Africa: Reorienting security cooperation against prevailing global geopolitical headwinds

Priyal Singh

The global geopolitical and security environment has grown increasingly turbulent and unpredictable in recent years. As the fault lines between major world powers deepen over their competing worldviews of international order, state actors are adopting increasingly inward-looking, myopic, and self-serving foreign policy approaches. These geopolitical fissures are most evident between Western actors (largely under the stewardship of the United States, the European Union, and certain individual European powers), and China, Russia, and other emerging of middle powers from the Global South. As this loose collection of geopolitical blocs grows more solidified their rival ambitions and competition for influence and resources has become increasingly overt. The inability of many global and regional multilateral organisations to curb this behaviour and encourage greater investment in collective, institutionalised, approaches to shared challenges has also led to a crisis of credibility and legitimacy.[1]

The effects of these prevailing headwinds are perhaps most acutely felt across Africa as a continent both disproportionately dependent on the effective functioning of multilateral institutions, while historically being a central theatre for the rival ambitions of great powers to play out. Following decades of political and financial support from its traditional Western partners to help develop its collective crisis and conflict response capacities (in line with the African Union’s (AU) Peace and Security Architecture and associated African Standby Force model for security interventions), Africa’s security environment has considerably deteriorated in recent years.[2] Prior investments in building institutional capacity for conflict response have simply not paid the kinds of dividends that its Western partners have hoped for. And persistent cycles of conflict and instability continue to plague all corners of the continent.

 

Continuous conflicts

In Southern Africa, radical non state actors have proliferated and extended their influence southward into Mozambique. Relentless cycles of conflict continue to undermine stability across the Great Lakes Region, centred around the restive Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo and its neighbours. In West Africa and the Sahel, a recent wave of unconstitutional changes in government have left the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) reeling. In Libya, competing rival political administrations and a shaky provisional government leave the country open to a resurgence of major conflict. And East Africa and the Horn remain mired in the ongoing civil war in Sudan and the limited capacities of the Somali Federal Government to reign in the Islamic extremist organisation Al-Shabab.

Against this backdrop, large-scale regional and international conflict responses such as the UN Stabilisation Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) and the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) are drawing down – with little political appetite in either New York or Addis Ababa for mandating and deploying new peacekeeping or peace support operations any time soon.[3] Responses by the continent’s sub-regional bodies such as the Southern African Development Community’s Mission (SADC) in Mozambique (SAMIM) or the DRC (SAMIDRC) have also led to mixed results due to capacity constraints and other political hurdles.[4]Accordingly, the growing set of emergent conflict stressors in Africa, from climate change to the threats posed by artificial intelligence and online disinformation – coupled with long-standing structural drivers and root causes of conflict, relating to governance deficits, economic underdevelopment, and a lack of resources and institutional capacities for conflict prevention – remain sorely unaddressed. And, perhaps more importantly, the continent’s ability to confront these issues remain considerably constrained by the broader prevailing global geopolitical environment in which it operates.

 

Hollowing-out of institutionalised conflict response

This worsening overall security environment, coupled with the ineffectiveness of global, regional and sub-regional bodies, has led to the rise of ad hoc military coalitions (often created at short notice as stopgap measures for very particular task-specific purposes) which often work outside the bounds of actors like the UN, AU, and subregional organisations like ECOWAS or SADC. These alternative forms of non-institutionalised conflict response, exemplified by the Group of Five for the Sahel (JF-G5S) or the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), have also contributed to the hollowing-out of institutionalised conflict response capacities across the continent; as state actors become less concerned or reliant on the deliberations or decisions taken in New York or Addis Ababa in addressing the security challenges they may be confronting.[5]

This overarching trend toward direct bilateral military support of state actors, and away from bolstering the institutionalised conflict response capacities of a continent-wide peace and security architecture, is clearly evident in the EU’s new strategic approach toward Africa. By replacing its dedicated African Peace Facility (APF), used since 2004 to shore-up the conflict response capacities of the AU, the establishment of the European Peace Facility (EPF) in 2021 has allowed the bloc to directly finance security interventions with state actors in Africa.[6] This includes the funding of military training, arms and equipment. This has signalled a major shift in the overall logic used by the EU to pursue the objectives of its common security and defence policy in Africa, as it largely circumvents the institutional actors it supported for the better part of two decades. The EPF has also ushered in a new era in which the EU is seen as a much more pronounced geopolitical actor in the security affairs of African states – alongside the US, individual European powers, BRICS nations, and other actors from the Global South.

