Mark Rutte is the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 

On September 19, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte visited The Hague to mark his first year at the head of the security alliance. The event was hosted by the Netherlands Atlantic Association, the Royal Netherlands Society for War Studies, and the Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs of Leiden University.

Rutte’s first year as Secretary General has been a turbulent one: Russia’s war in Ukraine continues relentlessly, the crisis in the Middle East has escalated into a full-blown humanitarian disaster, and defense spending in most European countries has surged in line with the newly adopted NATO norm, established at the NATO Summit in The Hague. During a conversation moderated by Anna van Zoest, Rutte engaged with students and young professionals on current international security challenges and the future of the alliance.

Is it possible for Europe to become an equal partner to the US within NATO, or does that equality require transcending the current trans-Atlantic power structure?

“The whole idea of the NATO Summit outcome was to make sure that in terms of spending, we equalize with what the US is spending. This was extremely important because we know since Eisenhower that the Americans were quite frustrated about the Europeans not spending as much as the Americans. The 3,5% equalizes with the US, so that is important. When I came to NATO, I assessed the situation, and there is no way Europe can defend itself without the US. We would need to spend not 3,5% but 5 or 6% on core defense spending, let alone the 1,5% on defense-related spending. So let’s not kid ourselves: we need to keep the trans-Atlantic alliance together.”

“By the way, that is what the Americans want. Because for the US to stay safe, they need a secure Atlantic, a secure Arctic, and a secure Europe. The US also increasingly realizes that if one day China would decide to move against Taiwan, there is a big possibility that before Xi Ping would do that, he would call his junior partner Putin in Moscow, and ask him to keep us busy here. Therefore, these theaters in the Pacific, Europe, and America are more and more connected. For all these reasons, the US wants to stay involved, but we had to solve this. I am happy with Trump when it comes to defence, because I am convinced we would have never had this outcome in The Hague without him as President of the US.”

In light of Trump’s recent talks with Zelensky and Putin, can Europe provide Ukraine with security guarantees if the US opts out, or is that impossible without US support?

“The security guarantees are the result of discussions initiated by the French President and the British Prime Minister, Macron and Starmer. How do we make sure that after a long-term ceasefire and a peace deal between Russia and Ukraine, we will not have a repeat of  what happened with the Minsk and Budapest Memoranda? We now have 26 countries that are part of the Coalition of the Willing. They all want to support an effort (post a peace deal) that makes sure that this never happens again. But we all agree that this can only happen with a strong involvement of the US. The good news is that Trump is committed to getting involved.”

“Now, discussions are ongoing on what that involvement will look like. In such a way that the collective of the original 26, plus the US involvement, will ensure that – after a peace deal or long-term ceasefire – Putin will never try again to capture one square kilometer of Ukraine. But of course, first you need a peace deal or cease fire. To get there, you need to sit down. That is another issue where Trump is trying to break the deadlock, or has broken the deadlock already, by starting to engage in dialogues. He was the only one who could do that, and I commend him for the fact that he did. But this is a tedious process that will not result in success short-term. We all agree that when it comes to these sensitive issues of post-war Ukraine, it is only Zelensky who can make those decisions on behalf of his country and people. For him, it will be crucial to know that these security guarantees are there.”

How do you see NATO cooperation with countries in Asia such as Japan and South-Korea develop during your term as Secretary General?

“This is one of the great things happening over the last years. Jaap [de Hoop Scheffer] started it in his days already and Jens [Stoltenberg] developed it further, and we now have this strong cooperation between NATO and what is called the IP4, the Indo-Pacific Four, so Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, and New Zealand. I was in Japan early April. The Japanese are extremely anxious to develop that relationship further. The idea is not to extend Article 5 to the Indo-Pacific, but to work together on the latest technologies, develop the defense industrial base; innovation in general.”

“And also sending a signal to the Chinese and the Russians and the North Koreans: yes, we know, you guys work together, with Iran, also when it comes to Ukraine at this moment, but we do the same, we also have a strong relationship with countries in the Pacific. The Chinese will have a thousand nuclear warheads by 2030, they have almost more navy ships sailing than the US, they have an incredible defense industrial base when it comes for example to ship-building – which the US is lacking at the moment – and I think it is there to be used one day. And the same for the Russians: they now spend 40% of their state budget on defense.”

There is no consensus among NATO Allies about Gaza, but it does have a big impact within NATO-countries and it also touches on security matters that NATO deals with. How do you deal with this division and how do you ensure that not speaking up does not undermine NATO’s credibility?

“The issue is that in NATO, if you would have a debate about it, you would have the Americans and the Germans on one side of the equation, and the Spanish, the Belgians, and others on the other side. You will never solve that discussion. The easy answer is that NATO is not involved; NATO is constrained to the Northern Atlantic territory. But at the same time, that makes it too easy on me, because we do have cooperation with what we call the ‘Southern Neighbourhood’, including Israel. So it would be a bit too easy to say that we are absolutely not involved. But in the end, when it comes to Gaza, it will be impossible for NATO to ever agree on anything and even if we would agree on anything, then we would not be able to execute it because we have no role there. This is a bit different for the European Union, because through trade and bilateral relations with Israel they can do more there.”

As a student of history, what lessons from past transitional periods in world history guide you as a NATO Secretary General?

“First of all, for Europe, it is really important to understand the importance of the trans-Atlantic relationship, and we should never think that we can do without it. And for the Americans to understand why the trans-Atlantic relationship is there. Not just to prevent a repeat of the mistakes that were made after the First World War, where the US retreated and said it would not be involved in Europe anymore, and Roosevelt had to wait until Pearl Harbor before he could really get involved again. After the Second World War, many thought that the US is involved in NATO not to repeat that mistake.”

“But the trans-Atlantic relationship is important for the US because for them to stay safe in the Indo-Pacific, but particularly when it comes to the Arctic, the Atlantic, and Europe, they need a strong trans-Atlantic relationship. So to that question, I think that is one of the biggest lessons from the twentieth century: that there is only one way to keep this world stable and safe, and that is through a strong trans-Atlantic relationship. I do believe there is no conflict in this world which can be solved without involvement of the biggest, most powerful nation on earth, and that is still the US.”

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