ATLANTISCH PERSPECTIEF

Rutte as Secretary General at NATO: power or paperwork?

Sabine Mengelberg

On the first of October yet another official from the Netherlands, former prime minister Mark Rutte, takes a high-ranking position in an organization that has become the most important one, again, for the defence and deterrence of 32 states in the Trans-Atlantic region. NATO is an alliance of 32 member states, each with its own security interests, friends and foes. Therefore, although Mark Rutte has been a prime minister for 14 years in a Dutch political landscape that has been challenging – to say the least – Brussels will be no easy ride either.

The international arena is often seen as being in a state of anarchy, where power and conflict dominate international politics and, if necessary, at the expense of peace and security. According to this view, known as realism, there is no arena in which multilateral organizations operate and make a difference. Organizations, it is argued, are wholly and existentially dependent upon the will of nation states. This theory claims that states cannot be influenced or ruled by any coercive power, other than that of the nation state itself. It remains a popular view in international politics. With the return of the, so often referred to, concept of geopolitics, organizations are then viewed as structures without any power at all.

International cooperation in a world of great power politics  

At the same time, one could argue that the role and impact of international organizations has strengthened in the political arena, precisely because of the return of power politics. Not out of idealism, but because in a world of increasing power struggles, most states are subjected to the sometimes violent great power politics. Surprising maybe, but in a world of increasing power politics states survive by joining ad-hoc cooperation schemes, alliances and more institutionalized organizations. Exemplified by the widening of the BRICS, as an alternative to the G7, but simultaneously cross-cutting states memberships of both organizations. Like India’s strategic partnership with the EU and at the same time allying with Russia. Hence, for political, military and economic security interests of a state, especially smaller states, it is important to be a member of an alliance or an organization. Within the European security region, this is exemplified by the decisions of Finland and Sweden to join the NATO alliance after the Russian invasion in Ukraine and many more who are knocking on the door.

Although international organizations are constrained by states, they are more than just the sum of interstate cooperation. This is for several reasons. Organizations are interesting for states, because they offer funds, technical expertise or a multilateral platform, like NATO provides with its command structure and experience in military operations. And, organizations can provide the reduction of transaction costs, for example the costs of common military capabilities by funds. Furthermore, organizations offer a joint approach to cross-border threats coming from terrorism or climate change and can provide information sharing between states. Finally, organizations can provide a shelter for the big bad world outside. Hence, international organizations do set the agenda in their policy domain, as a result of their mandate, expertise and capacities and in some situations can even compel states to comply.

Likewise, the NATO Alliance is not merely an agreement between states. Instead, is has become a large organization composed of many commissions, working groups etc. with thousands of officials and bureaucrats whose livelihood depends on the organizations’ survival.[1] Institutionalized organizations, like NATO, have become corporate actors, with political interests, influencing the national and international political agenda, and perceiving power as a result of their expertise and aim for survival. These officials have attained a degree of autonomy, because of their expertise, that allowed them to pursue goals that helps to keep the organization alive, and they have become lobbyists for adapting new missions and tasks. This also applies to the position of the Secretary General. Together with an increasing hostile environment, NATO’s Secretary General acquired more power and has become a public figure with agenda-setting influence. For decades there has been a debate between the member states about strengthening the political side of NATO. This political side refers to NATO’s role as a political actor on the global stage and has beard consequences for the position of the secretary-general.

For instance, when Russia invaded Crimea in 2014, the secretary-general’s public condemnation of the invasion was heavily criticized by the member states at that time. However, since the war in Ukraine of 2022, we have often heard a strong Stoltenberg represent NATO’s position.[2] Member states have moved towards supporting a stronger role for the Secretary General, not just as a spokesperson for the capitals, but also as a landmark. A reason for this is that states can hide behind the public figure of a Secretary-General of the Alliance, in case of national despair as well as an international crisis. Or because the member states want to make a strong and clear signal towards another actor or specific threat outside the Alliance, in this case Russia. In other words, with an increasing hostile environment the Secretary General has become a stronghold with influence for the heterogenic group of member states that NATO is as well as to the antagonistic outside world.

Power and decision-making within NATO

With regard to decision-making within NATO, without a doubt, the highest decision-making body of NATO is the North Atlantic Council (NAC), not the secretary-general. All 32 member states are represented in this council. Hence, the member states provide the political leadership of the alliance and take the political and military decisions by consensus. That makes NATO an intergovernmental organization, meaning that decision-making, for example regarding operations or enlargement, is based on consensus among the member states. Every ally has the ability to influence or even block decisions, without there being a formal veto right (consider the difficult processes during the accession of Finland and Sweden to the alliance). Ultimately, the “capitals” (governments) of the countries must always give their approval. For instance, when new states wish to join, all national parliaments must first agree (ratify). This process can take a long time, but in times of crisis (in the case of Article 5), it can proceed very quickly. Exemplified by the activation of Article 5 only one day after 9/11.

