In aanloop naar de NAVO-top organiseerden Jonge Atlantici in samenwerking met de Universiteit Leiden een essaywedstrijd, waaraan studenten van alle hogeronderwijsinstellingen in Nederland konden deelnemen. De opdracht: schrijf een essay over de toekomst van de NAVO. De jury bekroonde twee essays die zich wisten te onderscheiden met een unieke en goed onderbouwde visie voor de toekomst van de trans-Atlantische veiligheid.

Het winnende essay van Uri Scholten, student War & Peace Studies aan de Universiteit Leiden, getiteld: ‘A vision for NATO’ is hieronder te lezen.

Amidst the rubble of the Berlin Wall, the transatlantic allies were forced to embark on a soul-searching mission. The looming threat in the east had disappeared, and with it, the raison d’être of the alliance. Years of peace and disinvestment followed, and a steady membership expansion eastwards. Decades later, with a resurgent nemesis and policy shake-up from Washington, NATO needs to change and prepare for the future. Before providing solutions, this essay will first trace the deficiencies within NATO that arose in the post-Cold War period. Three deficiencies will be analysed: the post-Cold War relationship with Russia, the lack of a clear purpose, and the lack of solidarity. It will conclude by outlining a new vision for the future of NATO, a vision of renewed ambition and initiative from the European allies and a focus on establishing legitimacy on the global stage.

Relationship with Russia

After the fall of the USSR, there was no real peace, just as there had not been a real war. There was no reconciliation, no transformation of society, and no meaningful integration of Russia into the international or European community (Sakwa, 2017, p. 14). There was just the deep exhale of an unexpected and exhausting victory, of being the last political ideology standing and a hubristic expectation of (neo-)liberal peace and prosperity. Russia was left with the memory of greatness, now housed in a ruined empire.

Russia had aimed to be part of a new post-Cold War security arrangement in the West. Furthermore, it wished to be recognised as a great power and respected. (Sakwa, 2017, p. 13). Relations quickly soured after the unfulfilled promises of rapprochement of the Yeltsin Years (Ford, 2023, p. 430). The Russian establishment saw the US pursuit of a policy of NATO enlargement as an existential threat (Mearsheimer, 2022, p. 12). From our perspective, NATO is a purely defensive alliance, and its expansion should not threaten Russia, but this is not how Moscow perceives it(German, 2017, p. 298; Mearsheimer, 2022, p. 21).

After years of increasing tensions, we have left the realm of a Cold Peace and entered a new Cold War (Ford, 2023, p. 471). This latest Cold War shares many aspects of the previous one but is also different in key ways. Unlike in the last Cold War, the world is not as neatly defined in separate blocs. China and the US are deeply integrated into a globalised economy (Liu & Root, 2024, p. 125). The same goes for the global south, a key battlefield in the first Cold War. Engagement and bargaining are required more than ever as global south states stand stronger and more confident (Ford, 2023, p. 469).

Lack of purpose

Without the USSR, NATO had to rethink its purpose. This article contends that they did not manage to do so. Whereas ostensibly, the core tasks of the alliance have not changed, the global context did. As Trump took office in 2017, NATO faced a crisis because the administration’s hostile and unpredictable stance put all three core tasks of NATO under pressure. At the height of these tensions, French President Macron famously declared NATO ‘braindead’ in 2019 (Hamilton, 2020, pp. 65–66). Whereas the Trump presidency shocked the other NATO allies, shifting US priorities away from Europe was not a novel trend. The withdrawal of troops and equipment from Europe had already started under Obama (Petersson, 2015, p. 6). The strategic shift to Asia was accompanied by increased demands that Europe take more responsibility for their security (Petersson, 2015, p. 7; 16). Ultimately, the military alliance seemed to have lost its military purpose in Europe. More so, the experiences in former Yugoslavia and later Libya showed the US that NATO had become a military tool of limited use (Petersson, 2015, p. 12).

There was a strong belief in Europe that former Soviet states and, eventually, Russia could comfortably find a place in this new order. Europe was freer and safer than at any point in the previous century. Growing interdependencies were thought to bring security and prosperity (Hamilton, 2020, p. 66). This paradigm reduced the threat perception of European countries but did not necessarily entail that declining defence expenses implied free-riding on US hegemony. Instead, they adopted a stance of strategic restraint in response to lessened threats (Jakobsen, 2018, p. 495).

The 2014 Ukraine crisis and the full-scale invasion of Russia have returned NATO to its original purpose (Hamilton, 2020, p. 66; Schreer, 2019, pp. 13–14). In the intermezzo, the role of NATO as a security priority in the US has been under threat. Meanwhile, the perceived need for a military alliance lessened for European allies. NATO needs to find a purpose outside of a direct threat from a neighbouring country if it is to last past the war in Ukraine.

