“Have you said thank you once?”, US vice president JD Vance reproachfully asked Ukrainian president Volodymir Zelenskyy during his visit to the Oval Office on February 28. The Ukrainian president – who for years had vigorously expressed gratitude to his American allies – looked visibly astounded as president Trump further berated him, saying: “You’ve got to be more thankful because let me tell you, you don’t have the cards. With us, you have the cards, but without us, you don’t have any cards.”[1]

The Oval Office confrontation quite dramatically catapulted ‘gratitude’ as a factor in international relations into the public spotlight. Whilst gratitude has been a ubiquitous feature in transatlantic diplomacy, the Oval Office spat presented a blunt departure from the ‘emotion norms’ that characterized post-war transatlantic relations. As the case of the Netherlands suggests, the emotional intelligence with which U.S. representatives consciously approached gratitude as a delicate diplomatic factor in the aftermath of the Second World War proved to be a strategically clever move.

By no means a given

Already during the Second World War, the Roosevelt administration demonstrated a keen awareness of the strategic importance of cautiously navigating the emotional landscapes of post-war Europe. Seeking not only to win the war, but also to consolidate US interests in the peace that followed, the Office of War Information (OWI) hired the best and the brightest to chart national sensitivities to fine-tune its messaging to specific international audiences.

In her OWI analysis of The Netherlands, the famous American anthropologist Ruth Benedict described the Dutch as a “proud people, who were trying to cope with their diminished role in the world and their dependency on the help of the Allies, in Europe and Asia alike – something that could easily turn into resentment.”

Moreover, Benedict noticed, “this attitude went hand in hand with reservations over America’s postwar role as world leader and fears over American territorial ambitions and desire for economic concessions in the Dutch East Indies and elsewhere.”[2] Amidst this minefield of emotional sensitivities – with fear, distrust and resentment lurking – Dutch development into a ‘loyal ally’ was by no means considered as a given.

That Benedict’s assessment was not far off is reflected by the response of Dutch officials to the formalization of the European Recovery Program, the post-war American aid program better known as the “Marshall Plan”. During discussions of a draft bilateral agreement concerning the conditions of the recovery program, Dutch officials bemoaned “the sharp tone” of the American proposal. From their perspective, it “needlessly accentuated” the “one-sidedness” of the US-Dutch relationship and the “inequality of both partners.” Such emphasis, they argued, was “untactful” on “psychological grounds”, and undermined the common goals the United States and European nations had formulated.[3]

More business-like

Dutch officials preferred that the ‘idealistic spirit’ of the draft agreement, which emphasized US generosity and Dutch dependency, be replaced by a more “business-like” understanding of the relationship. By reframing it as a ‘joint-venture’, in which the Netherlands was not just a passive receiver but actively contributed to the pursuit of shared transatlantic interests, the Dutch advocated an alternative understanding of the Marshall Plan: as a collective investment that would pay itself back in ways that would profit both countries. This alternative frame, which de-emphasized the unequal relationship of an active and powerful benefactor versus a passive and dependent beneficiary, allowed the Dutch to accept US aid whilst maintaining a sense of pride and dignity.

American Marshall Plan representatives stationed at the European Cooperation Administration (ECA) mission to The Netherlands quickly picked up on these sentiments and adjusted their approach accordingly. Dealing with Dutch ‘pride’ was perceived as a particularly precarious issue in this context. “Because the Dutch have taken one of the quickest comedowns in Europe”, an early report from the ECA mission in The Hague stated, “their pride must be a prime consideration.” Translating the implication of this analysis into diplomatic practice, the report warned that: “Obvious demonstrations of gratitude must not be pushed, and all publicity of aid requires discretion and taste.”[4]

As such, demonstrations of gratitude did not need to be pushed: the Dutch had immediately and vigorously started to express gratitude – both for the American role in the liberation and for the Marshall Plan – on their own accord. Whether initiated by official political-diplomatic actors, through grass-roots citizen initiatives, civil society or the business community: gratitude sprang from all over the Netherlands.

Strategically timed celebrations

All these varied expressions of thanks were in turn also strategically mediated by the Dutch government to relevant U.S. audiences. Despite the ECA policy of not ‘pushing’ displays of gratitude, Dutch officials nevertheless experienced considerable US pressure to perform it frequently and in visually compelling ways. This was a direct result of the central role of the American Congress, which assumed the power to annually review the continuation and budget of the recovery program, including how aid would be distributed among participating countries. Thus, whilst there was a profound sense of sincere gratitude among Dutch citizens and officials alike, on a political-diplomatic level there was also a clear strategic interest in properly expressing Dutch gratitude and making sure it reached key American audiences.

