Catherine Yuk-ping Lo is an Assistant Professor of International Relations and Global Health at Maastricht University

Hengyi Yang is a PhD researcher at the EU Horizon project Reignite Multilateralism via Technology (REMIT)

The EU and US increasingly find themselves at odds over their competing means and goals for AI governance. This transatlantic divide offers opportunities for China to emerge as a strategic beneficiary. But will this actually alter Beijing’s long-term strategic plans?

The American AI Action Plan advocates minimal regulation and voluntary frameworks to promote financial and technological innovation. The EU’s AI Act, on the other hand, embraces strict binding rules and ethical frameworks to uphold human rights protections. This fragmentation has intensified recently, as the US president threatened to impose tariffs on countries, including European allies, with tech regulations or digital taxes he deemed “designed to harm or discriminate against American technology.”[1]

Opportunity knocks for China?

What does a divided Western bloc mean for China’s role in global AI governance? Some analysts suggest that Beijing may emerge as a strategic beneficiary of this transatlantic dispute. On one hand, the rift between the EU and the US has strengthened Beijing’s view that “the East is rising, and the West is declining,” highlighting a weakening of Western unity. This perception has bolstered China’s confidence in adopting a tougher stance against the EU.[2]

Amid these tensions, it is believed that Beijing has increased leverage, such as the option to cut off critical material supplies, when responding to EU restrictions on its electric vehicles and chip manufacturing, rather than relying solely on economic cooperation.[3]

On the other hand, the fragmentation of the Western bloc creates a leadership vacuum in global AI governance, which presents an opportunity for China to “overtake on a bend”.[4] Since the Xi administration, China has positioned itself as an advocate for multilateral governance in emerging technologies, sharply contrasting with Washington’s skepticism.

New multilateral AI governance

In the UN Global Dialogue on AI governance launched in 2025, the US was almost the only country to oppose a new multilateral AI governance mechanism, while China emerged as a strong supporter. Furthermore, Beijing seeks to promote the narrative of “standing with developing countries,” arguing that AI rulemaking should not become a “game of rich countries and the wealthy”.[5] This stance enables China to cultivate a reputation as a responsible stakeholder in AI during a time of Western discord.

The assumption that China will automatically exploit Western divisions requires contextualization within Beijing’s broader strategy for global AI governance. While the transatlantic divide offers favorable conditions, it will not fundamentally alter China’s long-term strategic plans. We contend that China is not overly concerned about this bilateral disagreement for three key reasons.

China’s broad reshape agenda

Firstly, China had already committed to an alternative model for global AI governance before these divisions emerged. Its proactive strategic focus on emerging technologies predates the Western fracture. Between 2017 and 2020, China began establishing AI regulations in line with its state-led vision of governance. In October 2023, President Xi proposed the Global AI Governance Initiative, which highlights key elements of China’s model, such as AI sovereignty, opposition to ideological division, and the inclusive participation of Global South countries.[6]

Following the 2023 Initiative, Beijing released the ambitious Global Artificial Intelligence Governance Action Plan in 2025, covering 13 agendas for international AI coordination, including standard setting, infrastructure investment, and ethical norms.[7]

This plan emphasizes an open, inclusive, and fair international order for AI cooperation. In short, China’s agenda has long been set: it seeks to reform global governance more broadly, as outlined in the Global Governance Initiative proposed by President Xi in September 2025[8], and reshape global AI governance in particular to reflect its strategic interests. Whether the EU and US align or diverge on AI regulation is not China’s primary focus; Beijing’s strategic aim toward greater influence in global tech governance remains consistent.

Three poles

Secondly, China recognizes that the internal divide between the EU and the US does not imply that either will adopt the Chinese model. While Brussels may distance itself from Silicon Valley’s market-driven ethos, it still shares Washington’s commitment to liberal-democratic values in tech governance. Despite regulatory differences, both the EU and the US adhere to transparency, human rights, and the rule of law, which starkly contrasts with China’s state-centric model of governance.

Therefore, for Beijing, the strategic importance of the rift in EU-US relations lies in the absence of a unified Western bloc in global AI governance. Furthermore, the competition is not merely between Western and non-Western models but involves three poles: the American model, which emphasizes market-led innovation and minimal regulations; the European model, which promotes strict regulations and human rights protections; and the Chinese model, which focuses on state-led innovation and development.[9]

Uniting the Global South

The previous point is closely related to the third reason. Rather than solely exploiting divisions within the Western bloc, China seeks to garner support from like-minded countries in the Global South. Beijing’s AI governance model emphasizes state-led innovation, control over data sovereignty, and development benefits, clearly targeting the needs of developing countries. Chinese officials often assert that AI governance should accommodate the demands of emerging economies rather than being dominated by Western powers.