However, although consensus is required for political and military decision-making, the US is the strongest ally. This is clearly reflected in NATO’s military command structure, because the supreme commander of all NATO forces, SACEUR, is always an American. As a result, the US is the first among equals on the political as well as the military level of the Alliance. At the same time, because of solidarity and shared responsibility, the backbone of NATO, the council is always chaired by a European Secretary General. Not only because of shared responsibility, but especially because of one of the most important tasks of the Secretary General is to ‘know Europe’s complicated political and diplomatic scene and shape the agenda of the North Atlantic Council for consensus’ on issues like tasks, operations and burden sharing.[3]

Formally, the Secretary General is an independent, neutral civil servant who’s task it is to reside above the member states. It is his or her task to coordinate the long term political and military strategy between the member states, coordinate the day-to-day operations within NATO, act as the primary spokesperson on behalf of the organization, maintain contact with member states, non-member states, and other organizations, and is thus the face of NATO to the outside world. Hence, the Secretary General influences the political agenda and is a mediator between the many member states of NATO.

In addition to the political decision-making structure, NATO has an integrated military structure. Political decision-making always prevails, but to support it, there is the Military Committee (MC), which provides military advice to the council. At this moment, the MC is chaired by yet another Dutch high-ranking officer, Admiral Rob Bauer. The MC is responsible for translating political decisions into military strategy and doctrines. SACEUR then, the supreme commander of all NATO forces, is accountable to the MC. Alongside the increasing impact and strength of the secretary-general, the position of SACEUR and the chair of the MC have strengthened as well. Ever since, the Wales (2014) and Warsaw (2016) summits and the Strategic Concept (2022) the NATO military structure has been transformed, as a result of the Russian threat along the European borders.[4]

Now, units must be ready and deployable in case the red button is pressed. The result is that NATO member states offer their own units to ‘fill’ certain defense plans during crises and conflicts. Once designated, an agreement is an agreement. The designated units will need to be well-equipped and fully staffed, with sufficient supporting resources to be deployable. This requires a different kind of armed forces, based on readiness and deployability. It resembles the Cold War era, when the army knew exactly where to take position in West Germany if the Warsaw Pact crossed the border.

The new model of planning and designated units cannot rely solely on trust. A verification system will be implemented, and the new plans will guide military exercises. As a result, the member states will need to get used to the idea that deployment occurs under the operational command of NATO. In an Article 5 scenario, they will therefore lead few to no operations themselves. Noteworthy for an intergovernmental organization like NATO is. For instance, in the case of the Dutch armed forces, which constitutionally resides under the Dutch government and Dutch command and not NATO, according to Article 97 of the Dutch Constitution.[5]  Hence, both the positions of the Secretary General and SACEUR have strengthened and have widened their formal and informal power.

A secretary-general of NATO is thus an independent person and has a neutral position, above national interest. However, the upcoming post will not be held by a Portuguese or an Estonian. The future Secretary General will once again have a Dutch nationality, the fourth one in fact, and not the only Dutch official in a high position within NATO ranks.

Today’s world presents a lot of challenges within and outside NATO. The threat from outside is clear. Inside we’ve lost the Axis Berlin-Paris, the UK’s strong capacities within the EU (EU and NATO have an overlap of 23 states), a tense Trans-Atlantic relation because of different interests and a possible victory of Trump as the next US president, and differentiating European interests with regard to threat perception; Russia or refugees. Within this arena the Dutch carry the image of being a mediator and driver of pragmatism, necessary in a world of crisis, conflict and war. It will be no easy job for Mark Rutte keeping the 32 different member states aimed in the same direction, however a smile and an apple can do just the job.

Header foto: Flickr.com / NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Footnotes

 

[1] Driver, D., ‘SACEUR, CJCS, and U.S. military influence’, The Journal of Transatlantic Studies, Volume 19, pages 313–334, (2021).

[2] Schuette, L., A., ‘Why NATO survived Trump: the neglected role of Secretary-General Stoltenberg’, International Affairs, Volume 97, Issue 6, November 2021, Pages 1863–1881.  https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiab167

[3] Rynning, S., ‘NATO. From Cold War to Ukraine, a History of the World’s Most Powerful Alliance’, Yale University Press, p. 270, 2024.

[4] Osinga, F., ‘Putin’s War, a European Tragedy: Why Russia’s War Failed and What It Means for NATO’, in: Rothman, M.G.D, Peperkamp, L., Rietjens, B, ‘Reflections on the Russia-Ukraine War’, Leiden University Press, 2024.

[5] Article 97 of the Dutch Constitution:

  1. There shall be armed forces for the defence and protection of the interests of the Kingdom, and in order to maintain and promote the international legal order.
  1. The Government shall have supreme authority over the armed forces.

Sabine Mengelberg is an Assistant Professor International Security Studies at the War Studies Department of the Netherlands Defence Academy.