Lack of solidarity

The different perceptions of NATO’s purpose exacerbated the existing issues surrounding burden sharing and alliance solidarity. Not in the last place, the military capacity of European allies to perform missions outside of Europe was limited (Moller, 2023, p. 97). Decades of downsizing militaries have left Canada and most European allies with insufficient combat forces and support elements to fulfil regional defence plans and the new posture by NATO (Moller, 2023, p. 100). The shift in military plans after the Cold War led to the assumption that allied forces would be deployed in a limited expeditionary capacity (Jakobsen, 2018, p. 493; Moller, 2023, p. 101). Equipment shortages further complicate the insufficiencies (Moller, 2023, p. 104). The lack of solidarity regarding contributions to the alliance is most evident when considering burden sharing. Even though the number of countries meeting the 2% norm has increased to 23 from 11 in 2023, this number alone does not say much. There is a lively discussion on what counts towards the 2% defence spending, and many creative loopholes are being sought (Moller, 2023, p. 105).

Integrated security constellation

NATO had two ways of achieving security for its members but failed to do either. It did not transform into a broader security constellation and alleviate the threat of Russia through diplomacy, nor did it provide credible deterrence against military action from Russia. The result is that Russia acted upon the perceived threat of NATO expansion that was not sufficiently backed up by actual membership (German, 2017, p. 306). After this current era of great power competition, NATO should reconsider its role, learn from the mistakes of the post-Cold War and give space for security concerns to be resolved politically (Sakwa, 2017, p.33). This security will require a modus vivendi with the Russian Federation. Regarding NATO’s open-door policy, this leaves the alliance in a complicated place. Especially given the most recent accession of Finland and Sweden, the space between Russia and NATO has almost ceased to exist. The ambiguous stance on future expansion increased tensions (German, 2017, p. 300). Rather than the open-ended promise of an open door, NATO should take a clear stance vis-à-vis membership and future expansion. Under the Trump administration, and given the ongoing war, it is doubtful we will see Ukraine and Georgia joining the alliance soon. Despite ongoing negotiations, the prospects of lasting peace between Russia and Ukraine seem slim (Srkadiy & Petrovich-Belkin, 2024, p. 127). As long as this conflict keeps smouldering, normalising Ruso-EU relations looks distant. At that moment, NATO should approach it open-mindedly and take Russian security concerns seriously. This balancing act between the extremes of Versailles and Munich, imposition and submission, will not be an easy task.

Legitimacy and new purpose

NATO can serve three purposes. In the most minimalist view, NATO serves to promote national interests. A more moderate view sees NATO as a vehicle for the protection of collective security, and the maximalist view sees NATO as promoting “Western” values (Petersson, 2015, pp. 12–13). The strength and future of NATO lie in this maximalist view. In this new era of competition between great powers, NATO does not pay enough attention to the geopolitics of legitimacy. Great power competition is more than just a military confrontation. It is an ideological struggle for legitimacy and influence on the world stage (Mittlemark, 2021, p. 206). NATO’s opponents seem more acutely aware of this. China sees society itself as the battlefield. This vision means that victory requires employing all means necessary, both armed and non-armed, regular and irregular. Russia shares the same vision (Mittlemark, 2021, pp. 212-213). As discussed in the first section of this paper, they aim to be acknowledged as a great power, and they have shifted to establishing a leading role in a new world order (Johnson, 2022, p. 6). In this pursuit, they use the same tenets of war (Ryan, 2022, pp. 52–53). The NATO 2022 Joint Doctrine acknowledges moral legitimacy as ‘vital ground’ for the current strategic competition (Joint Doctrine, 2022, p. 60). Legitimacy is left chiefly at this descriptive level. Merely describing legitimacy does not do enough justice to its importance nor provide any avenues for addressing the current decline of our moral order. All the more because the causes of this decline are becoming more complex. Not only do they lie outside of the alliance, but increasingly on the inside. The ideological struggle for legitimacy and influence in the changing world is not one we should treat lightly or abandon. It should be at the forefront of our concern and requires an equally well-thought-out strategy as any battle plan against Russia. After all, our ideals give meaning to our lives; our ideals are what we fight for.

More defence investments and European assertiveness

European members need to enhance their capabilities to perform in today´s world. Burden-sharing is one of the most persistent problems within the alliance. It is also one of Trump’s main demands during his first term (Schuette, 2021, p. 1865). Besides more funds, Europe also needs more troops. The war in Ukraine provides a rare window of opportunity and has created momentum and public support to achieve this.