Much of Dutch public diplomacy surrounding the Marshall Plan consequently focused on keeping Congress – and the American taxpayer – satisfied. To this end, the Dutch presented their case with copious statistical reports documenting the progress of their economic recovery through “hard work and sober living”, but also through periodic public events, such as the reception of ships delivering US goods or parades, pageants, and anniversary ceremonies portraying Dutch gratitude for American aid – often strategically timed to coincide with congressional debates on the aid program. In this, the Dutch Marshall Plan Bureau worked closely together with the American ECA mission in The Hague, whose staff helped the Dutch to satisfy congressional demands whilst carefully mediating the Dutch emotional landscape. [5]

As ECA information officer Eugene Rachlis reported: “We have not sponsored or requested demonstrations of gratitude but have emphasized the genuine American desire for Dutch recovery and pointed up the mutual cooperation which is bringing this about.” In this, he argued, “Dutch taste, while an elusive thing, has been respected”. The report does not hide that accommodating this ‘elusive’ Dutch taste did at times require considerable effort by the Americans: “many projects”, Rachlis explained, “while apparently dignified, must be tested first lest they be judged offensive or condescending by the Dutch.”[6]

Marshall aid for political purposes

Indeed, Dutch bureaucrats at times privately expressed misgivings about what they regarded as undignified public ‘stunts’, or – as one Dutch information officer referred to it: “hip hip hooray and thank you Marshall” publicity.[7] Dutch resentment towards the way in which the Americans used Marshall aid as a tool of decolonization – pressuring the Netherlands to let go of its colony Indonesia – presented a more profound point of friction. Whilst “in general, the Dutch are pro-American,” Rachlis noted that local representatives experienced “a fairly difficult period of Dutch-American relations”.

By the end of 1949, the idea was gaining traction that “the U.S. gives with one hand and takes with the other.”[8] As an anonymous letter in a local Dutch newspaper—signed by the author as “Not A Grateful One”— sarcastically asked: “Is this gratitude caused by the powerful role that the United States played in tearing away Indonesia from the Dutch Empire?”[9] Such obvious instrumentalization of Marshall aid for political purposes that undermined the Dutch national interest strengthened the criticism from citizens who argued that the American aid was clearly not a gift bestowed upon them by a generous and benevolent friend, but rather just served American political interests.

American ECA representatives also struggled with diplomatically tone-deaf congressional demands. This included the requirement that the Marshall Plan emblem with the American stars and stripes be visibly printed on Marshall aid sponsored goods, including the text: ‘For European Recovery, supplied by the United States of America’.[10] This American self-promotion – again highlighting US generosity and Dutch dependency – did not live up to the standards of ‘taste’ and ‘discretion’ that diplomatic representatives had called for.

Recognizing that such actions were counterproductive – not just in the Netherlands, but throughout Europe – the 1951 guidelines for Marshall Plan information policy asserted that experience up to that point had “amply demonstrated the superficiality and futility of any effort to win friends in Europe by appealing to a sense of gratitude for American generosity’.” Since any aid clearly labeled as ‘American’ tended to “offend national pride” and to “put people on the defensive against ‘propaganda’”, the new guidelines explicitly advised against such practices.[11]

‘Part of a joint venture’

These efforts by American representatives to respectfully defer to the pride and dignity of aid-receiving countries did not go unnoticed by their Dutch counterparts. Looking back on this period, Ernst van der Beugel, who had been responsible for the daily coordination of the Marshall Plan on behalf of the Netherlands, repeatedly pointed out how the attitude of the American Marshall Plan representatives left a profound impression on him.

As he recalled, these Americans “found themselves right in the middle of policy making, in spheres which belonged to the privacy of [Dutch] national sovereignty (…) in such a way that they were simply the donors and we were simply the receivers.”

Such an “extremely delicate” relationship, Van der Beugel underlined, presented an exceptionally fertile breeding ground for conflict and resentment: “With the power they had, they could have behaved as pro-consuls,” but – and this still greatly amazed him decades later – they did not. Instead, “they exercised their powerful position with great restraint.”[12] 

He was deeply touched by the fact that American representatives had explicitly not approached the Marshall Plan as “a matter of one side bestowing a gift as a royal but dominating gesture on the other, accepting timidly and thankfully.” Instead, they gave him the feeling that they shared the Dutch understanding that “the fundamental principle of the Marshall Plan was something far beyond this, that this was a joint attempt, we were part of a joint venture.” In doing so, these Americans combined “wisdom and tactfulness with sufficient toughness and the ability to negotiate.” To van der Beugel they resembled “the vanguard of the new role of the United States in the world.”[13]

Emotional ties that remained strong

US Foreign Policy and behavior during this period demonstrated to Ernst van der Beugel that whilst the United States was powerful, it was a benign power that could be trusted, and – because of that – respected and admired. While pockets of resentment and distrust endured, similar emotional ties would remain strong among the majority of the Dutch World War Two generation.[14] Thus, the respect, trust and goodwill this American policy and behavior generated strengthened transatlantic bonds and helped to build a constructive emotional foundation that allowed the US to more easily consolidate and maintain its international position of power and leadership in the wake of the Second World War.