Additionally, given that the EPF’s funds are not specifically earmarked for Africa (whereas those of the APF were), the continent’s overall security environment has seemingly fallen off the EU’s priority list as more pressing or immediate concerns, like Ukraine, may now be addressed. In fact, between 2001 to November 2023, 83 percent of EPF financing was directed toward supporting Ukraine whereas 10 percent went to the AU, alongside smaller allocations to individual African state actors including Mozambique, Mali, Nigeria, Rwanda, Ghana, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Benin, and Somalia.[7] This new competitive environment for security cooperation financing from the EU again affirms the role of the bloc as a key geopolitical actor, vying for greater influence in Africa amongst an increasingly crowded and diverse set of other major world powers.

 

Threefold conundrum

In this new scramble for influence, the primary conundrum for the continent’s traditional Western partners is threefold. Firstly, other major world powers are providing African states with a far more compelling worldview of international order moving forward, than that provided by Western actors. Common commitments across Brussels and Washington, for example, to promote democracy, good governance, and open societies, increasingly ring hollow in African capitals – weighed down by perceptions of ongoing double standards, abuses of power, ill-considered military adventurism, and considerable historical baggage. Moreover, policy coherence over more tangible or singular international policy issues (like climate change or preventing the next global pandemic) appear increasingly fractured amongst Western actors, especially following the inauguration of the current US President earlier this year. In sum, the liberal consensus of old, needed to shore-up support of post-war international institutions, and which allowed a collective “West” to speak with one voice to African capitals is broken.

Accordingly, US-Africa relations may progress down an increasingly divergent path than that with the EU, or with individual European nations. On the other hand, Africa’s other major international partners appear far more adept at framing their growing cooperation with the continent within a more compelling worldview. One that speaks to a shared responsibility to usher in a new, more equitable, representative and just, multipolar international order – in part based on a commitment to the reform of global governance, security, and financial institutions.[8]

Secondly, the continent’s major partners from the Global South are unencumbered by the historical baggage weighting down Western actors in Africa. Countries like China and India (despite their own individual differences), for example, can lean into and leverage their credentials as long-standing allies against Western abuses of power in Africa. Growing trade relations and security cooperation often comes on the back of high-level political engagements that seek out solidarity with African nations against neo-imperialism and the lingering structural effects of colonialism that ravaged the continent for centuries.

In this way, African states are more naturally inclined to deepening their engagements with other emerging poles of power in the international system. Moreover, many of these actors maintain increasingly aspirational foreign policy outlooks, seeking to bolster their own respective power-projection capabilities and secure access to new markets that will drive their development over the coming decades. For China, India, and many other regional powers in the Global South, the strategic value of Africa cannot be understated.[9]

Third, Africa’s other major partners from the Global South are similarly unencumbered by the red tape and bureaucracy surrounding security cooperation that still largely defines its engagements with Western actors. For better or worse, adherence to standards on a raft of issues relating to the promotion of democracy, financial transparency, women empowerment, and the rights of marginalised groups, are largely less overt in the realm of security cooperation between African states and its non-Western partners. This provides another competitive edge to these actors, who may be able to act more expeditiously and respond to the requests of African state actors with a greater degree of flexibility.

 

Search for a more pragmatic and rational basis

This conundrum begs the question of what should be done moving forward. Given that the fallout of ongoing insecurity and instability in Africa will likely lead to more pronounced knock-on effects over the coming decades, how exactly should the continent’s Western partners seek to position themselves to play a more effective or meaningful security cooperation role with the continent?

Firstly, Western actors should clearly acknowledge that the policies and practices they’ve championed in prior years will no longer work in Africa. Security cooperation frameworks with elements linked to the liberal peacebuilding model, for example, or the responsibility to protect (R2P), have all largely fell flat in Africa over the last decade.[10] Similarly, there should be a more explicit common recognition that Western-led efforts to strengthen institutional capacities for conflict response across the continent have simply not led the kinds of results that were expected. Moving forward, new forms of direct bilateral security cooperation with African state actors should be approached from a far more pragmatic and rational basis, focusing on clearly-defined short-term and medium-term goals – with the priorities of African partners taking centre stage. The long-term implications of these new arrangements, on regionalised security environments, for example, should be left to African capitals to take the lead and deliberate on. Accordingly, Western powers should aim to tone down and disentangle their security cooperation in Africa with broader efforts aimed at global moral and normative leadership.