On the other hand, ongoing negotiations and the prospects of a ceasefire carry the risk of complacency returning (Moller, 2023, p. 111). As of yet, the momentum remains. The recent discussions within the EU for shared defence lending and a more concerted and coordinated effort to improve the defence industry show that European allies are stepping up. Of 32 members, 23 now meet the 2% norm, with Germany recently announcing drastic policy changes to expand its budget. Taking a broader view of burden-sharing, there are other areas in which Europe can step up. One such way would be to take on a more significant part of the burden of staff officers and logistics. This would accommodate the long-term trend of the US’s desire to decrease its permanent military presence and focus on the political elements of the alliance. By reducing the ongoing costs of US presence in Europe, its willingness to remain part of the alliance and respond to an Article 5 scenario could be improved in the long term. Perhaps Trump’s suggestion of forgoing an American candidate for SACEUR would be an interesting opportunity for Europe to signal that it is taking charge of its own defence.

NAVO Secretaris-Generaal Mark Rutte met Amerikaanse President Donald Trump op de NAVO-top in Den Haag, juni 2025 (Flickr)

President Trump

The first presidential term of Donald Trump sent shockwaves through the alliance. It was full of hostile rhetoric, pressure on fellow allies, and even threats of US withdrawal (Schuette, 2021, p. 1863). In a broader sense, Trump emphasised unilateralism and viewed alliances as expensive liabilities (Schreer, 2019, p. 10). The US, however, did not end up leaving NATO. Three explanations emerged from analyses of Trump’s first term in office. The first explanation bases Trump’s inconsistency in US policy on domestic factors. One such factor is that the US foreign policy establishment fiercely supports NATO. Alternatively, it might be due to the inherently outward-looking nature of entrenched liberalism that prevents withdrawal from the international stage. The second explanation sees the continued support as a rational utility-maximising decision from US hegemony. The final explanation examines Trump’s personality and cognitive features to explain the seemingly inconsistent foreign policy stance (Schuette, 2021, p. 1864). The widespread support for NATO within Congress and the Senate during Trump’s first term is a clear example of the first explanation (Schreer, 2019, p. 13). With Trump now floating the abandonment of the position of SACEUR, the opposition voiced by Republican senators indicates this support persists for the time being(Stewart & Maler, 2025).

The Secretary-General plays another vital role in keeping Trump on board. Trump was successfully kept within NATO through strategic agenda-setting, building coalitions with like-minded US foreign policymakers, and brokering compromises among allies (Schuette, 2021, p.1880). Looking at the history of US-NATO relations, it is clear that the president’s personality directly impacts the US´s global image. It follows that strained relationships during one presidency can improve during the next. (Kaufman, 2017, p. 265). Whilst Trump and his Secretary of Defence have thus far spoken in support of NATO and Article 5, the issue of contributions remains (‘Hegseth Tells NATO Hard Power Provides Deterrence, Defence.’, 2025). The ongoing negotiations with Russia on the future of Ukraine once again show Trump’s preference for good relations with Russia. Time will tell if the Senate and Congress remain staunch in their support for NATO. There also lies a challenge for Secretary-General Rutte to keep the alliance together.

A vision for NATO

Morbidly, we ought to thank Putin and Trump for revitalising NATO with a sense of purpose and solidarity. Because Putin invaded Ukraine, NATO can stand united once more in its foundational purpose of repelling the Russian menace. It no longer has to agonise over its usefulness in peacetime. Meanwhile, President Trump’s harsh reality check has spurred the other NATO members towards unprecedented action. For the first time in decades, the 2% norm is fulfilled by most allies. After years of ineffectual warnings, rapports, and complaints from a succession of US administrations, European NATO members are finally expanding their capabilities. The geopolitical earthquake of the last few years has revitalised NATO as an alliance rather than an extension of US military might. The most important task now is to prepare NATO for the future by looking beyond the war in Ukraine. In doing so, we should learn from our mistakes at the end of the Cold War. NATO needs an exit plan. It needs to evolve beyond war and find a purpose in peacetime. Achieving this requires a well-thought-out idea of what constitutes peace and security. Europe also needs to take a stance in affirming shared and enduring interests with the US. Namely that a strong and free Europe, independent and unthreatened by any of the US’s opponents, can be a counterpart to the US (Hamilton, 2020, p. 70). I believe NATO should strive for a world that no longer needs it. A world in which the naive optimism of Europe in the post-Cold War era becomes a reality. Until this world has been achieved, NATO must strengthen its purpose, be prudent in its expansion, and unite.

References

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