“I consider this the finest period of U.S. foreign politics and of the American behavior,”[15] Ernst van der Beugel concluded whilst looking back on his life and career – by now as professor of Post-World War Two Western Cooperation. Indeed, whenever US international policy inspired more negative responses amongst new generations of Europeans, for example during the Vietnam and Iraq wars, it was the memory of America’s role during this period that many Atlanticists, including Ernst van der Beugel, would reach back to[16] – suggesting that if the US has ever known a ‘golden age’ of American foreign relations, this may have been it.

All notes and references can be found at https://www.atlcom.nl/magazine/do-not-push-for-gratitude

[1] Adriana Gomez Licon,“What they said: Trump, Zelenskyy and Vance’s heated argument in the Oval Office”, Associated Press, February 28, 2025, https://apnews.com/article/trump-zelenskyy-vance-transcript-oval-office-80685f5727628c64065da81525f8f0cf.

[2] Marja Roholl, ‘An Invasion of a Different Kind: The US Office of War Information and “The Projection of America” Propaganda in the Netherlands, 1944–1945’, In: Bak, Mehring and Roza, eds., Politics and Cultures of Liberation (Brill: Leiden/Boston, 2018), 26.

[3] Report of a meeting of the Advisory Council for the European Recovery Program addressed to Hirschfeld, June 1948, Dutch National Archives (DNA), BuZa, entry 2.05.117, inv. nr. 23057.

[4] Eugene Rachlis, information officer, ECA Mission to The Netherlands, to Roscoe Drummond, director, OSR information Division in Paris, 15 December 1949, National Archives of the United States at College (NARA) Park, MD, Record Goup 469: Records of US Foreign Assistance Agencies, 1948-1961, Mission to the Netherlands, entry 1335, box 1.

[5] For a more in depth analysis of Dutch expressions of gratitude and the ‘diplomacy of gratitude’ in this context see: Jorrit van den Berk, and Albertine Bloemendal, “‘Hip Hip Hooray and Thank You Marshall’: Gratitude, Emotion and the Mediation of Post-War Dutch–US Relations”, Contemporary European History, (2024), 1–18. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0960777324000444.

[6] Rachlis to Drummond, 15 December 1949.

[7] Cited in: Berk and Bloemendal, “Hip Hip Hooray”, 7.

[8] Rachlis to Drummond, 15 December 1949.

[9] Diederik Oostdijk, Bells for America: The Cold War, Modernism, and the Netherlands Carillon in Arlington (Pennsylvania State University Press: University Park, 2019), 58, 93.

[10] Pien van der Hoeven, Hoed af voor Marshall: De Marshall-hulp aan Nederland 1947–1952 (Amsterdam: Bakker, 1997), 115–16.

[11] Report enclosed in Roscoe Drummond, director of information OSR, to ECA information officers, 9 Feb. 1951, NARA, RG469, entry 1335, box 2.

[12] E.H. van der Beugel, “An Act without Peer: The Marshall Plan in American-Dutch Relations”, Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden 97:1(1982), 466-467. Albertine Bloemedal, Reframing the Diplomat: Ernst van der Beugel and the Cold War Atlantic Community (Brill: Boston/Leiden, 2018), 77.

[13] E.H. van der Beugel, “An Act Without Peer”, 466; Albert Kersten et al., Oral History E.H. van der Beugel, file 61-66, Ernst van der Beugel Papers, DNA, The Hague, 139-146.

[14] Albertine Bloemendal, “‘To Ensure that these Emotions are Passed to the Next Generation’. The Netherlands American Military Cemetery in Margraten as a Site of Transatlantic Memory Diplomacy during George W. Bush’s ‘War on Terror'”, European Journal of American Studies 18:2 (2023). https://doi.org/10.4000/ejas.20247

[15] Kersten et al., Oral History E.H. van der Beugel, 146.

[16] Bloemendal, “‘To Ensure that these Emotions are Passed to the Next Generation’”.