Tanya Mehra is a terrorism researcher and associate fellow at the ICCT

In short: 

• The new CT-strategy ignores empirical data from intelligence agencies by omitting domestic right-wing extremism and nihilist violent extremism (NVE), while selectively shifting focus toward narco-terrorism, the far-left, and migration.
• By formally designating drug cartels as foreign terrorist organizations rather than transnational criminal networks, the U.S. stretches counterterrorism frameworks. This expansion of power serves to indirectly justify future military action in Latin America.
• The strategy relies heavily on a military approach, ignoring the underlying ideological drivers of terrorism. Furthermore, by withdrawing from key multilateral forums, the U.S. is creating a widening strategic rift between itself and Europe.

The National Security Strategy (NSS) adopted in 2025 already provides a good insight into how the Trump administration perceives security threats ranging from terrorism to migration, and from drug cartels to state-led sabotage. Last week, the new Counter Terrorism Strategy was published.  Together with the NSS, it lays the foundation for U.S. security policy in the coming years.

For decades, the U.S. and its partners have invested in counterterrorism through multilateral frameworks such as the United Nations, the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), and coalitions like the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. These efforts have combined military, legal, and preventive tools to address a complex and evolving terrorism landscape. Leaving aside the rhetoric and sloppiness, according to many CT experts, the long-awaited CT strategy is heavily flawed; it is a blow to countering terrorism and to the rule of law.

Ignored right-wing terrorism

First, the strategy’s treatment of extremist threats is selective and incomplete. It identifies three serious threats: narco-terrorists, jihadi terrorists and the far-left. Yet for years, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) have consistently assessed domestic violent extremism—particularly right-wing extremism—as a significant and persistent threat. The strategy does not refer to or acknowledge right-wing extremism as a threat.

Furthermore, the rise of nihilist violent extremism (NVE) is being ignored. This online ecosystem consists of many loosely connected networks, such as ‘764’ or the ‘Com network’ and specifically targets vulnerable youth. As of February 2026 the FBI is investigating over 350 individuals engaged in NVE. A credible CT framework must reflect the full spectrum of current threat dynamics, not selectively emphasize some while minimizing others.

Drugs cartels as terrorist groups

Second, the expanded use of terms such as “narco-terrorism” risks blurring legal frameworks and has far-reaching implications. Whilst it is known that organized crime groups and terrorist groups can benefit from and mutually reinforce one another, they are distinct categories under international law with different motivations, structures, and legal challenges.

By labelling drug cartels as terrorist groups, they are being framed as a national security threat which has serious implications: it triggers severe sanctions regimes and enables broad material-support prosecutions carrying significant criminal penalties. Conflating them may expand enforcement powers in ways that were originally intended for other purposes, leading to further securitization. In February 2025, the US had designated 8 drug cartels as Foreign Terrorist Organizations.

Although the designation does not authorize the use of force, it contributes to a shift in perception that drug cartels are seen as a national security threat rather than a law enforcement issue. This framing may indirectly justify the military strikes in Venezuela and possible involvement in assassinations in Mexico under the pretext of combatting narco-terrorism. Yet, the U.S. has the possibility to designate drug cartels as transnational criminal organizations under Executive Order (EO) 13581 which is more appropriate. This trend illustrates the adaptation of counterterrorism tools to problems that may be better addressed through organized crime and law enforcement frameworks.

Antifa

Third, the designation of loosely organized movements such as Antifa as terrorist organizations raises additional legal and conceptual challenges. Many of these movements lack centralized command structures, defined membership, or coherent operational hierarchies—criteria traditionally associated with terrorist designation frameworks.

While according to one report there is an increase in left-wing extremist attacks in the US in 2025, this slightly stands out because of the decline in jihadi and right-wing extremist attacks during that same time frame. President Trump’s designation of Antifa – after the murder of Charlie Kirk – is concerning as it criminalizes a broad range of individuals, networks, and ideologies ranging from anti-fascists to anti-government to anti-Christians. Several populist parties in Europe – notably in the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany – also called upon their respective government to designate Antifa.

Furthermore, the strategy refers to the so-called “Red–Green alliance,” understood as a convergence between Islamist and far-left movements. The hybridization of ideologies is indeed an increasing concern. However, the so-called “Red–Green alliance” does not appear to constitute operational cooperation involving shared funding, training, or logistical support. Rather, it reflects a broader phenomenon in which people across the ideological spectrum may temporarily converge around specific political grievances online or on the streets without forming a structured alliance. Such overlaps can emerge during highly polarized protests related to the Israel–Gaza war, climate issues, or immigration.

