The US has always played a leading role in NATO, setting the course for other member states. But contributions from small and middle powers, which make up the majority of the alliance, have always been critical to its success. The Netherlands is one of them.

‘The strong do what they can, the weak suffer what they must’, as the great Greek historian Thucydides once quipped. To many, his often repeated mantra captured the quintessence of international politics. Small and middle powers (SMPs) often fall victim to the wishes and whims of great powers. This was certainly true during the days of Athens, Sparta and the infamous Delian League. The Delian League had originally been established as a mutual defense alliance against the powerful Persian empire in 478 BC. Soon, however, Athens started using the Delian League as a means to exert control over an alliance consisting of city and island states. It demanded that member states paid membership fees to Athens, using the funds to pay not only for a large naval force under Athenian control but also for the construction of opulent buildings including the Parthenon at the Acropolis. Athens punished Delian League allies that sought to leave the alliance, if necessary with military force.

‘All for one and one for all’

Close to two and half millennia later, power imbalances in the international system persist and SMPs continue to suffer from ‘structural constraints – whether financial, demographic, geographic, or historical – which limit their ability to act fully independently in ensuring their own security’. Yet, some alliances, at least for some periods of time, have managed to overcome these pernicious dynamics sketched by Thucydides. The NATO Alliance is a wonderful case in point. For over 76 years now it has provided for the defense and deterrence of its members and ensure the security of the Euro-Atlantic Area – without infringing upon the sovereignty of its members.

The Acropolis at Athens, painting by Leo von Klenze, 1848 (Wikimedia Commons)

NATO is not the Delian League, despite some superficial similarities. Sure: both are defensive alliances led by a great power, and both were originally established to protect its members. But unlike the Delian League, NATO members consist of independent and sovereign-nation states that reach decisions by consensus and contribute in kind to the group rather than pay fees to the alliance leader. Moreover, members join and leave NATO by their own volition. This is and has always been the strength of the Alliance: it is a community of nations that stick together and adhere to the D’Artagnanian principle of ‘all for one and one for all’ because they want to. The Alliance will only be able to survive in its current shape and form – and prolong its oft-touted track record of being the most successful alliance in history –  if these fundamental tenets endure.

Nations adhere to the principle of ‘all for one and one for all’ because they want to

A dual-hatted American general

Granted, there is and always has been a quid pro quo: the NATO Alliance is an instrument for the US to manage its relationships with the SMPs on the European continent. NATO extends the US sphere of influence, binds European powers to military equipment trading relationships that – truth be told – have proven extremely beneficial to the US-military industrial complex, and ensures that no other power holds sway over the European continent. This prevents contenders from emerging and projecting extra-regional power to threaten the US homeland and its global power position more generally.

In today’s multipolar system, consisting of multiple geopolitical centers of gravity, NATO ensures that the European SMPs, that in their aggregate represent more than a quarter of global military expenditures, are allies to the US and have its back should war break out in other theatres, notwithstanding the fact that NATO’s security commitments are by treaty limited to the Euro-Atlantic area. Meanwhile, most European SMPs – with the exception of France, who is a major power rather than a SMP– willingly traded away some of their strategic autonomy but in return benefited enormously from an unprecedented stretch of peace during which major power war was conspicuously absent from the European continent.

The US has always worked to set the military course for the Alliance – shaping its key strategic directions that the SMPs are inclined to follow; formulating warfighting concepts such as AirLand Battle and Follow-on-Forces Attack, and Network Centric Warfare and MultiDomain Operations used by SMPs to guide their defense planning and developing the capabilities that the SMPs subsequently acquire to equip their armed forces. On top of this, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander (SACEUR) has always been a dual-hatted American general who leads NATO member’s troop formations in case of war.

A change of command ceremony is held at the Allied Joint Force Command Naples during 2016 (Wikimedia Commons)

The vital role of small and middle powers

Still, within NATO it has always been recognized that the leader can’t lead when the followers won’t follow. From the outset, SMPs have played a critical role in the Alliance, perhaps best expressed by the fact that the position of the NATO Secretary General has exclusively been held by individuals from SMPs (with the exception of the Lord George Robertson of the UK, the other major European power). The current Secretary-General Mark Rutte is the fourth Dutch Secretary-General in NATO’s history.

