Indo-Pacific Security after the US Elections

Haruko Satoh & Anoma P. van der Veere

“Japan and NATO are partners,” former prime minister Shinzo Abe argued during his historic visit to the organization’s headquarters in January 2007.[1] He was the first Japanese prime minister to officially visit NATO. A few months later Abe would address the Indian parliament, introducing Japan’s new concept, “a region called ‘the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity’ [which] will be formed along the outer rim of the Eurasian continent.”[2] This later became the basis of Japan’s ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP) vision, outlining the regional concept, “Indo-Pacific” that has since gained traction among  policy makers in Europe, the US and parts of Asia. The QUAD (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue between Japan, India, US and Australia) is a notable “minilateral” initiative based on this new concept.

With the benefit of hindsight, we can now see that his remarks and diplomatic initiatives signaled a turning point in Japan’s foreign policy to become more proactive in international security affairs. This shift in outlook and willingness to play an active role reflects the rapidly changing face of global politics. This is mainly instigated by China’s rise as a power capable of challenging the US-led liberal international order. The Atlantic community has warmly embraced Abe’s initiatives to enhance Japan’s security policy options, including opening active dialogues with like-minded partners in Europe, namely NATO. The outgoing Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has followed in Abe’s footsteps in this regard, taking the historical decision in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine to increase Japan’s defense spending from 1% to 2% of the GDP — on par with NATO countries’ defense budget ratio.[3]

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg visits Iruma Air Base in Japan, 31 Jan. 2023 (Photo: NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization).

‘Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow’

There is no doubt that Japan and NATO are (and should be) ‘partners’ insofar as meeting a complex web of global security challenges posed by an increasingly assertive China.[4] For nearly two decades, the complex territorial disputes in the South- and East China Seas have been a security concern, as Chinese actions endanger freedom of navigation in the region. For this reason, a number of countries, including the QUAD countries, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy and The Netherlands have articulated their ambition to stabilize the region by increasing their presence and formulating their own Indo-Pacific strategies.

This attention to the Indo-Pacific is a welcome development, especially if this involves the European countries. Japan and Europe have been the weaker link during the Cold War’s Western alliance, in the absence of a clear and common security threat (with the exception of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the deployment of the SS-20s). Prime Minister Kishida has urged European countries and NATO to remain dedicated to the region, arguing that “Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow”.[5] Indirectly referencing the possibility of armed conflict in Taiwan, he stated that collaboration between “like-minded countries” is crucial to maintaining stability in a region that accounts for most of the world’s trade.

Critics in Europe of NATO’s involvement in the Indo-Pacific warn of over-stretching of domestic militaries and that it should also stay out of the region. This criticism is not unwarranted, as NATO lacks organizational capacity and cannot put boots on the ground in the case of a conflict in Asia.[6] As things stand at the moment, European security is and should be paramount for NATO, considering major global security threats, such as the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, or conflicts in Africa, destabilize European security more directly than they do Asia.

Nevertheless, we reject the idea that NATO engagement in the Indo-Pacific is an overstretch.[7] First, engagement is not a zero-sum game in which cooperation is based on organization burdening or deploying military assets and troops in times of conflict. In fact, the ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza will put pressure on European countries and NATO to reassess their priorities and focus efforts back on the Atlantic. However, the strengthening of ties between Russia, China, and North Korea in addition to the intensifying US-China rivalry are likely to require greater competency (or familiarity) in Europe (and NATO) of Indo-Pacific geopolitics and security concerns, even if it is to engage with China more effectively.  As such, the focus of cooperation between NATO and Japan or other Indo-Pacific powers – especially India and South Korea – should be on mutual capacity-building, diplomatic engagement, and trust-building efforts. Concretely, this article posits that Europe and NATO’s approach to the region should focus on leveraging Japan’s position as a key ally and bridge to the Indo-Pacific.

US Elections and (in)security

Japan has enjoyed a high level of support from the US under the tenure of President Biden. This includes the promise that the alliance between the two countries covers the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu-islands, over which both China and Japan claim sovereignty.[8] It also includes the realignment of US military assets and command from Hawaii to Japan in order to improve cooperation with Japanese Self Defense Forces,[9] and upgrading the military command structure in Japan itself for the same purpose.[10] All these developments signal a dedicated, and importantly, stable US that is willing to keep investing in security in Japan, and by extension the Indo-Pacific.

An extract from a map of Asia drawn by Jean Baptiste Bourguignon d’Anville in 1752. The currently disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands (Hoa-pin-su) are shown north east of Taiwan. (Photo: Wikimedia Commons)

What needs to be remembered in understanding the US commitment to Asia is that it is not perceived as rock-solid as US commitment to Europe and the Middle East (namely Israel). President Barack Obama’s ‘pivot to Asia’ has been a disappointment, as the 8 years of his presidency essentially enabled China to become bolder in its actions in the disputed East and South China Seas.[11] By comparison, US dedication to NATO and European allies has remained relatively stable. The US has coordinated targeted sanctions on Russia and Russian actors involved in the Ukraine war.[12] It deployed thousands of additional troops to NATO countries in Eastern Europe in order to strengthen deterrence and assure allies of its defensive commitments,[13] and has provided Ukraine with 55.7 billion USD in military aid, which includes rocket systems and advanced air defense systems.[14] For key allies these efforts have signaled a US dedicated to European security.