At the 2025 UN Security Council meeting, China was in line with the Group of 77, advocating for representation of all countries, not just wealthy democracies, in global AI governance. Additionally, China’s 2025 Global AI Action Plan prioritizes investment in digital infrastructure, technology transfer, and capacity building for developing countries, particularly in the Global South, to ensure that the benefits of AI are widely shared. China has also proposed the AI Capacity-Building Action Plan for Good and for All[10] and initiated the establishment of a World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization[11], aimed at enhancing the AI governance capabilities by sharing technology with other developing countries.

The efforts indicate that China’s primary goal in global AI governance is to unite Global South countries around its vision (i.e. “a community with a shared future for mankind”), thereby expanding its normative influence. Whether Western countries unite or divide, these initiatives will persist, as Beijing believes that securing the support of developing countries for its AI governance model is more strategic than capitalizing on temporary conflicts between Brussels and Washington. Ultimately, China aims to position its AI standards and values alongside those of the West.

Beijing leads its own coalition

It is unlikely that China will align itself with either the EU or the US. Similarly, it is improbable that Western democratic countries will join the Chinese bloc. Beijing will continue its independent path, promoting a state-centered vision while upholding multilateralism through forums such as the United Nations and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, rather than seeking short-term gains from regulatory disputes between the EU and the US. Although differences exist between the EU and the US, democratic values remain the cornerstone of transatlantic technological governance.

Given the ideological gap, mutual inclusivity between Chinese and Western models of AI governance appears nearly impossible. Distinct boundaries in global AI governance have been established: Beijing will lead its own coalition, predominantly consisting of emerging economies, while transatlantic partners will lead another coalition, despite facing internal coordination challenges.

Counterbalancing China

For transatlantic policymakers, the key takeaway is that the EU and US should first resolve their differences and seek common ground before worrying about Beijing exploiting divisions among democratic allies. A coordinated Western strategy is crucial to counterbalancing China’s influence. The EU and the US should coordinate key aspects of AI regulation to prevent China from strengthening its model.

This may involve establishing a joint transatlantic framework for AI security, data protection, and ethical norms to bridge the gap between European and American approaches. Moreover, the long-term success of any governance model depends not only on geopolitical maneuvering but also on its substantive value and the willingness of other countries to adopt it. Therefore, returning to the essence of the normative influence of technology, the EU and the US should join forces to create high-standard, reliable, and inclusive AI governance plans, even amidst the current volatile geopolitical landscape.

This article was supported by the REMIT research project, funded by the European Union’s Horizon Europe research and innovation program under grant agreement No 101094228.

[1] Mark Sweney, “Trump Threatens Tariffs on Countries That ‘Discriminate’ Against US Tech,” The Guardian, August 26, 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/aug/26/donald-trump-tariffs-us-tech-uk-digital-services-tax-eu.

[2] Mercy A. Kuo, “China-EU Relations in China-US Strategic Competition,” The Diplomat, August 2025, https://thediplomat.com/2025/08/china-eu-relations-in-china-us-strategic-competition/.

[3] Michael Czin et al., “Between Washington and Beijing: How Europe Fits into US-China Strategic Competition,” Brookings Institution, 2025, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/between-washington-and-beijing-how-europe-fits-into-us-china-strategic-competition/.

[4] Elizabeth Gibney, “China Wants to Lead the World on AI Regulation — Will the Plan Work?,” Nature, 2025, https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-025-03902-y.

[5] “China’s Xi Tells G20 Summit AI Should Not Be a ‘Game of Rich Countries,’ Xinhua Reports,” Reuters, November 19, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/chinas-xi-tells-g20-summit-ai-should-not-be-game-rich-countries-xinhua-reports-2024-11-18/.

[6] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Global AI Governance Initiative,” October 20, 2023, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/zy/gb/202405/t20240531_11367503.html.

[7] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Global AI Governance Action Plan,” July 26, 2025, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg_663340/jks_665232/kjlc_665236/AI/202507/t20250729_11679232.html.

[8] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Concept Paper on the Global Governance Initiative,” September 1, 2025, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xw/wjbxw/202509/t20250901_11699912.html.

[9] Olajide Olugbade, “In Search of a Global Governance Mechanism for Artificial Intelligence (AI): A Collective Action Perspective,” Global Public Policy and Governance 5 (2025): 139–161.

[10] United Nations General Assembly, Artificial Intelligence Capacity-Building Action for Good and for All, A/79/545 (October 23, 2024), https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4065096/files/A_79_545-EN.pdf.

[11] Gibney, “China Wants to Lead the World on AI Regulation.”