022). Uncharted and uncomfortable in European defence. The Hague: Clingendael.
Bukowski, M. (2025, March 19). CEPA. From Sympathy With the Devil: The Lie of NATO Expansion: https://cepa.org/article/sympathy-with-the-devil-the-lie-of-nato-expansion/
Kaplan, R. D. (2025). Trump’s New Map. Foreign Policy.
Landsbergis, G. (2025, Februari 11). Carnegie. From Suspend Hungary’s Voting Rights to Save the EU’s Credibility: https://carnegieendowment.org/europe/strategic-europe/2025/02/suspend-hungarys-voting-rights-to-save-the-eus-credibility?lang=en
Mary Lovely, J. Y. (2024, August 24). While the US and China decouple, the EU and China deepen trade dependencies. From Peterson Institute for International Economics: https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economics/2024/while-us-and-china-decouple-eu-and-china-deepen-trade-dependencies
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Pierre Yared. (2024, December 20). US military strength secures financial dominance. From CEPR: https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/us-military-strength-secures-financial-dominance
The White House. (2025, March 13). REMARKS BY PRESIDENT TRUMP. From The White House: https://www.whitehouse.gov/remarks/2025/03/remarks-by-president-trump-and-nato-secretary-general-mark-rutte-before-bilateral-meeting/
Walter, S. (2023). Prodigal Nukes. Princeton: Princeton University.

Foto header: NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte meets with JD Vance, Vice President of the United States (Flickr)