Trump’s America and the dual threat to European security and democracy

In his speech at the Munich Security Conference, Vice President J.D. Vance confronted Europeans with a dual challenge most did not know existed. It is confronted with a American foreign policy hostile to multilateralism and ambivalent about alliances. Besides that, Europe must also contend with a right wing populism, that is part of a global trend, and rejects key aspects of the European project.

Jack Thompson

Europeans fully expected that Trump administration officials at the 2025 Munich Security Conference would sing a now-familiar tune: Europe must take more responsibility for its own security, it must spend more on defense, and the Trump administration wanted the war in Ukraine to end soon. What Europeans did not expect was a full-frontal assault from the Vice President, JD Vance, on European democracy, spoken in the language of a rightwing populism that is increasingly recognizable throughout the West. Vance criticized Brussels for targeting hateful content online, Berlin for combating misogyny, and European policymakers in general for opening “the floodgates to millions of unvetted immigrants.” He warned his European colleagues, “The threat that I worry the most about vis-a-vis Europe is…the threat from within. The retreat of Europe from some of its most fundamental values… If you’re running in fear of your own voters, there is nothing America can do for you.”

 

Vance’s speech highlighted the fact that Europe faces not one, but two types of threats from the current administration. It is confronted with a foreign policy hostile to multilateralism and ambivalent about alliances. In addition, Europe must contend with a political worldview that rejects key aspects of the European project and is openly sympathetic to Europe’s right-wing political movements.

 

These two threats are related, and originate in a version of rightwing populism that has rapidly migrated from the fringes to the mainstream of American politics. European policymakers would do well to acknowledge the nature of these threats and to begin the urgent process of adapting their political systems, both to support more ambitious and capable foreign policy security policies, as well as to remain resilient in the face of interrelated internal-external attacks from rightwing populists hostile to European democratic values.

 

The Threat Posed by a Nationalist U.S. Foreign Policy

Most on this side of the Atlantic have finally accepted the revived version of nationalism that guides the Trump administration. It is hostile to the type of international system that Europe would prefer: a multilateral world based on cooperative security, rules-based trade, and international law. What many Europeans have been slower to acknowledge is the durability and influence of this worldview. While U.S. foreign policy will continue at times to reflect a more liberal international perspective – Democrats still favor multilateralism and collective security – Trump’s nationalism is now a mainstream school of thought and will not disappear after he leaves office. In addition, there is widespread support for the Trump administration’s desire to focus on the Indo-Pacific and for at least a degree of protectionism.

 

The widespread appeal of this nationalism is partly a function of the changing international landscape. Among many rightwing voters there has been a backlash to elements of globalization, especially the lowering of trade barriers and higher levels of immigration that accelerated beginning in the 1990s. In addition, there is considerable anxiety about the emergence of a multipolar world order and the relative decline of American power.

 

But powerful historical and cultural impulses also bolster the appeal of Trump’s worldview. Since the outset of the Revolutionary War in 1776, the American sense of identity has been built upon two related convictions – that Americans are exceptional because of their unique political system and social values, and that they are different from and better than non-Americans, especially Europeans. Today, that conviction is manifested on the American right, in part, by disdain for the European project and for Europe’s progressive social values.

 

The Danger of Transnational Rightwing Populism

Vance’s speech confronted Europeans with a challenge most did not know existed. The rightwing populists that have conquered the Republican Party are not an isolated phenomenon. Instead, they are part of a global trend. In retrospect, we can see that the current incarnation of rightwing populism emerged in the 1990s in the United States. But similar political movements also arose in most West European countries at roughly the same time. Eventually, comparable movements appeared in Eastern European countries as well.

 

Over time, most of these movements have achieved significant electoral success. While each speaks to local and national issues, over time these movements have increasingly adopted similar ideas, language, and policy positions. This includes complaints about anti-wokeism, the embrace of the Great Replacement Theory and other conspiracy theories, and, in many cases, a convergence on issues such as ambivalence or even hostility to Ukraine’s war for survival against Russia. One of the foremost victories for transnational rightwing populism was Trump’s return to the White House.

 

The growing overlap between rightwing populist parties, especially in North America and Europe, is not an accident. We still do not fully understand why these movements originated at roughly the same time. However, their convergence today is at least in part the result of old-fashioned networking at gatherings such as the annual National Conservatism Conference and the recent meeting in Madrid hosted by the Vox party, which promised to “make Europe great again.” The annual U.S. Conservative Political Action Conference has recently gone global, with international versions in many locations. Visits to Victor Orban’s Hungary have become something of a right of passage for rightwing populists from the United States and elsewhere. In addition, social media has made it easier for rightwing populist ideas and terminology to spread.

 

Implications for Europe

Vance’s speech at the Munich Security Conference was in part an ongoing attempt by the Vice President to appeal to the rightwing populists that now form the base of the Republican Party, and thereby position himself as Trump’s successor. But it also underscored the extent to which Europe needs to understand and plan for two long-term threats to its security and political systems emanating from the United States. One is a nationalist foreign policy which a large minority of Americans – and the leadership of the GOP – now embrace. The other is a version of rightwing populism that takes energy and ideas from its European counterparts, even as it serves as an example to them. In order to prepare itself for these challenges, Europe should embark on two long-term programs.

 

First, it should revive its ability to fight and win military conflicts independent of the United States. Many have made similar pleas, but until real progress occurs on this front it bears repeating. The second initiative is even more complicated, but potentially even more important. The most significant political divide in Europe today is not right versus left, it is democratic versus illiberal. Europe’s mainstream political movements should recognize this and act accordingly. Though academic research on effective strategies to counter rightwing populism is relatively underdeveloped, it is clear that Europe’s mainstream parties, right and left, need to implement policies that address both the economic and cultural factors fueling the success of rightwing populism. This means delivering higher economic growth for working and middle class voters, as well as addressing the sources of their cultural resentment.

 

None of these ideas will address the root causes of rightwing populism on the far side of the Atlantic. That is a task for the many Americans that still care about saving their own democracy. But it will make rightwing populism, both the American European variants, less attractive to voters in Europe.

Header photo: Wikimedia Commons / Gage Skidmore