The black hole at the center of America’s Ukraine strategy

Andrew Gawthorpe

Even before the recent election of Donald Trump as president of the United States, the war in Ukraine was approaching an inflection point. Russia is advancing on the battlefield, Ukraine is facing a critical manpower shortage, and political will is growing weaker in the United States. Any newly elected president would be turning towards a negotiated settlement. Thinking about what such a settlement might look like forces America and its allies to confront the strategic black hole which has long existed at the heart of their strategy in Ukraine.

Since Russia’s renewed invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the West’s strategy towards the conflict has been plagued by a number of contradictions and omissions. In public debate, particularly in Europe, these problems are often passed over in favor of a conversation which revolves around matters of right and wrong. It is true that Vladimir Putin bears ultimate responsibility for the conflict in Ukraine, that his case for war is based on lies, and that Russia’s conduct of the war has been barbaric. But having right on its side does not exempt the West from the need to arrive at a credible strategy – particularly when it is possible that mishandling the conflict could lead to nuclear war, the ultimate normative wrong.

 

The first and most serious problem with U.S. strategy is that American policymakers have never defined what success looks like. The Biden administration has embraced two goals: preventing Ukraine’s defeat and avoiding escalation with Russia. But these are negatives. They say only what Washington doesn’t want, not what it does want. Among other things, they leave the precise meaning of “avoiding defeat” unclear. Does it mean the continued existence of Ukraine as a sovereign state? Does it mean the reclamation of all Ukrainian territory? And does that include or exclude Crimea? These are all open questions.

 

Likelihood of Russian nuclear use

When pressed, Biden administration policymakers say that the precise definition of war aims is a matter for Kyiv. This may be an important rhetorical move in order to prevent Ukraine from looking like an American puppet, but it ignores the underlying reality of the conflict. Ukraine may be no American puppet, but it is inconceivable that the superpower which is responsible for keeping Kyiv in the fight and which is taking on substantial risks in order to do so will not have a say in how the conflict ends. Even though this matter is almost certainly discussed more bluntly in private, a public refusal to acknowledge it has left the Biden administration open to the criticism that they had landed the U.S. in an open-ended commitment with no clue how it would eventually be wound down. As even senior members of the American foreign policy establishment now concede, this created a major political liability which Republicans eagerly exploited.[1]

 

This leads us to the second problem with U.S. strategy. The fiction that Ukraine sets the terms of victory obscures the fact that Washington and Kyiv have fundamentally divergent goals in this conflict. Ukrainian negotiators want all of their territory back, including Crimea, whereas the Americans – including the Biden administration – view the achievement of this as coming at too high a level of cost and risk.[2] This became apparent in October 2022, when the Biden administration was alarmed that Ukraine’s success in its southern offensive could spark a nuclear crisis with Russia.[3] The U.S. is particularly unlikely to support any Ukrainian attempt to retake Crimea, which is seen as having a high likelihood of leading to Russian nuclear use.[4] Now that the tide of battle has turned in Russia’s favor, catastrophic Ukrainian success is no longer an issue. But the episode is illuminating, because it reveals the fault lines that will likely appear underneath the negotiating table.

 

Asymmetry of interest

The third problem with U.S. strategy is perhaps the most fundamental of all: the asymmetry between America and Russia’s commitment to achieving their respective political goals in Ukraine. Put simply, Russia is prepared to fight for its aims in Ukraine, and the United States is not. While Washington has been able to paper over this fact through the provision of military aid, the asymmetry of interest has led to declining political will for providing even this indirect means of support. Over the long term, this makes it hard to see how Russia is not favored to achieve its diplomatic goals – or at least to consolidate any territorial gains that it makes prior to a settlement.

 

This asymmetry of interest creates broader problems for NATO. The credibility of an alliance like NATO rests on a sharp inside/outside distinction. Members will be defended, non-members will not. Taking on halfway-house commitments to non-members risks diluting the credibility of the alliance’s core purpose of defending its members. By putting NATO credibility on the line for a non-member state – and doing so without any clear idea of how to overcome the strategic dilemmas that make helping it achieve victory so difficult – successive U.S. administrations have risked weakening NATO’s credibility overall, not to mention political support for its mission within the United States.

 

The asymmetry of interest between Ukraine and the United States also raises a normative question. Successive Ukrainian governments have been led to believe that there is a pathway open to integration into the West, and that their country would be defended against Russia in the meantime. Neither of these points is really true. U.S. policymakers have no intention of bringing Ukraine into NATO for so long as Russia depredations continue. And Washington’s appetite for continuing to defend Ukraine against these depredations has dramatically diminished, a shift notable in Biden’s downgrading of the U.S. commitment to Ukraine’s defense from “as long as it takes” to “as long as we can”.[5]

 

It is undoubtedly true in a normative sense that Ukraine ought to be free to choose its own international alignment. Sadly, such norms are enforceable only via force, and there is an argument to be made that U.S. policymakers have been irresponsible in making promises that they cannot keep. The effect has been to keep Ukraine in a sort of geopolitical purgatory, always suffering the consequences of Russia’s anger and never quite receiving the deliverance from it which Washington has seemed to promise.

