Trump II and the Korean Peninsula: A Transatlantic Challenge

Elena Guido

Nowhere will the impact of Donald Trump’s new presidency be more immediate than on the Korean Peninsula, where both the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) are waiting to reassess their strategies in response to Washington’s expected shift in postures. While NATO pivots to confront new threats, evaluating the global implications of U.S. policies’ change towards Asia –and especially the Korean peninsula– is critical for understanding the effect this will have on European and transatlantic security.

Trump’s re-election is likely to aggravate tensions in US-ROK relations for several reasons, impacting security dynamics on the Korean Peninsula and the broader Indo-Pacific region.

 

During his first term, Trump’s transactional approach to alliances led him to demand that South Korea bear the full cost of US troops stationing on the territory, threatening their partial withdrawal otherwise[1]. This would be a significant departure from the current arrangement where South Korea covers approximately 50% of this cost. Although Joe Biden’s October five-year defense cost-sharing agreement with South Korea included an 8.3% increase in Seoul’s contribution[2], this hike falls short of Trump’s earlier demands by far. A full withdrawal of US forces remains unlikely, but Trump may renegotiate this agreement and/or use troop reductions as a bargaining chip[3]. This would strain relations, especially if the US departs from trilateral military exercises with Japan and South Korea or re-open talks with North Korea. The strategic importance of US forces stationing on the Korean peninsula is greater for the ROK than their absence is for the DPRK, hence Seoul fears vulnerability under these scenarios.

 

South Korea under pressure

Uncertainty is fueling debates in South Korea over developing nuclear capabilities, especially in fear of American abandonment.[4] Whilst traditionally opposed to nuclearization, South Korean public support might grow if Trump rekindles talks with Pyongyang.[5] Indeed, nuclearization could offer immediate security assurances, but it risks destabilizing the region by prompting other Indo-Pacific nations to pursue their own nuclear capabilities, increasing the likelihood of miscalculation and conflict.

 

Simultaneously, South Korea faces challenges navigating indirect support for Ukraine amidst its war. President Yoon has been very vocal lately about the possibility of his nation providing direct lethal aid to Ukraine.[6] South Korea does supply arms to intermediaries probably aiding Ukraine (the US and different European countries), but it avoids direct involvement to prevent heightening tensions with North Korea and Russia.[7] This posture reflects the country’s non-interventionist policy, which prohibits arming nations in active conflicts. This situation is unlikely to change, since direct involvement of the ROK could risk turning the Ukrainian war into a proxy battleground between the two Koreas, potentially escalating into a broader confrontation on the peninsula and beyond, something the Yoon administration, and any other following administration, cannot afford.

 

The drop in approval ratings for President Yoon Suk-yeol, previously at a perilous 20%, further complicates South Korea’s position.[8] Yoon’s very recent brief imposition of martial law on December 3 — likely an attempt to counter political gridlock from his weak parliamentary and public support — was lifted within eight hours via a parliamentary vote.[9] While such a move might have bolstered Trump’s perception of Yoon as a ‘strongman’, it has instead set the stage for his likely impeachment.[10] A new progressive administration may adopt a less hardline approach toward North Korea, but will still grapple with the same strategic challenges.

 

However, Trump’s focus on countering China may ensure a continued strong US presence in the Indo-Pacific, even if his administration might threaten traditional alliances.[11] Unpredictability leaves South Korean policymakers anxious about the future of US-ROK relations as they face North Korea and internal instability.

 

Opportunity makes the thief: the DPRK

Earlier this year, Trump made headlines by referencing his personal relationship with Kim Jong Un, suggesting Kim probably “misses” him.[12] North Korean state media denied this,[13] but it is a fact that Trump’s re-election could have serious implications for North Korea’s position on the global stage. One notable outcome of this re-election might be reduced US support for NATO, given Trump’s skepticism toward the alliance and transactional approach to burden-sharing.[14] His remarks about letting Russia act freely against under-contributing NATO members raise concerns about the alliance’s cohesion[15] This could halt NATO’s growing focus on the Indo-Pacific, highlighted by recent summits with South Korea, Australia, and Japan. Moreover, Trump’s UN ambassador pick opposing Ukraine’s NATO bid signals a US policy shift, weakening the alliance globally. A weakened NATO would allow deeper DPRK-Russia collaboration, reducing containment efforts and enabling North Korea to emerge as an assertive global actor[16].

