Zim Nwokora is an associate professor at Deakin University in Melbourne, Australia 

After a meeting with Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, US President Trump expressed his ongoing support for the controversial US-UK-Australian defense pact. But a lot of uncertainties remain. 

On Tuesday, Australian Prime Minister, Anthony Albanese, held talks in the White House with President Donald Trump, in the first face-to-face meeting between the two leaders. Topping the agenda in what was dubbed the diplomatic test of Albanese’s political life was the future of AUKUS, the controversial defense pact signed in 2021. It links Australia, the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US) in a decades-long partnership involving joint production and exchange of nuclear-powered submarines. It also involved cooperation in computing, artificial intelligence, and quantum technologies. These two aspects, described as Pillar 1 and Pillar 2, will become increasingly connected in the future as the advanced technologies are integrated into the new submarines.  

In the press conference that followed, Trump announced that it was “full steam ahead” with AUKUS’s implementation. But beyond this headline endorsement, the trilateral agreement is still the subject of a review led by US Undersecretary of Defense Elbridge Colby, which is considering the questions of details that have raised doubts. As Malcolm Turnbull – a former Australian prime minister and AUKUS sceptic – has pointed out, ‘warm words don’t build submarines.’ The review has stimulated another round of debate in Australia about the country’s understanding of its future security, and about whether the eye-watering cost of the AUKUS project, $368bn over 30 years, is money well spent. 

The AUKUS vision 

A number of reasons have been canvassed as justifications for AUKUS. Central to these narratives is the rapid growth and modernization of China’s defense capabilities, and their increasingly assertive deployment. The Indo-Pacific region has clearly entered a period of instability. The US was the region’s dominant power for most of the time since World War II, exercising its power through a hub-and-spokes model. In this model, it underwrote a form of stability by guaranteeing security for allies such as Australia, Japan, South Korea, Philippines and Taiwan. Operating under US preeminence, America’s allies in this region, like those in Europe, imagined security in terms of supporting US-led operations. And with weak incentives to build large militaries, they were able to commit resources to fund welfare and development that might otherwise have gone to defence. 

The rise of China, especially in the 2000s, has upended this model. The US is no longer the sole regional power. China’s strengthening, coupled with various kinds of US stagnation, suggest that, at least in the Indo-Pacific, the balance of power may be trending in China’s favour. In response, the US is pivoting by committing new resources to the region and by enabling its allies to do more.  AUKUS lies at the heart of a vision of a renewed US alliance system with additional Indo-Pacific nodes.  

Technologies far beyond reach 

The new base envisaged for Australia, HMAS Stirling, would bring capacity on a par with bases in Hawaii. Furthermore, AUKUS doubles down on a domain of US advantage in undersea operations, in which it retains a clear lead, technologically and numerically, over China. This domain is forecast to become even more important in the future as nuclear-powered submarines may become the submerged motherships coordinating the activities of drones and the like in the surrounding area. For US policymakers, then, AUKUS offers an opportunity for strategic empowerment. From this standpoint, it should be seen alongside calls by the US for its Indo-Pacific allies to increase their spending on defense.  

What’s more, AUKUS envisions a ramping up of US domestic shipbuilding and investment in technology, national enhancements that resonate with the commitments of the Biden administration, which signed the AUKUS deal, as well as those of the current Trump administration. For UK policymakers, AUKUS is integral to the country’s renewed focus on defense, with current and foreseeable challenges not only in Europe but also in the Indo-Pacific. British policymakers see AUKUS as crucial to strengthening global alliances to deter and, if necessary, to defeat adversaries. Another dividend for the UK, as for the US, will be the substantial investment in domestic production at a time when the country is struggling to find sources of economic growth.  

For Australian policymakers, the agreement offers a rare opportunity to bolster its defence and deterrence capacity with technologies that would otherwise lie far beyond their reach. Australia has a long history of alliance with its AUKUS friends. Thus, the agreement, though often presented as path-breaking, is in keeping with its traditional approach to security. Indeed, commentators point out that one of its chief contributions is to formalize and accelerate ongoing initiatives between the countries. 

