There is a strong sense of the Russian threat in Poland nowadays. Since these tensions are back in Poland, I am wondering, how do you see those threats being reflected in the policies of Poland?

“Let me start by saying that this is not something new. This risk of Russian revanche and it’s international aspirations have been a longer perspective. These grim scenarios were very vivid among the Polish society and decision-makers and it seemed that throughout these decades, the risk was not fully recognized, especially in Europe, but also in the United States. This is the perspective for our part of the world. We’re not only talking about Poland here, also about the Baltics and Finland. I can put it this way, we never forgot Carl von Clausewitz. He famously said that ‘there is no victory unless your enemy accepts it’s defeat.’ And Russia never accepted its defeat. The spirit in the Western part of the world was that we won the Cold War, it is the end of history and liberalism is here. In the eastern part of Europe, we were never that sure.”

”As for the policies, the first and major policy in this respect is the support given to Ukraine. It is not without difficulties, the war has turned out to be prolonged, resources are strained, and social tensions are rising around Ukrainian war refugees in Poland. The strategic policy on this issue remains broadly uncontested, supported both by the right-wing Law and Justice government and the liberal-centrist coalition that came to power in 2023. In the area of war and crisis preparedness, due to the growing threat of conflict, authorities are inventorying shelters and stockpiling protective equipment against radiological, biological, and terrorist threats. In the country’s most popular supermarket chain, you can find a military survival backpack—fully equipped. There is also a discussion going on about military training for everyone.”

France and the United Kingdom, following Trump’s phone call with Putin in February, came up with a plan for Europe to guarantee peace in Ukraine in the event of a ceasefire, with a group of countries called the ‘Coalition of the Willing’. Had this ‘Coalition of the Willing’ not already begun to falter when Poland promptly announced that it would not be deploying troops on the ground?

”I wouldn’t say that the primary reason for this coalition to be failing is that Poland said no to boots on the ground. Because this is probably the last resort that you would use in terms of a possible intervention. It’s the riskier one. It’s no coincidence that out of 30 countries in the coalition, only 4 have declared their readiness to send troops. So why not provide very sophisticated equipment to Ukraine, first? I also think that it’s too early to say that this initiative is failing. We are still getting mixed signals, while France and the United Kingdom present this attitude of all hands on deck, Germany’s strategy is still inconclusive. We need a general consensus and the question is whether this consensus has already been reached. One thing is certain: Europe cannot allow Ukraine to fall. Not everything in war is resolved through military means, and Russia is highly adept at hybrid warfare.”

There has been a lot of discussion about the proposed new NATO investment target of around 5%, with 3.5% allocated to defense and 1.5% to infrastructure. For Poland, I assume the situation is a bit different, since you’re already close to meeting that 5% spending commitment. How is this being perceived within Poland? And what is the general view there on member states like Spain, Italy, and Belgium, who are still not meeting the 2% defense spending agreement?

”This is not controversial in Poland, because everything comes down to the issue of risk perception. And of course, there is a general understanding that what is perceived as a threat here in Krakow, since the city is at 300km from Lviv, is not necessarily the same perception of Italy and Greece. There is however a general sense, that in order to become a stronger player in all other fields of influence, Europe needs to reinforce itself and invest and decide what Europe can do with this real potential. In the debate on defense spending, we also need a new, broad concept of security. Building a secure state or continent means accumulating the kind of capabilities that can deter an aggressor, but it also requires ensuring social cohesion and information security.”

”Take the United States as an example, it has built the world’s largest arsenal, yet it is still being torn apart from within by social frustration rooted in inequality and systemic neglect. In the age of information and cyber warfare, defense spending means also investments in media education and civic education. It is a critical need, regardless of how far your country is from Russia.”

”This should be a part of a new defining concept of the European Union. The EU’s success was rooted in a clear, shared vision from the start. Pioneers like Robert Schuman laid out bold goals for a united Europe, and they stuck to them, moving forward with purpose and conviction. But today, the landscape looks very different. The world around the EU has shifted dramatically, especially with the United States no longer playing the supportive role it once did. There is a gap in terms of filling in this identity space. We need to ask ourselves the question of who are we again as Europeans? And what is the role that we would like to play in the future?”

I read a very interesting essay called ‘Poland’s Long Farewell to the End of History’. You mentioned the term already. It is written by Michał Sutowski and published by the Brussels Institute for Geopolitics. He wrote: ‘Either way, everyone believed that as long as America was in, Russia would be out.’ I was wondering, because the transatlantic relationship is very vivid for Poland, how do you see this relationship changing after all the turmoil?

”A common sense is a dominant atmosphere. Poles have historically been very much pro-US and strong Atlanticists. What is going on in the US now, is very unfortunate, given the weight of the European security challenges we are facing. I think that even in these turbulent times, the strategy remains the same for Poland as the one embraced at the end of the Cold War: be a devoted European who cheers for America, because you know it is your natural ally!”

”Poles were always as European as they were Atlanticists. When you look at surveys with the expression of support for the European Union, it is just obvious. In 2023, within the final year ruled by the Law and Justice party, the level of support was 92%. Poles are super pro-European, but also pro-American, because the military centre of gravity for this geopolitical space has long been and still is in the Pentagon.”

Prime Minister Donald Tusk is a very strong advocate for European security, within the Polish EU presidency. What will his and Poland’s role be in making Europe stronger in the time ahead?

”It is about indicating what’s important. Donald Tusk is trying to establish a certain hierarchy, where security is the priority. Security was out of the picture for a very long time. The first European Security Strategy (ESS) was adopted in 2003. From its opening line, you can read that ‘Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure, nor so free’.  In 2020, the EU Security Union Strategy announces that ‘Europeans today face a security landscape in flux, impacted by evolving threats…”. Clearly, much can change over the course of 17 years. Ultimately, it all comes down to how adept we are at reading the signs. And that is where the difference lies. In Eastern Europe, the warning signs were recognized early in the century, while in Western Europe, they were largely dismissed. Poland was seen, back then, as a junior partner.”

“The Russian annexation of Crimea was a signal strong enough to bring the issue of security back to the European agenda, but for a variety of reasons this never happened. As a consequence we now find ourselves in the third year of the war, where Ukrainians are fighting for us and Europe’s security situation deteriorates. The European Union as a structure is right now in a very hard position, because you cannot do everything. It is going to be painful to pick your battles, but you have to pick your battles. What Poland is trying to say, once again, is that we need to learn our lesson and embrace reality, because this is the only way to go. Poland has experienced the harsh realities of a brutal, interest-driven political game too well to be an idealist. However, having also witnessed the twists and turns of history over the past half-century, it remains cautiously hopeful rather than completely disheartened. This perspective serves as a filter through which we seek opportunities amidst uncertainty.

Photo sources: Flickr.