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Joseph Nye and the Tragic Decline of the US-Led Liberal Order

Joseph Nye envisioned a world build on American soft power. Could this still be saved?

28-05-25

Jack Thompson

The recently deceased political scientist Joseph Nye (1937-2025) was known as one of the pioneers of the theory of soft power. Now that Washington’s policies did seriousdamage to its international standing, could American leadership in the multilateral, rules based order still be saved, or will the world soon be tired of American nationalism?

Two decades ago, as the world recoiled from the damage caused by the Iraq War, Joseph Nye observed that the United States remained a powerful and resilient international actor. In spite of the profoundly misguided decision to invade Iraq, the US still had the distinction of having “built some of the longest-lasting alliances and institutions that the modern world has seen” that had “been central to our power for more than half a century.” In addition, he wrote, the United States had enormous soft power – a “vibrant social and cultural life” providing “an almost infinite number of points of contact with other societies” – and had demonstrated again and again its ability to wield that power to its own advantage and to the benefit of the international system as a whole. His main point was, though the US had harmed itself by invading Iraq, it still had the capacity to recover and be a responsible international actor.

Interdependence and security

But in the wake of Nye’s recent passing on May 6, and as US policies once again do enormous damage to its international standing, it is worth considering whether US soft power, and the US position of leadership in key alliances and multilateral institutions, can still be salvaged. Nye’s life and career coincided with the rise and maturation of USinternational engagement. Born in the late 1930s, just in time for the US to fight in WWII and then embrace collective security (in the form of alliances such as NATO), multilateralism (in institutions such as the United Nations), and a rules-based international trade and financial system (GATT, the Bretton Woods system), Nye spent his entire professional career – aside from a few years working in the Clinton administration – teaching at Harvard University.Crucially for small and medium-sized countries such as the Netherlands, that rely on international trade and commerce, Nye’s influential work in international relations theorydemonstrated the importance of economic interdependence for security.

Perhaps no concept better embodied Nye’s vision of America’s proper global role than his coining in 1990 of the term “soft power” – essentially a state’s ability to influence the behavior of other states through persuasion and attraction, rather than force or coercion. But Nye also lived long enough to watch the US commitment to constructive international engagement begin to wane. He warned that “Americans and others may not notice the security and prosperity that the liberal order provides until they are gone—but by then, it may be too late.” Nye’s unease about this development should be heeded.

It is often forgotten that recovery from earlier bouts of self-inflicted damage such as the Vietnam War and the War in Iraq occurred during periods in which the United States faced adversaries that turned out to be less daunting – such as the militarily powerful but economically mediocre Soviet Union during the Cold War – or no powerful challengerswhatsoever. The current bout of self-harm comes during a potentially much more worrisomecontext, when the United States is engaged in what it often calls “strategic competition” with China, an adversary that is on a trajectory to be more formidable than the Soviet Union ever was.

The Chinese alternative

The scope of the challenge posed by China is what makes the current shift toward illiberalism and nationalism so troubling. Though there were deep flaws inherent in the international engagement and interdependence that Nye championed – including the tendency toward over-reliance on military interventions and acceptance of deep economic inequality – but italso gave the United States enormous resilience and a road back from self-inflicted wounds. The unilateralism, protectionism, xenophobia, and illiberalism that much of the US electorate has recently embraced neuters much of that resilience. It makes it harder to reconcile with existing allies or to cultivate new ones. It limits economic growth and erodes one of the key factors binding the United States to allies and partners. It makes fewer people want to visit or study or work in the United States. In short, it lessens America’s hard and soft power across the board. Meanwhile, China is an economic powerhouse, unlike the Soviet Union, and is increasingly positioning itself as an alternative source of leadership and stability in the international system. Beijing is also mindful of the importance of soft power and devotes considerable resources to cultivating it – even if the results are still uneven.

The shift toward nationalism is fundamentally different than the Vietnam War or the War in Iraq. Those missteps, though they caused horrific consequences and cost many lives, did not alter the US commitment to engagement and interdependence. The current bout of self-destruction is different. To be sure, most of the American center and left remains more or less committed to collective security and multilateralism, but given the nature of American elections, we can expect nationalists to be steering US foreign policy at least some of the timefor the foreseeable future. Hence, instead of being able to rely on US engagement, Europe and other erstwhile allies will need to anticipate a more erratic America, one that oscillates between bouts of tentative engagement followed by reversion to a resentful and destructive nationalism.

Until recently, the combination of engagement and interdependence and democratic stability was one of the biggest advantages the United States enjoyed in its competition with China. But it is now in the process of voluntarily discarding most of these advantages. This latest is bad enough in terms of the likely impact on US interests. But it will also do significant damage to partners and allies, all of whom are even more dependent on collective security, multilateral institutions, and economic interdependence than the United States.

There is still time to salvage a significant portion of the wreckage that was America’s international standing. Washington could still embrace an updated version of the engagement and interdependence that Nye championed. The United States can still maintain its network of global alliances, leadership in international institutions, and participation in a rules-based trading order, even as it embraces necessary reforms, such as encouraging more European autonomy in security and defense, less use of military interventionism, and a reformed World Trade Organization. But the clock is ticking, and someday soon the world will tire of American nationalism. Perhaps, as Nye began to fear in his final years, it already has.