Sophie Vanhoonacker is Professor in Administrative Governance at the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at Maastricht University

Roberta N. Haar is Professor in Foreign Policy Analysis and Transatlantic Relations at the Faculty of Science and Engineering at Maastricht University

Strategic technologies, including digital innovations such as AI, are increasingly a source of transatlantic tension. The EU is a relatively weak player in the field of strategic technologies, while the US is clearly a frontrunner. Washington now ruthlessly weaponizes this gap in digital autonomy. What should Europe’s answer look like?

Transatlantic divergences on strategic technologies are not new. The United States has long favored a market-driven approach, grounded in strong confidence in self-regulation and a limited governmental role outside the security area. This laissez-faire attitude is not only motivated by a search for relentless innovation and economic efficiency but also by a strong belief in individual liberty and free speech.

In contrast, the EU and its member states have long opted for a rights-driven approach.[1] Flagship laws, such as the Digital Markets Act,[2] the Digital Services Act,[3] and the AI Act,[4] illustrate how the EU is trying to find a balance between stimulating innovation and protecting its citizens from the risks of the technological revolution. As with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), the EU again hopes that its standards and regulations will be an important source of inspiration for other countries and the global governance models of strategic technologies more broadly.

Ruthlessly weaponized dependencies

Until recently, both approaches lived more or less in parallel, without impinging on each other. Under the Joe Biden administration (2021-25), initiatives such as the Executive Order (EO) on a “Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of AI,”[5] which set ambitious safety and security standards, even led to the silent hope that the US was slowly moving towards a more regulatory approach. In another example, a joint statement of the EU-US Trade and Technology Council (TTC) expressed a commitment to a risk-based approach.[6]

Unfortunately, these timid steps towards a more convergent pathway forward ended abruptly with the second Trump administration (2025-). In fact, leaders of tech companies, who supported Trump in the 2024 elections, were rewarded with a series of executive orders that reinforced self-regulation, weakened antitrust enforcement, softened data privacy requirements, and promoted permissive content moderation rules.[7] Equally significant was the end of Washington’s earlier laissez-faire acceptance of the EU’s distinct digital governance model.

The United States moved on to leveraging Europe’s dependence on security and trade to pressure the EU into loosening or modifying its digital regulations. This is a maneuver that the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, described as living in a world where “dependencies are ruthlessly weaponized.”[8]

Economic and cultural 

From the perspective of the Trump administration, the United States has two concerns: first, an economic one. Those currently in charge in Washington view the EU’s regulatory constraints as targeting American tech giants and their ability to make a profit. The second issue is a cultural one, where there is a profound divergence in norms.

Whereas the EU prioritizes protecting citizens from harmful online content, many of the loudest voices in the US regard such interventions as encroachments on free speech. For example, in September 2024, then-vice-presidential nominee J.D. Vance suggested that continued US support for NATO should hinge on the EU refraining from regulating social media platforms like X. In an interview with influencer Shawn Ryan, Vance argued that “It’s insane that we would support a military alliance if the military alliance isn’t going to be pro-free speech.”[9]

In February 2025, Vance also scolded Europeans for their emphasis on consumer protection, saying, “The AI future will not be won by hand-wringing about safety.”[10] These sentiments more recently found their way into the US National Security Strategy, published in December 2025. This strategy referred to the “censorship of free speech” as one of “the larger issues facing Europe” and that Europe should “abandon its failed focus on regulatory suffocation.”[11]

Structural faultline

Clearly, normative differences now intersect with a new readiness in Washington to weaponize Europe’s vulnerabilities in other domains to secure concessions on digital governance. This was evident in the negotiations surrounding the Framework Agreement on Reciprocal, Fair and Balanced Trade. While public debate around the “Turnberry deal” focused on tariffs, the United States used the talks to pressure the European Commission to soften its digital rules,[12] thereby demonstrating how value-based disagreements are increasingly coupled with coercive bargaining tactics.

Taken together, the widening transatlantic rift over strategic technologies is no longer a manageable divergence but a structural faultline, in which regulatory, economic, and security interests are increasingly entangled. As cooperation with Washington becomes more conditional and coercive, the EU can no longer rely on convergence alone and must prepare for less favorable scenarios.

The need for a Plan B

If Plan A is to cooperate pragmatically with the United States on digital technologies for as long as possible, it is high time for Europeans to simultaneously develop a clear Plan B. Such a plan could be executed in parallel, decoupling external engagement from internal preparation, by framing the necessary steps as non-antagonistic. In line with this dual-track approach, we suggest that any Plan B include three key elements.

Firstly, the EU should firmly resist US pressure to dilute or reinterpret its digital regulations. Maintaining the integrity of the DSA, DMA, and AI Act is essential not only for protecting European citizens but also for safeguarding the EU’s credibility as a global regulatory leader. Any concessions made in unrelated domains, such as trade or security, risk setting a precedent in which core European values and standards become bargaining chips.