 

Washington looks forward

Regardless of who won the presidential election, the point has been rapidly approaching when it is no longer possible to ignore these dilemmas and contradictions. The fact that it will be an administration led by Trump which will be charged with resolving them is grim news indeed. Trump is an unserious and volatile leader who has a concerning personal affinity for Russian president Vladimir Putin. His early picks for Cabinet positions suggest that his approach to governing has not changed from his first term. If anything, he appears to be valuing loyalty over competence to a much greater degree than before.

 

This will have unfortunate implications for U.S. policy towards Ukraine. Over the past few years, Trump has claimed that he can end the conflict in “24 hours” and suggested that his opening gambit in negotiations with Russia would be to cut off support for Kyiv.[6] Strategically speaking, this is senseless – the fact that Washington still provides military aid to Ukraine is one of the few bargaining chips it has in any negotiation with Russia. And the continued provision of aid is likely to form a key component of any deal, at least one which is acceptable to Kyiv.

 

Under a responsible administration, the opening of negotiations would be an opportunity to resolve some of the uncertainties discussed above. It would finally force a decision about what exactly the U.S. is willing to help Ukraine fight for, and at what cost. The achievement of a concrete political settlement might even have provided an opportunity to reset the U.S. political discussion over military aid. Rather than being asked to provide support for an open-ended, undefined commitment – one in which even Ukrainian success might bring unacceptable risks – the U.S. Congress would instead be asked to provide aid as part of a concrete, defined political compromise.

 

Trump’s previous conduct of international negotiations gives us little hope that he is capable of the delicate dance that this would require. In his first administration, he showed impulsiveness and shallowness in his diplomacy with North Korea and stubborn petulance during his visits to international summits in Europe. He has little grasp of policy specifics or the long-term implications of his decisions, focusing instead on theatrics and short-term political gain.[7] Then there is the question of the extent to which his preference is simply for Russia to achieve its goals, given that he has an affinity for Putin and a view of the conflict which seems shaped by Russian propaganda. Alternatively, his need to appear strong may lead him to escalate precipitously in search of a deal – something he has hinted at doing if Putin will not enter negotiations and in his slogan “peace through strength”.[8]

 

Security guarantees on paper

On top of this, it must be acknowledged that no conceivable negotiation can overcome the asymmetry of interest between the United States and Russia. After Trump’s election, Ukrainian officials are said to be prioritizing security guarantees over territory, itself an admission that the country’s maximalist goals have become unachievable.[9] But security guarantees themselves raise impossible questions. One of the defining features of the present conflict is that Russia is willing to accept the risks of fighting in Ukraine, but the West is not. There is no reason to think this situation will change and that Western countries will ever accept the risk of directly engaging their forces in Ukraine’s defense. Like the ill-fated Budapest Memorandum of 1994, such security guarantees would only be made of paper – Russia could cut through them once again.[10]

 

With that said, any future security guarantees for Ukraine will probably rest on continued indirect support – the building up of Ukraine’s military and the provision of advanced weapons capabilities. In Washington, this is sometimes referred to – although not so much since October 2023 – as the “Israel model”.[11] Yet it will probably prove to not be enough. As Israel has demonstrated over the last year, it enjoys military dominance over its neighbors and regional rivals. Ukraine does not, and there is no clear path to getting it into a position where it does.

 

Ukraine faces not just an equipment problem but also a manpower problem, one that outsiders can do little to alleviate. The country is in an unfavorable economic and demographic position and is struggling with recruitment and desertion.[12] Ukrainian officials have said that recruitment and retention difficulties could be alleviated with more Western aid, but equipment is only one part of the problem.[13] And while more economic support could free up manpower for the frontline by enabling the removal of workers from the civilian economy, this risks further shredding the country’s economic position and turning it into a perpetual aid dependent.

 

The dark and obscure path ahead for Europe

Since the outbreak of the latest round of the conflict in Ukraine in February 2022, discussion in Europe has often centered around normative concerns. There is horror at the violence, lamentations of the violation of international law, and earnest hopes that Ukraine can restore its sovereignty. Each of these points is valid. But when faced with an aggressive power like Russia, norms cannot be enforced by mere discussion. If Europe wishes to give teeth to its normative wishes, it must develop the means with which to uphold them.

 

There are indications that Trump’s second term may lead to concrete steps to boost the hard power capabilities of European NATO member states and to continue to provide Ukraine with aid. Polish prime minister Donald Tusk has called for other countries to step into the breach if the United States withdraws support from Kyiv.[14] But it is unlikely that any combination of European states can substitute for U.S. support, at least not on a meaningful timeframe. Attempting to continue to support Ukraine without the backing of the American president is also a risky business. It could lead to a Russian provocation, a refusal by Trump to uphold the alliance’s Article V, and the resultant shredding of NATO’s credibility.