Costs and risks 

Yet, among the allies, it is Australia who faces the most acute questions of strategy, precisely because AUKUS is targeted at the country’s biggest trading partner and the most influential country in its region. China has shown its willingness to punish Australia economically for what it regards as diplomatic transgressions. Keenly aware of this risk, Australian policymakers have generally proceeded with great caution, seeking to keep the US close without provoking Chinese ire. However, it is hard to see how this stance can be sustained as AUKUS gains momentum, organizing China’s containment and preparing Australia as a potential launchpad for attacks on its military assets.  

High-profile Australian politicians and strategic thinkers have expressed their opposition to the deal, and the public appears to be lukewarm at best. The primary question is whether the role that AUKUS envisages for Australia is in its best interests. Hugh White, a leading AUKUS sceptic, recently argued that: “the costs and risks to us of supporting the United States in trying to maintain its position in East Asia in the face of China’s challenge (…) exceed our interests and therefore on balance our interests will be better served by not supporting the United States in that kind of situation, not going to war with them over Taiwan for example.” 

American preconditions 

The problems with AUKUS, from an Australian standpoint, are also practical. The deal has Australia purchasing between three and five Virginia-class nuclear-powered submarines from the US, beginning in 2032. Australia has already committed $2 bn in down payments for upgrades to the US manufacturing base. However, the available evidence suggests that the rate of production is well below the speed needed to match the ambitious AUKUS timeline, and the issues here are not simply ones that more money can remedy.  

Australian politicians argue that the submarines that the country is due to receive will be sovereign—under the command of the Australian government. But given the difficulty of producing just one of these submarines, there are serious doubts as to whether the US will ultimately be prepared to give up any of these prized assets. The emerging view seems to be that Washington, especially led by Trump, will not agree to give up any subs unless Canberra agrees to use them to support US military objectives. In short, while there has been steadfast support for AUKUS (at least publicly) from Australian governments since its inception, it is an agreement fraught with risks. 

Not much debate 

One might think that a policy raising such fundamental questions about Australia’s security, and which will cost one-third of the current annual federal government budget, would be the subject of much debate and scrutiny. 

In fact, this hasn’t been the case. The deal was cobbled together following the decision by the then Prime Minister, Scott Morrison, to ditch the plan of his predecessor, Malcolm Turnbull, to purchase diesel-electric submarines from a French company. The new deal between the military and political leaderships of the three countries at the time was bashed out behind closed doors. In the intervening years, the UK has held an inquiry to review its commitment and the US, as noted earlier, is currently doing something similar.  

In Australia, by contrast, there has been no such review. Moreover, there has been limited public debate about AUKUS, largely because the project was supported by the main opposition party (Labor) when it was out of power, and since winning power in 2022, the Labor government has continued to nourish AUKUS financially and politically.  

All the while, polls suggest the Australian public would very much like there to be a parliamentary inquiry, as they are unsure whether AUKUS will advance Australian security. The policies of the Trump administration have led many to question whether the US is the dependable ally of the past, and indeed whether the story of ‘shared values and interests’ still holds as it once did.  

Uncertain futures 

Australian policymakers have shown no indication that they wish to heed the calls of those who demand a national reflection on AUKUS. However, their commitment to the project exists alongside many uncertainties. The meeting in Washington between Albanese and Trump has clarified that the US remains committed, at least in principle, to the deal. But even with this green light, there remain big questions about submarine production capacity in the US, as well as questions about whether Australia will be able to build any such capacity anytime soon.  

Pillar 1, the joint production and exchange of nuclear-powered submarines, has received most attention, but experts report that Pillar 2, the cooperation in computing, artificial intelligence, and quantum technologies, may be in even worse shape. The architecture overseeing AUKUS seems insufficient. Indeed, Gary Roughead has called for a new trilateral secretariat, which would coordinate the project’s strands and, crucially, counteract the parochialism of national agencies. AUKUS represents an intergenerational commitment.  

But whether the foreign policy establishments in Australia, the UK and US who, at present and in public, seem to be committed to AUKUS continue to be so, and whether they can continue to bring their publics along with them, remains to be seen. Finally, because AUKUS aims to shape the calculations of China and its allies, the biggest but also the most uncertain questions concern what effects the project will have on their planning and actions.