Additionally, the EU should continue to articulate clearly that companies operating in the Single Market, including US tech giants, remain fully bound by EU law. The recent enforcement of the DSA with a fine on Elon Musk’s social media platform X is a step in the right direction. Although the fine concerns consumer protection rather than content moderation, several figures in the Trump Administration nonetheless framed it as an attack on free speech (Mak, 2025).[13]

Secondly, the EU should address its vulnerabilities, especially its dependence on American technological products, platforms, and security guarantees, by strengthening its resilience. This requires intensifying investment in indigenous technological capacity across key sectors such as semiconductors, cloud infrastructure, AI, and cybersecurity. Achieving this means expanding industrial policy initiatives, supporting cross-border R&D networks, and creating conditions for European firms to become globally competitive. Reducing these dependencies is essential for achieving true strategic autonomy. Initiatives such as the Second Chips Act, designed to strengthen Europe’s competitiveness within the global semiconductor ecosystem, are therefore welcome.

Thirdly, the EU should adopt a clear internal position that rules out the “trading away” of digital standards in negotiations focused on trade, tariffs, or security cooperation. Attempts by the US to leverage NATO commitments or trade concessions to influence EU digital policy must be met with coordinated, united responses from the Commission and member states. Establishing a principled firewall between digital regulation and other policy domains will shield EU decision-making from coercive bargaining tactics and ensure that transatlantic cooperation proceeds on mutually respectful terms.

Making Europe a better partner

Growing transatlantic tensions over strategic technologies increasingly reflect not only a fundamental clash of regulatory philosophies but also deeper cultural differences. These variances are now amplified by the second Trump administration’s willingness to leverage Europe’s dependencies for political gain. The EU must respond with firmness and unity. By defending its regulatory autonomy, reducing its strategic vulnerabilities, and refusing to let digital rules become bargaining chips in other negotiations, the EU can safeguard its values and maintain its role as a credible global standard-setter in the digital age.

This article was supported by the REMIT research project, funded by the European Union’s Horizon Europe research and innovation program under grant agreement No 101094228.

[1] Anu Bradford, Digital Empires: The Global Battle to Regulate Technology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023), https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197649268.001.0001

[2] European Parliament and Council, Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2022 on Contestable and Fair Markets in the Digital Sector (Digital Markets Act), Official Journal of the European Union,https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/1925/oj

[3] European Parliament and Council, Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market for Digital Services (Digital Services Act), Official Journal of the European Union, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32022R2065

[4] European Parliament and Council, “Regulation Laying Down Harmonised Rules on Artificial Intelligence (Artificial Intelligence Act),” 2024, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:e0649735-a372-11eb-9585-01aa75ed71a1.0001.02/DOC_1&format=PDF

[5] United States, Executive Order, “Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence,” October 30, 2023, https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2023/10/30/executive-order-on-the-safe-secure-and-trustworthy-development-and-use-of-artificial-intelligence/

[6] European Commission, “Joint Statement on a United States–European Union Framework on an Agreement on Reciprocal, Fair and Balanced Trade,” August 21, 2025, https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/news/joint-statement-united-states-european-union-framework-agreement-reciprocal-fair-and-balanced-trade-2025-08-21_en

[7] Paul Barrett, “Tech’s Love Affair with Trump Grows Stronger by the Day,” Tech Policy Press, October 25, 2025, https://www.techpolicy.press/techs-love-affair-with-trump-grows-stronger-by-the-day/

[8] Ursula von der Leyen, “State of the Union 2025,” address to the European Parliament, European Commission, 2025, https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/state-union/state-union-2025_en

[9] Gustaf Kilander, “J.D. Vance Says US Could Drop Support for NATO If Europe Tries to Regulate Elon Musk’s Platforms,” The Independent, September 17, 2024, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/jd-vance-elon-musk-x-twitter-donald-trump-b2614525.html

[10] Tom Bristow, “Britain Dances to JD Vance’s Tune as It Renames AI Institute,” Politico, February 14, 2025, https://www.politico.eu/article/jd-vance-britain-ai-safety-institute-aisi-security/

[11] National Security Strategy of the United States, November 2025, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf

[12] Aneta Datta, “US Trade Deal Doesn’t Touch EU Tech Laws, Brussels Vows (Again),” Euractiv, August 5, 2025, https://www.euractiv.com/news/us-trade-deal-doesnt-touch-eu-tech-laws-brussels-vows-again/

[13] Aaron Mak, “Why the X Fine Is Causing So Much Transatlantic Drama,” Politico Digital Future Daily Newsletter, December 8, 2025,  https://www.politico.com/newsletters/digital-future-daily

Photo: The White House