 

For Europe, the path ahead is hence dark and obscure. Many of the strategic dilemmas faced by the West in Ukraine apply just as readily to European countries as they do to the United States. If Trump chooses to abandon Kyiv, European NATO policymakers may be forced to cut their losses and turn to the more urgent task of ensuring their own defense. This would require a military buildup, development of the continent’s defense industrial base, and – most critically of all – assurance of the American commitment to Article 5. Tragically, standing against Trump in Ukraine may be one of the fastest ways to undermine that commitment.

 

It will be easy during the coming months and years to blame Trump for what befalls Ukraine. Europe will be faced with the realization that it is a bystander to the most important developments on its own continent since the post-Cold War settlement. But while the new president is an unfortunate messenger, he is ultimately not the author of the message. That fault lies with the European policymakers who allowed their own tools of influence to atrophy and hence made themselves the passive vessels of an American policy which had become unsustainable long before Trump won back the presidency, and which now faces its inevitable end.

The author would like to thank Martijn van Ette and Catherine Wood, both from Leiden University, for their feedback on a draft of this article. All views, errors and omissions remain the author’s own.

Footnotes

[1] Richard Haass, ‘The Perfect has Become the Enemy of the Good in Ukraine’, Foreign Affairs, November 2024, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/perfect-has-become-enemy-good-ukraine-haass.

[2] Alexander Ward and Lara Seligman, ‘U.S. ‘Unimpressed’ with Ukraine’s Victory Plan Ahead of Biden-Zelensky Meeting’, The Wall Street Journal, September 2024, https://www.wsj.com/world/u-s-unimpressed-with-ukraines-victory-plan-ahead-of-biden-zelensky-meeting-23e87bff.

[3] Bob Woodward, War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004), pp. 98 – 109.

[4] Carol E. Lee, Courtney Kube and Dan De Luce, ‘A Biden Admin Official Recently told Members of Congress that Ukraine has the Military Capability to Take Back Crimea’, NBC News, December 2022, https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/biden-official-told-congress-ukraine-can-retake-crimea-rcna61755.

[5] Michael Hirsh, ‘The Biden Administration is Quietly Shifting its Strategy in Ukraine’, Politico, December 2023, https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2023/12/27/biden-endgame-ukraine-00133211.

[6] Veronika Melkozerova, ‘Ukraine Braces as Triumphant Trump Vows to “Stop Wars”’, Politico, November 2024, https://www.politico.eu/article/ukraine-reaction-donald-trump-victory-us-election-2024-russia-war-volodymyr-zelenskyy/.

[7] See Jim Sciutto, The Madman Theory: Trump Takes on the World (New York: Harper, 2020); John Bolton, The Room Where it Happened: A White House Memoir (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2020).

[8] Jacob Stokes, ‘Trump Pushes “Peace Through Strength” Vision with Defense Picks’, Center for a New American Security, November 2024, https://www.cnas.org/press/in-the-news/trump-pushes-peace-through-strength-vision-with-defense-picks.

[9] Andrew E. Kramer, ‘Ukraine Prioritizes Security, not Territory, as Trump Pushes Truce Talks’, The New York Times, November 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/13/world/europe/trump-ukraine-russia-peace.html.

[10] Security guarantees were a divisive point in an abortive early attempt to negotiate an end to the conflict in 2022. See Samuel Charap and Sergey Radchenko, ‘The Talks that Could have Ended the War in Ukraine’, Foreign Affairs, April 2024, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/talks-could-have-ended-war-ukraine.

[11] Rajan Menon, ‘An Enduring Coalition to Protect Ukraine’, Foreign Affairs, August 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/enduring-coalition-protect-ukraine.

[12] Peter Apps, ‘Ukraine Battles its Demography to Find Sufficient Soldiers’, Reuters, August 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-battles-its-demography-find-sufficient-soldiers-peter-apps-2024-08-07/; Ivana Kottasová and Kostya Gak, ‘Outgunned and Outnumbered, Ukraine’s Military is Struggling with Low Morale and Desertion’, CNN, September 2024, https://edition.cnn.com/2024/09/08/europe/ukraine-military-morale-desertion-intl-cmd/index.html.

[13] Jamie Dettmer, ‘Draft-Dodging Plagues Ukraine as Kyiv Faces Acute Soldier Shortage’, Politico, March 2024, https://www.politico.eu/article/ukraine-faces-an-acute-manpower-shortage-with-young-men-dodging-the-draft/.

[14] Francesca Micheletti, ‘Poland’s Tusk to Meet EU, UK, NATO Leaders on Ukraine after Trump Win’, Politico, November 2024, https://www.politico.eu/article/poland-donald-tusk-meet-eu-uk-leaders-nato-ukraine-after-donald-trump-win/.

Photo: Flickr.com / The White House