Secondly, as the prevailing global geopolitical environment becomes increasingly volatile and less predictable, Western actors should more greatly consider establishing new institutional mechanisms to earmark longer-term security cooperation funds for the continent. Without these financing windows, progress in many of the continent’s conflict hotspots will likely be lost due to unrealistic and unsustainable operating environments. It is clearly evident that the nature of conflict in many of the continent’s fragile regions are cyclical in nature. Longer-term financing commitments are therefore necessary to create a predictable operating environment in which short- and medium-term security interventions may be deployed in an iterative manner. One that leverages local and international skills, best practices, and institutional memory created over longer term frameworks. Again, this will be vital given that the large-scale multilateral peacekeeping and peace support operations of old are coming to be seen as relics of the past, given their waning utility and influence.

 

Meaningful security cooperation

Third, Western actors may need to make a more concerted effort in differentiating their own individual security cooperation approaches in Africa, in order to avoid the historical baggage of operating as a collective. Given that some Western state actors have particularly problematic relations in Africa, certain other countries may want to create as much distance between them and their counterparts who have sullied their reputations due to prior ill-conceived military misadventures, abuses of power, double-standards, and legacies of colonialism. In short, guilt by association will do no favours to many Western actors seeking to undertake meaningful security cooperation endeavours in Africa, against the prevailing geopolitical headwinds already discussed.

And, finally, given the rising influence of other powers in Africa, Western actors may need to more seriously explore triangular security cooperation arrangements and partnerships with emerging powers from the Global South. These arrangements could allow for the pooling not only of vital resources and expertise, but also leading to a greater degree of legitimacy and credibility for security interventions in Africa around shared concerns. These kinds of triangular arrangements have been particularly prominent in the area of development assistance, with lessons and best practices that may be extended into the realm of hard security cooperation in Africa.

 

[1] Jaldi, A., “The Crisis of Multilateralism viewed from the Global South”, Policy Center for the New South, Policy Paper, April 2023. https://www.policycenter.ma/publications/crisis-multilateralism-viewed-global-south

[2] Pharatlhatlhe, K. & Vanheukelom, J., “Financing the African Union: On Mindsets and Money”, ECDPM, Discussion Paper 240, February 2019. https://ecdpm.org/work/financing-the-african-union-on-mindsets-and-money

[3] Russo, J., “What the 2023 Ministerial Can Tell Us About the Future of Peacekeeping”, International Peace Institute, Global Observatory, 25 January 2024. https://theglobalobservatory.org/2024/01/what-the-2023-ministerial-can-tell-us-about-the-future-of-peacekeeping/

[4] Mooloo, N. & Hoinathy, R., “Can SAMIDRC be spared the fate of previous peace missions?”, Institute for Security Studies, ISS Today, 28 October 2024. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/can-samidrc-be-spared-the-fate-of-previous-peace-missions

[5] Brosig, M. & Karlsrud, J., “How ad hoc coalitions deinstitutionalize international institutions”, International Affairs, Vol. 100, Issue 2, March 2024. https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/100/2/771/7609296

[6] International Crisis Group, “How to Spend It: New EU Funding for African Peace and Security”, Africa Report, No. 297, 14 January 2021. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/african-union-regional-bodies/297-how-spend-it-new-eu-funding-african-peace-and-security

[7] Hartwig, Z.N., “European Peace Facility: ‘The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly’”, European Student Think Tank, 20 February 2024. https://esthinktank.com/2024/02/20/european-peace-facility-the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly/

[8] Singh, P., “BRICS Summit 2024: everything, everywhere, all at once?”, Institute for Security Studies, ISS Today, 30 October 2024. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/brics-summit-2024-everything-everywhere-all-at-once

[9] Singh, P., “Africa has a rare chance to shape the international order”, Institute for Security Studies, ISS Today, 30 August 2022. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/africa-has-a-rare-chance-to-shape-the-international-order

[10] Council on Foreign Relations, “The Rise and Fall of the Responsibility to Protect”, 20 April 2023. https://education.cfr.org/learn/timeline/rise-and-fall-responsibility-protect

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