 

The DPRK could also benefit from the anticipated de-prioritization of denuclearization talks under Trump, as the US faces crises in Ukraine and the Middle East.[17] With North Korea slipping down Washington’s foreign policy agenda, Pyongyang could solidify its nuclear capabilities and seek global recognition. Trump might want to negotiate a rapid resolution of the Ukrainian war, potentially conceding occupied territories to Russia. Such precedents could enable North Korea to strike its own favorable agreement, securing sanctions relief or international recognition as a nuclear state.[18]

 

Paired with Russia’s support —formalized through recent defense agreements—[19] these maneuvers risk further insulating North Korea from punitive measures. Lack of effective containment mechanisms and realistic diplomatic engagements has already led to unchecked North Korean actions that elevate its standing as a bolder international actor. This trend is apparent in Pyongyang’s increased participation in global forums such as BRICS and COP29; and of course, in its direct engagement in combat in Ukraine, signaling its intent to assert itself as a legitimate global player.[20]

 

Nonetheless, it should also be considered that Trump may attempt to weaken the DPRK-Russia partnership as a strategy to reshape US Indo-Pacific position. However, success would depend heavily on resolving the war in Ukraine, as North Korea remains cautious about overly relying on a Russia entangled in a prolonged conflict. Pyongyang’s relative silence after Trump’s election indicates that Kim Jong Un may be cautiously waiting for conditions conducive to renewed dialogue. Any engagement under Trump, though, risks reinforcing North Korea’s legitimacy as a nuclear state without addressing the regime’s human rights abuses or regional destabilization efforts.

 

North Korea’s growing prominence as a global actor, backed by Russia’s strategic alignment and financial inflows, directly threatens the international order. Its unchecked nuclear advancements, increased multilateral participation, and readiness to justify authoritarian policies hint to the regime’s intent on reshaping its “rogue” image while undermining Western efforts to curb its ambitions.[21]

 

Why Should Europe and NATO care?

The way in which Trump will approach North and South Korea will inevitably impact global dynamics, posing critical questions for Europe and NATO. While re-engaging with Pyongyang might initially appear like a shortcut to reduce tensions, Trump’s expected engagement risks reinforcing and cementing North Korea’s ties to Russia, undermining Indo-Pacific and European stability. Such developments highlight how deeply interconnected these regions have become in terms of security.

 

The DPRK has historically aligned with the highest bidder, shifting loyalties to sustain its regime. Currently, Russia occupies this role, providing resources and diplomatic support that help Pyongyang evade sanctions and build resilience outside the international order. This pattern sets a dangerous precedent for other authoritarian states dissatisfied with global norms, who may find encouragement in North Korea’s ability to forge an alternative economic and diplomatic base. Deepened North Korea-Russia ties could make future efforts to dislodge Pyongyang from Moscow’s orbit nearly impossible.[22]

 

For Europe, this scenario carries grave risks. Trump’s dismissive attitude toward transatlantic alliances already raised concerns about US security commitments. A renewed focus on bilateral dealings or other global hotspots like the Indo-Pacific or the Middle East could deprioritize European security. This would be particularly dangerous as the war in Ukraine demands sustained transatlantic unity to counter Russian aggression. Recuced US support for Ukraine could embolden Moscow and its allies, including North Korea, to exploit Western divisions.

 

Closer North Korea-Russia coordination could lead to more opportunistic behavior, further straining Western responses. Russia’s nuclear rhetoric in Ukraine could serve as a model for North Korea to intimidate its regional adversaries, destabilizing the Indo-Pacific.[23] These ripple effects would inevitably reach Europe, as US security provisions for the continent are tied to its ability to manage tensions across the Pacific. Lack of robust US support could exacerbate weaknesses within the Euro-Atlantic military-industrial complex, which is already struggling to meet the growing demand for munitions, advanced weaponry, and technological innovation necessary to counter Russia’s prolonged war effort. This would leave NATO and the EU exposed to external threats, with reduced ability to respond effectively.[24]

 

The humanitarian consequences of Trump’s approach to North Korea are also alarming. His previous administration minimized the priority given to human rights issues, including withdrawing from the UN Human Rights Council and downscaling support for DPRK-related initiatives. A similar trajectory would isolate North Korean citizens even further, empower the regime to act with impunity against its population, and eliminate critical lifelines for defectors seeking refuge. This approach directly contradicts the EU’s principles of upholding human rights and fostering global solidarity, potentially straining transatlantic relations and undermining Europe’s efforts to champion human rights on the international stage.[25]

 

To constructively navigate this landscape, Europe cannot afford passivity. While NATO’s Indo-Pacific involvement is contentious,[26] the EU can play a role in addressing these challenges. Strengthening partnerships with Indo-Pacific nations like South Korea and Japan would enhance Europe’s stability. Collaborative efforts with frameworks such as the Quad and AUKUS —focused on intelligence sharing and cybersecurity, for example— could provide meaningful support without overextending military commitments. Furthermore, a revitalized EU-South Korea partnership would bolster Europe’s voice in shaping the future of transatlantic and Indo-Pacific relations. By fostering deeper cooperation with like-minded partners, Europe can mitigate the risks posed by a stronger DPRK-Russia alignment and ensure the protection of its security interests.[27]

 

In an interconnected world, regional security challenges are no longer confined by geography. Europe should care because the stability of the Korean Peninsula has direct implications for European security, and Trump’s return to power could redefine how these issues are confronted—or neglected. The time to act is now, with a unified response that ensures global stability and upholds human rights.

