

The EU, NATO and Transnational Terrorism

Anton Bebler

NATO's and the EU's Response to '9/11'

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 caught the West collectively unprepared. On 12 September 2001, in an unprecedented move, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Most notably this invocation was the first act of this kind in NATO's entire history. However, contrary to its original purpose, the invocation called for the defence of the continental United States of America and not of the European allies. It was unusual also because the invocation of Article 5 was not prompted by a massive military invasion across state borders from outside the North Atlantic Treaty area. For the first time in NATO's institutional history the 'war on terrorism'¹ was proclaimed to be a major mission for the Alliance. The Alliance speedily corrected its previous strategic posture, geared itself to deal with the perceived threat to its members and has since developed additional capabilities. It has also partly adjusted its internal structure and relations with other actors.

The outrage caused by the 11 September attacks also moved the Council of the European Union to call for the broadest possible global coalition against terrorism to be assembled under the UN aegis. On 21 September 2001 the EU Council adopted a series of measures to combat terrorism by non-military means. These unprecedented public steps were taken, however, against a partly concealed background. Since 1975 the members of the (then) European Communities have in fact maintained low-profile confidential cooperation among ministries engaged in suppressing terrorism, radicalism, extremism and international violence (Group TREVI). Corresponding Swiss authorities have also participated in this cooperation.

Since September 2001 the European Union has greatly strengthened its anti-terrorism activities and adopted a number of measures, notably to cut off the financing of suspected terrorists and of organizations supporting them through registered banks. The European Union also expanded the anti-terrorism role of Europol and Eurojust. In a landmark decision, the Council of the European Union introduced a European arrest warrant, which was supposed to come into force in January 2004. It also decided to enhance intelligence cooperation among member states through the EU's 'third pillar'. In March 2004 the Council appointed an EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, who was placed in the office of the EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The EU anti-terrorism actions were then linked substantively to the anti-proliferation policies for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the programmes of economic and technical assistance to non-member states.

European Security Strategy

In December 2003 the EU Council adopted a new strategic document entitled *A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy* (hereafter the *European Security Strategy*). It was prepared in the Office of, and presented to the Council by, the EU High Representative for CFSP, Javier Solana, who was also a former NATO Secretary-General. As more than half of the NATO members are also EU members, it is not surprising that the 'Solana paper' expressed an assessment of terrorism and proposed a strategy that was very similar to those adopted earlier by NATO. This EU document envisioned, *inter alia*, a wide variety of anti-terrorism activities, including military activities in cooperation with NATO, on the basis of the Berlin-plus arrangements. In addition the EU signed a joint statement with the US on combating terrorism and, on 23 June 2003, also two agreements on mutual legal assistance and on extradition.

The *European Security Strategy*, so far the only official document of this kind, spelled out the following phenomena as 'key threats' to the EU members:

- Terrorism;
- Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (particularly of biological, chemical and radiological weapons in conjunction with the spread of missile technology);
- Regional conflicts and failed states (citing in both categories distant Asian and African countries);
- Organized crime.²

The document asserts that the importance of conventional military threats and of conventional military instruments to deal with them have drastically diminished in the last decade. The proposed rank-ordering of threats, however, strikes one as highly questionable on conceptual and empirical grounds. This applies notably to the placing of terrorism at the top of the list. For example, natural, partly man-made disasters, such as catastrophic droughts, hurricanes, forest fires and floods, have certainly constituted a greater immediate menace than the 'key threats' to the population, not only in sub-Saharan Africa, South-East Asia, the Far East, Caribbean and the US but also in Portugal, Germany, Austria, Poland and several other European states. The proposed rank-ordering has also been very poorly related or unrelated to the actual priorities in security and defence policies of the EU member states, as reflected for instance in their budgetary allocations and in the use of scarce resources, including qualified manpower. It also looks unlikely that this gap will be reduced in the foreseeable future.

Spurred again into action by the Madrid bombing in March 2004, the EU adopted an ambitious *Plan of Action to Combat Terrorism* accompanied by an *EU Declaration on Combating Terrorism*. The new documents urged EU members to enhance consensus and mutual cooperation, to intensify exchange of police and judicial cooperation and generally to ensure the implementation of what was already agreed upon, including more effective border controls and better protection of citizens and infrastructure. This appeal itself reflects the fact that the implementation of a number of the EU anti-terrorism decisions adopted since September 2001 had been unsatisfactory, including exchange of information among intelligence agencies and the application in practice of the EU arrest warrant. Reluctance and even resistance to sharing critical information not only persist among national security agencies but even between security agencies and law enforcement institutions within the same EU member state. Even more saliently, the EU three-pillar structure generally hurts the effective enforcement of agreed-upon decisions on counter-terrorism.

NATO's Response

While the EU actions have concentrated on financial, law enforcement and civil protection aspects of anti-terrorism, NATO understandably paid primary attention to military countermeasures. Most notably, its anti-terrorism activities were added to numerous already developed functions of the Alliance. A new military concept for the defence against terrorism and the Prague Capabilities Commitments (PCC) were adopted.³ On the operational side, these activities included: sending NATO's AWACs to patrol US skies; deploying groups of naval vessels in the eastern Mediterranean and the Gibraltar Straits with the tasks of escorting civilian ships, monitoring, stopping and searching suspected vessels in high seas; training senior officers of the Iraqi security forces; assuring external security at the Olympic Games in Athens, of a mass event in Portugal, etc. Preventive security measures at NATO headquarters and at other NATO installations were stepped up and sharpened. Cooperation between the security services of member states has been enhanced and the special Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit was instituted. The member states' security cooperation with the Partnership for Peace (PfP) countries has also been strengthened in accordance with the Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism. It was related, *inter alia*, to anti-terrorism activities

in Afghanistan and in the Near East and applied notably to cooperation with the Russian Federation. Two ships of the Russian Navy recently joined NATO's operation 'Active Endeavour' in the eastern Mediterranean.