As Americans face the polls in November, however, these same allies are now trying to figure out which candidate will most benefit their own security agenda. A greater issue is arguably at stake in this presidential election, as the post-1945 liberal international order may be undermined depending on who wins. Another Trump presidency risks uncertainty and instability, as the former president has repeatedly attacked allies and friends for not contributing enough to America’s security alliances.[15] Japan and South Korea, the two most important Asian allies to the US, host tens of thousands of US troops on their soil and pay their costs and yet they did not escape Trump’s blanket attack on allies. His targeting of China as “biggest geopolitical rival”[16] is a double-edged sword, even though Trump officials have sent reassurances to Japan about their dedication to the security alliance. [17] Japan’s or South Korea’s relationship with China is not determined by America’s China policy alone, and mishandling of Taiwan could be costly.[18]

A Harris presidency, on the other hand, should be understood as a constitutional crisis averted in the world’s most powerful democracy. Her foreign policy experiences are limited, but she is unlikely to implement new templates for US policy toward the Indo-Pacific, if her statement as vice president during the visit to Singapore in 2021 is any indication: “The United States is a proud part of the Indo-Pacific. And this region is critically important to our nation’s security and prosperity.” On China, she is also quite clear: “We know that Beijing continues to coerce, to intimidate, and to make claims to the vast majority of the South China Sea.”[19] As with Biden, Harris is realistic about seeing China as a vital partner in tackling global challenges such as climate change, but her economic strategy toward China coalesces more with that of Europe, Japan and South Korea of ’de-risking’ supply chains, deviating from Biden-administration’s outright decoupling.[20] What would be an important continuation from the Biden administration is to consolidate the ‘minilaterals’, such as the QUAD, and two groundbreaking trilaterals, US-Japan-South Korea and US-Japan-Philippines.[21]

U.S. President Joe Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida in Akasaka Palace, Japan, May 2022. (Photo: Wikimedia Commons / Prime Minister’s Office of Japan)

Moving Away from US-Centered Security

A gradual shifting away from the asymmetrical ‘hub-and-spokes’ system in the Asia-Pacific region in which the US took the lead on security issues as key allies are expected to bandwagon is likely to continue.[22] Not because of US policy change, but because the spokes have more power and voice now. It is in this newly emerging landscape of power dynamics that NATO and Europe’s engagement with the Indo-Pacific becomes important.

First, East Asia’s (Northeast and Southeast Asia) security problem is no longer confined to the region. North Korea’s nuclear ambition is real, and China’s nuclear ambitions are disconcertingly opaque. The US is already preparing to address both Russia’s and China’s nuclear arsenal. It is not enough that NATO’s nuclear posture aims at Russia’s nuclear weapons alone; Russia is also an Asian power. Second, the nature of security threats has been diversifying rapidly; military threats are only one aspect. Concerted efforts to mainstream non-traditional security issues, e.g., cybersecurity, as areas of international (or inter-regional) cooperation are important. Last but not least, diplomatic efforts to avoid entrenching confrontational divides between the ’global north’ and ‘global south’, the West and the East (or the rest), and democracies and authoritarian regimes, are as important as preparing for immediate security threats.

These are issues that should not stretch the organizational capacity of NATO, nor European countries interested in developing an Indo-Pacific strategy, they should be complementary. In fact, cooperation in these fields is aimed at decreasing the stress on multilateral organizations and European countries, while maintaining a strong presence in the region. What has been overlooked, as mentioned above, is Russia as a major Asian power. Only following President Putin’s visit to North Korea has this been highlighted in major strategic discussions among Western countries, but for Japan and South Korea the danger of Russia supplying nuclear weapons technology to the North Korean regime has, and remains, an imminent threat to national security. As Japan’s Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa recently stated during her meeting with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg: “it has been evident that the security of Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific are inseparable”[23]

Chinese people protested against what they call Japan’s illegal occupation of the Diaoyu Islands. (Photo: Shutterstock.com / Chintung Lee)

Cooperation should be about connectivity

For this reason, Japan has been actively trying to get NATO-member states to pay more attention to the Indo-Pacific through defensive cooperation and development projects. Examples include the co-development of the new generation fighter jets together with the UK and Italy,[24] the reciprocal access agreement with Germany,[25] an increasing number of multilateral military exercises with European countries held in the Indo-Pacific,[26] and a growing number of marine ships from NATO-member states visiting the country.[27] Critics who say that “NATO simply does not have the intellectual and organizational bandwidth to add China to its endlessly expanding list of activities” and that security in the Indo-Pacific is simply a “distraction”,[28] misunderstand Japan’s intentions. It is not expecting, for example, European troops in the case of a major conflict in the region. In fact, Japan is quite symbolic in its attitude towards this sort of engagement, as it argues that it only wants to “[promote] concrete cooperation in the areas such as cyber, space, strategic communication and women, peace and security (WPS) [issues].” [29]