In fact, NATO wouldn’t be NATO if it weren’t for its patchwork of different geographies, economies, and cultures – allies who are bound together by a shared goal. Their vital contributions to the Alliance was and is rooted in the various geographical, political, economic, and ideological assets that these SMPs bring to the table. During the Cold War, this has provided the Alliance with a critical edge over its peer competitor the Soviet Union, and it will, similarly, remain crucial in the current period of persistent confrontation with Russia.

NATO wouldn’t be NATO if it weren’t for its patchwork of different geographies, economies, and cultures

On NATO’s Eastern flank, Finland, the Baltic States and Poland occupy military-strategic locations that are critical to NATO’s operational reach and deterrence posture. They are central to the alliance’s efforts to deter aggression from Russia by hosting forward-deployed troops and a logistical infrastructure that is being rebuilt in the face of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. Norway in turn offers direct access to the Arctic region, a central area of geopolitical competition in the years to come. On NATO’s South Eastern flank, Romania constitutes a bulwark against aggression, providing the Alliance access to the Black Sea. Turkey, situated at the nexus of Europe, the Middle East, and Asia, hosts the Incirlik airbase, which enables NATO nuclear and conventional operations across NATO’s Southern region.

Diplomatic bridges and force multipliers

At the same time, SMPs, among which The Netherlands, are vital to maintaining NATO’s internal cohesion and facilitating political consensus across the Alliance’s 32 members. They can act as bridge builders and intermediaries. Luxembourg, the small Grand Duchy, for instance, has played a key role in NATO’s founding and remains a staunch advocate for closer NATO collaboration. Based on its culturally ingrained strategic inclination, The Netherlands continues to be a diplomatic bridge between the United States and continental Europe, advocating for a stronger Europe but always within the context of a strong NATO.

Many SMPs are force multipliers through their investments in niche areas that are critical to the Alliance’s strength, despite their limited military size. Estonia, for instance, has emerged as a leader in cyber defense based on its early experiences with Russian cyber aggression. It is host to NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence and furnishes the Alliance with important insights for a relatively new but key warfighting domain. SMPs also harbor Headquarters critical to NATO’s overall deterrence and defense posture. Italy is home to NATO’s Allied Joint Force Command (JFC) Naples, which is responsible for planning and executing NATO missions and operations in Europe, the Balkans, North Africa, and the Middle East.

Another JFC is located in Brunssum, The Netherlands, which is responsible for operations in Northern and Eastern Europe. The two Commands report to Allied Command Operations, headquartered at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, in Belgium, another SMP, which, at the strategic level, is responsible for the planning and execution of all NATO operations.

Small and middle powers make important contributions to the Alliance’s international legitimacy

Beyond their role in force development and planning, SMPs also make important contributions to the Alliance’s international legitimacy. This is relevant for support in the rest of the world, including by emerging middle powers, such as Brazil, Nigeria, India and Indonesia. Legitimacy is important in these times of interstate strategic competition, but is at risk of being neglected. Countries such as Canada, Denmark and Sweden have been important proponents of multilateral engagement at the international stage. Even when their military contributions are limited, SMPs can enhance NATO’s standing in the global battle of the narratives. Iceland, another founding member of NATO, which does not have a standing military and does not host permanent NATO bases, is an example of the Alliance’s commitment to collective security because it also extends to the security of smaller island states.

NATO sign at Keflavik Air Base, Iceland (photo NATO)

Powerful warning

In conclusion, SMPs play a critical role in achieving NATO’s founding mission ‘to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples’ [..] based on allies uniting ‘their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security.’  Amidst increasing international discord, it is important to revisit these fundamental principles and decide whether alliance members will want to stick together or fall apart. The Delian League was disbanded when Athens lost the Peloponnesian War to Sparta, after an unconfirmed number of smaller members defected – 74 years after its founding in 404 BC. NATO has just lived past this age. The decline of the Delian League, first slow, and then sudden, should serve as a powerful warning to the leaders gathered for the NATO Summit in The Hague in the summer of 2025.

All notes and references can be found at: https://www.atlcom.nl/magazine/the-leader-cannot-lead-if-the-followers-wont-follow