Targeting migrants

Perhaps most concerning is the strategy’s framing of terrorism through the lens of migration. The strategy considers Europe to be both a “terror target and an incubator of terror threats,” fuelled by mass migration and weak borders. Empirical evidence does not support the notion that irregular migration is a primary vector for terrorist infiltration in Europe. While a limited number of attackers have exploited migration routes — including several perpetrators involved in the Bataclan attacks — many terrorist attacks in Europe have been carried out by citizens, long-term residents, or individuals radicalized domestically.

Moreover, such framing often fails to distinguish between individuals who radicalize prior to arrival and those who do so after arrival in Europe, as well as between migrants, asylum seekers, and long-term residents, each a distinct legal category. Migrants may be vulnerable to radicalization during their journey in refugee camps or asylum centres. There are myriad factors that make migrants vulnerable to radicalization and terrorist propaganda such as marginalization, social isolation, identity issues and discrimination. By linking terrorism and migration too closely, the strategy risks stigmatizing migrant communities broadly—many of whom are in fact fleeing the very violence counterterrorism policies aim to prevent.

Force alone

Underlying these concerns is a deeper issue: the continued reliance on a predominantly kinetic approach to countering terrorism. Language suggesting that terrorism can be “defeated” through force alone reinforces a narrow approach that history has repeatedly shown to be insufficient. As the cases of the Taliban and Hezbollah illustrate, military pressure can degrade capabilities, but it rarely eliminates the underlying ideological or political drivers of such movements. Even with the relative success of the territorial defeat of ISIS in 2019, it is clear that the ideology has not been defeated. One cannot bomb ideology out of existence.

In fact, the new CT-strategy acknowledges that jihadism still poses a serious threat. The successive take-overs of jihadi Islamists in the Sahel and the growing stronghold of ISKP in Afghanistan are concerning. According to the latest report of Europol and several national threat assessments, jihadist terrorism remains one of the most significant terrorist threats in Europe. While most plots and attacks in Europe are no longer centrally directed by Islamic State, many individuals—particularly young people online—continue to be drawn to its ideology, posing an ongoing and evolving security concern.

Spill-over effect

At the same time, the NSS indicates that the U.S. intends to pivot away from the Middle East. Instability in post-Assad Syria, the Israel-Hezbollah conflict in Lebanon, the unresolved conflict in Gaza and the continuation of the US-Iran war demonstrate that the region is far from safe and secure. The conflicts have intensified regional polarization, increased online radicalization, and heightened the risk of spill-over effect into Europe and North America. Europol, DHS, and several intelligence agencies have warned that escalating tensions involving Iran and its proxy networks may increase the likelihood of terrorism, violent extremism, cyberattacks, and lone-actor violence in the West.

This should in particular be of great concern to the U.S., which is directly engaged in a war with Iran. Yet, the strategy continues to focus primarily on Sunni Islamist extremist organizations. Just this weekend an Iraqi member of the pro-Iranian militia Kata’ib Hizballah has been extradited to the U.S. wo has been allegedly orchestrated a string of attacks against Jewish people and property across Europe but also for planning and plotting attacks on American soil. This is a significant shift as Khatiba has so far only carried out attacks in the Middle East. The prolonged instability in the Middle East creates fertile conditions for extremist resurgence, including the potential re-emergence of ISIS.

Political manifesto

The transatlantic security agenda and shared threat perception between the U.S. and Europe are no longer fully aligned. The U.S. has withdrawn from initiatives such as the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) and the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, while remaining engaged in the Global Coalition against Daesh. This continued participation suggests that counter-ISIS efforts may remain one of the limited areas where close U.S.–European cooperation on counterterrorism can still be sustained.

The new Counter Terrorism Strategy reads more like a political manifesto. Previous counter-terrorism strategies were generally grounded in evidence-based threat assessments and reflected the need to allocate limited resources according to the level of posed across the entire ideological spectrum. A more effective counterterrorism strategy would therefore rebalance its focus: maintaining robust security tools while investing equally in prevention with a particular focus on countering radicalization and recruitment, rule-of-law frameworks, and long-term political solutions. Without that balance, there is a risk that this unhinged strategy will not only fail to reduce the threat but may inadvertently reinforce the very dynamics it seeks to counter.