 

Footnotes

[1] Landler, Mark. “Trump Orders Pentagon to Consider Reducing U.S. Forces in South Korea.” The New York Times, May 3, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/03/world/asia/trump-troops-south-korea.html?smid=url-share.

[2] Atwood, Kylie. “US and South Korea reach tentative agreement on new cost-sharing deal for US troops ahead of potential Trump victory.” CNN, October 4, 2024. https://edition.cnn.com/2024/10/04/politics/us-forces-south-korea-cost-sharing-agreement/index.html.

[3] Lendon, Bred. “Donald Trump says US to stop ‘war games’ with South Korea.” CNN, June 12, 2018. https://edition.cnn.com/2018/06/12/politics/trump-us-military-war-games-south-korea-intl/index.html.

[4] Hill, Alannah. “Trump Victory Sets off Renewed Calls in ROK to Go Nuclear to Counter North Korea.” NK News – North Korea News, November 7, 2024. https://www.nknews.org/2024/11/trump-victory-sets-off-renewed-calls-in-rok-to-go-nuclear-to-counter-north-korea/.

[5] Hwang, Yongha, and Juneseo Hwang. “Out of Fire Into the Frying Pan? The Ripple Effect of the Russia–Ukraine War on Korean Denuclearization.” Peace Review, October 11, 2024, 1–11. https://doi.org/10.1080/10402659.2024.2414031; KINU – Korea Institute for National Unification. “KINU’S ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE RESULT OF THE 2024 KINU UNIFICATION SURVEY: North Korea’s Two-State Claim: US Presidential Election Outlook and ROK-US Relations,” June 27, 2024. Accessed November 19, 2024. https://www.kinu.or.kr/eng/board/view.do?nav_code=eng1678858138&code=78h7R6ucKsuM&idx=24481.

[6] Al Jazeera. “South Korea Says ‘Not Ruling Out’ Supplying Weapons to Ukraine,” November 7, 2024. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/11/7/south-korea-says-not-ruling-out-supplying-weapons-to-ukraine.

[7] Šebeňa, Martin. “South Korea’s Defence Industry Finds Opportunity in Europe’s Insecurity.” CEIAS, October 30, 2024. https://ceias.eu/south-koreas-defence-industry-finds-opportunity-in-europes-insecurity/;  Casimiro, Christine, and Christine Casimiro. “Poland Not Transferring South Korean Weapons to Ukraine: President.” The Defense Post, October 31, 2024. https://thedefensepost.com/2024/10/30/poland-korean-weapons-ukraine/.

[8] Junotane. “Analysis: South Korea’s Presidential Controversies Pose Dilemma for Diplomatic Community.” Diplomatic Seoul (blog), November 7, 2024. https://www.junotane.com/p/south-koreas-presidential-controversies-pose-dilemma-for-diplomatic-community; Park, Anna Jiwon. “President Yoon’s Approval Rating Drops to All-time Low of 20% Again.” Koreatimes, October 27, 2024. https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2024/11/113_384995.html.

[9] Associated Press. “South Korea’s Yoon Lifts Martial Law after Just 8 Hours amid Political Turmoil.” AP News, December 3, 2024. https://apnews.com/article/south-korea-yoon-martial-law-997c22ac93f6a9bece68454597e577c1.

[10] Sim, Walter and Teo, Wendy. “US Allies Japan, S. Korea Seek Quick Rapport With Trump Amid Security Concerns.” The Straits Times, November 7, 2024. https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/us-allies-japan-s-korea-quickly-seek-to-build-rapport-with-trump-amid-security-jitters.

[11] Horovitz, Liviu, Suh, Elisabeth, and Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP). “Trump II and US Nuclear Assurances in the Indo-Pacific: Why Australia, Japan, and South Korea Have Other Concerns.” SWP Comment 36 (2024). https://doi.org/10.18449/2024C36.

[12] WSJ News. “Trump on North Korea’s Kim Jong Un: ‘I Think He Misses Me’ | WSJ News,” July 19, 2024. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bK6KCAPs9_8.