USS Green Bay (LPD 20) and the Japan ship JS Kunisaki (LST 4003) sail in formation during a training exercise (Photo: Flickr.com / Official U.S. Navy page)

Moreover, as a major regional player with direct stakes in the game, Japan is actively pursuing security partnerships with countries throughout the Indo-Pacific region, from South and Southeast Asia to Oceania. It is setting itself up as a reliable alternative to China for the island-nations in the Pacific.[30] The Japanese Coast Guard has contributed ships and skill-building workshops to the Philippine Coast Guard, helping them to strengthen defenses around disputed areas in the South China Sea.[31] Japan is currently making similar promises to Vietnam.[32]

As part of their ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision,’ Japan has become relatively successful in engaging with a growing number of countries in the region in on security matters. As Kei Koga argues: “Japan has made its approach flexible; Tokyo is using its ambiguous FOIP concept to gauge other states’ responses, understand their perspectives, and adjust its strategic emphases accordingly — so-called ‘tactical hedging’.[33] Japan is significantly better positioned than European countries and NATO, both geographically and organizationally, to take on this burden. Importantly, Japan does not expect NATO to take on this role. It would rather become the bridge between the region and its key allies outside of the Indo-Pacific, as Shinzo Abe already pointed out in 2019 when he argued that cooperation should be about “connectivity”.[34]

Footnotes

[1] https://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2007/s070112b.html

[2] https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/pillar/index.html

[3] https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d_act/d_budget/pdf/230330a.pdf

[4] https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_171584.htm

[5] https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100356160.pdf

[6] https://www.atlcom.nl/artikel-atlantisch-perspectief/nato-should-not-go-to-the-indo-pacific/

[7] It also rejects the idea that Ukraine and Taiwan are similar contingencies, see for example: https://thediplomat.com/2022/07/china-is-not-russia-taiwan-is-not-ukraine/

[8] https://www.mofa.go.jp/na/na1/us/page3e_001104.html

[9] https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Indo-Pacific/U.S.-Japan-to-update-command-structure-for-smoother-teamwork

[10] https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2024/07/28/japan/politics/us-japan-two-plus-two/

[11] https://thediplomat.com/2022/03/the-us-pivot-to-asia-was-dead-on-arrival/

[12] https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/03/24/fact-sheet-united-states-and-allies-and-partners-impose-additional-costs-on-russia/

[13] https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2920844/us-to-deploy-3000-troops-to-romania-poland-germany/

[14] https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-ukraine/

[15] https://www.reuters.com/article/world/trump-says-unfair-defense-treaty-with-japan-needs-to-be-changed-idUSKCN1TU0AJ/

[16] https://www.nippon.com/en/in-depth/d01013/

[17] https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/15325425

[18] https://www.brookings.edu/articles/should-the-united-states-change-its-policies-toward-taiwan/

[19] https://news.usni.org/2021/08/27/vp-harris-stresses-u-s-commitment-to-indo-pacific-during-regional-tour-calls-out-chinese-aggression

[20] https://www.cfr.org/election2024/candidate-tracker/kamala-harris#china

[21] https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/23/fact-sheet-in-asia-president-biden-and-a-dozen-indo-pacific-partners-launch-the-indo-pacific-economic-framework-for-prosperity/ and https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/05/20/quad-leaders-joint-statement/

[22] https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/kokusaiseiji/2022/206/2022_206_133/_article/-char/en

[23] https://www.mofa.go.jp/erp/c_see/pageite_000001_00287.html

[24] https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Defense/Japan-U.K.-and-Italy-aim-for-next-gen-fighter-prototype-in-2026

[25] https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_00124.html

[26] See for example, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Defense/Germany-France-and-Spain-hold-joint-air-drills-in-Japan

[27] See for example, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/south-korea/dutch-naval-air-defence-frigate-hnlms-tromp-make-call-busan-naval-base_en?s=179; https://www.forcesnews.com/services/navy/hms-spey-arrives-japan-part-indo-pacific-deployment; https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/14476161

[28] https://www.atlcom.nl/artikel-atlantisch-perspectief/nato-should-not-go-to-the-indo-pacific/

[29] https://www.mofa.go.jp/erp/c_see/pageite_000001_00287.html

[30] https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2024/08/12/japan-helpt-eilandstaten-in-oceanie-graag-maar-heeft-daarbij-een-eigen-agenda-a4862601

[31] https://www.kaiho.mlit.go.jp/e/topics_archive/article4347.html

[32] https://japannews.yomiuri.co.jp/politics/defense-security/20231128-152365/

[33] https://academic.oup.com/ia/article-abstract/96/1/49/5697492

[34] https://japan.kantei.go.jp/98_abe/statement/201909/_00003.html