[13] Sharma, Shweta. “North Korea Snubs Donald Trump for Saying He’s Still Good Friends With Kim Jong-un: ‘We Don’t Care.’” The Independent, July 26, 2024. https://www.independent.co.uk/asia/east-asia/donald-trump-kim-jong-un-north-korea-b2586460.html.

[14] Ellison, Davis, Paul Van Hooft, Julia Doll, and Damiani, Giulio. “Twilight of Atlanticism? America’s Shifting Approaches to Europe.” The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, November 2024. https://hcss.nl/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/Twilight-of-Atlanticism-HCSS-2024.pdf.

[15] Sullivan, Kate. “Trump says he would encourage Russia to ‘do whatever the hell they want’ to any NATO country that doesn’t pay enough.” CNN, February 11, 2024. https://edition.cnn.com/2024/02/10/politics/trump-russia-nato/index.html.

[16] Yu, Jihoon. “Global Security Interdependence: The Impact of Russia-North Korea Military Ties on Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific Stability.” Global Defense Insight, November 5, 2024. https://defensetalks.com/global-security-interdependence-the-impact-of-russia-north-korea-military-ties-on-euro-atlantic-and-indo-pacific-stability/.

[17] Reddy, Shreyas. “Why North Korean Denuclearization Will Likely Take Backseat in Second Trump Term.” NK News – North Korea News, November 8, 2024. https://www.nknews.org/2024/11/why-north-korean-denuclearization-will-likely-take-backseat-in-second-trump-term/.

[18] Hill, Alannah. “Trump Return Rekindles Prospects of North Korea Talks, but Russia Stands in Way | NK PRO.” NK PRO, November 8, 2024. https://www.nknews.org/pro/trump-return-rekindles-prospects-of-north-korea-talks-but-russia-stands-in-way/.

[19] Bremer, Ifang. “Putin Signs Mutual Defense Pact With North Korea Into Law.” NK News – North Korea News, November 11, 2024. https://www.nknews.org/2024/11/putin-signs-mutual-defense-pact-with-north-korea-into-law/.

[20] Lee, Rachel Minyoung. “Quick Take: North Korea and BRICS.” 38 North, September 20, 2024. https://www.38north.org/2024/09/quick-take-north-korea-and-brics/; Reddy, Shreyas. “North Korean Delegation Joins COP29 Climate Talks in Azerbaijan.” NK News – North Korea News, November 12, 2024. https://www.nknews.org/2024/11/north-korean-delegation-joins-cop29-climate-talks-in-azerbaijan/; Sokolin, Anton. “US, South Korea Confirm North Korean Troops Have Entered Combat Against Ukraine.” NK News – North Korea News, November 14, 2024. https://www.nknews.org/2024/11/us-south-korea-confirm-north-korean-troops-have-entered-combat-against-ukraine/.

[21] Bremer, Ifang. “North Korea Defends Crackdown on Foreign Media, Admits to Public Executions.” NK News – North Korea News, November 8, 2024. https://www.nknews.org/2024/11/north-korea-defends-crackdown-on-foreign-media-admits-to-public-executions/.

[22] Reddy, Shreyas. “How The Ukraine War Could Play Into Trump’s Plans to Counter North Korea.” NK News – North Korea News, November 12, 2024. https://www.nknews.org/2024/11/how-the-ukraine-war-could-play-into-trumps-plans-to-counter-north-korea/.

[23] Horovitz, Suh and SWP. “Trump II and US Nuclear Assurances in the Indo-Pacific: Why Australia, Japan, and South Korea Have Other Concerns.” (2024). Pp. 4-6.

[24] Yu, Jihoon. “NATO’S Role in a Korean Contingency: Strategic Implications and Challenges.” The Diplomat, August 23, 2024. https://thediplomat.com/2024/08/natos-role-in-a-korean-contingency-strategic-implications-and-challenges/.

[25] Chubb, Danielle. “North Korean Human Rights During the Trump Administration.” In Cambridge University Press eBooks, 87–104, 2024. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009119269.005; Bremer, Ifang and Park, Joon Ha. “What North Korean Escapees Think About Donald Trump’s Return to Power.” NK News – North Korea News, November 14, 2024. https://www.nknews.org/2024/11/what-north-korean-escapees-think-about-donald-trumps-return-to-power/.

[26] Willemsen, Patrick. “Opinion | NATO Should Not Go to the Indo-Pacific.” The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, May 1, 2024. https://hcss.nl/news/opinion-nato-should-not-go-to-the-indo-pacific/.

[27] Pacheco Pardo, Ramon. “The EU-South Korea Security and Defence Partnership – CSDS,” CSDS, November 5, 2024. https://csds.vub.be/publication/the-eu-south-korea-security-and-defence-partnership/.

Header photo: Wikimedia Commons / The White House