The most important organizational change in NATO's military structure that was specifically geared to fighting terrorism was the creation of the NATO Response Force (NRF) in summer 2003.⁴ The NRF's size, posture, mode of operation and rules of engagement, etc., are however still in the process of evolution. After considerable internal debates, NATO has assumed responsibility for the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. This was NATO's first military operation outside Europe. ISAF has provided the backbone of security protection in the capital city of Kabul, which has been threatened, *inter alia*, by Islamic terrorists. In Iraq NATO has established a training mission for members of the Iraqi security forces. The missions of NATO's 'out-of-area' forces in the Balkans have also been partly related to the struggle against terrorism. The Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina had continued operating until December 2004 and was then largely replaced by a more constabulary EU force. NATO has, however, retained its residual presence in Bosnia-Herzegovina and, if necessary, the capability to intervene by force. The latter capability has also been geared to the potential need to combat transnational terrorism.

The terrorist attacks of September 2001 and the American response to them have had a considerable and contradictory impact on transatlantic relations. At first they almost instantaneously brought the EU and NATO members together in a moving display of transatlantic solidarity. The undeclared war in Afghanistan that soon followed was reasonably well justified by the Bush administration as a military response to the terrorist attacks in the United States and transnational terrorism. Fourteen EU and NATO member states, notably France and the United Kingdom, together with a score of other states, joined the US in the military operations against the Taliban regime and subsequently in efforts to provide security in Afghanistan and to stabilize the new regime. However, the military forces of individual NATO and EU members had operated in Afghanistan for almost two years outside the Alliance framework. This fact indicated NATO's diminished relevance in the eyes of the Bush administration and internal disharmony within the Alliance. The also undeclared but much more controversial war in Iraq was at the outset declared a military action to stop WMD proliferation and to wage the 'war on terrorism'. This very tenuous and, as it turned out, unsubstantiated public justification for the US-led invasion deepened disagreements among the Allies, particularly between the US and France and Germany. In fact, the Iraq war has complicated the process of gaining and maintaining broad European, transatlantic and still wider international support for counter-terrorism actions.⁵

EU and NATO Limitations in Fighting Terrorism

How well do these activities correspond to the gravity of the challenge and the need to meet it effectively? The requirements for and the difficulties of fighting transnational terrorism can be gauged from what is known or alleged about the structure and mode of operation of al-Qaeda:

- The structure of a clandestine, non-state transnational organization, probably consisting of several loosely connected networks, with mobile headquarters and anonymous leadership, using a wide variety of means of communication (from very elementary to sophisticated electronic modes of communication);
- A concealed network of trained and highly motivated members, ready to sacrifice their lives, supported in many countries by thousands of sympathizers and providers of funds, shelter, cover, food, medical and technical assistance, etc. Most sympathizers live in or originate from states with a majority of the population professing Islam. However, cells of devoted members and supporters have also been uncovered in several EU and NATO member states;

- The use of surprise, high mobility and an unconventional combination of destructive means in attacks against high-value, symbolic and mostly civilian targets;
- The very uneven distribution of presumed targets and geographic spread of violent acts with the most numerous and destructive attacks since September 2001 taking place in countries and regions with a significant Muslim population and, so far, mostly outside the Euro-Atlantic area (in the Near East, North Africa, Middle East, South and South-East Asia and the Russian Federation);
- The exploitation of the mass media, particularly of television, to magnify the psychological and political impact of terrorist acts.

Taking into account the characteristics of the most notorious international terrorist organization – al-Qaeda – it is obvious that a wide gap still persists between the requirements for effective struggle against terrorism, on the one hand, and several fundamental features of the EU and NATO, on the other. There are several important reasons for this mismatch.

The **first** is organizational. As large and relatively open international organizations, each containing close to 300 committees and following time-consuming decision-making procedures, the EU and NATO are structurally too cumbersome and slow for this purpose. The EU has in addition a three-pillar structure that effectively prevents joint communal counter-terrorism actions. Both organizations lack the necessary speed in decision-making and implementation.

Second, both organizations, but particularly NATO, have been hampered by different perceptions of terrorism among their members, stemming from the historically highly uneven exposure to major terrorist attacks. Among EU members and European NATO members there is no common vision for anti-terrorism, while significant divergences still persist concerning the gravity of the threat, the role of the military in facing it, etc.⁶ In fact, anti-terrorism still does not command high priority in a number, if not in a majority, of EU and NATO member states, all declarations to the contrary notwithstanding. According to a recent RAND study, NATO has not yet been able to reorient itself from its 'Cold-War mindset' in order to meet more effectively the challenge of modern terrorism.⁷ In contrast with good day-to-day practical cooperation between corresponding security services and the armed forces of NATO member states, considerable elements of discord in anti-terrorism matters still persist at the high political level. The corresponding strains surfaced, for example, in 2004 following the targeted assassinations of two Palestinian Hamas leaders by the Israeli military. It became obvious that quite different views on the political acceptability of terrorism in all its forms, including state terrorism, persisted among prominent NATO and EU members. It has been asserted that during recent natural disasters in the Mediterranean, serious disagreements among the Allies arose concerning the authorized scope of operations and several proposed deployments of the NATO Response Force, basically for training purposes.

The **third** serious hindrance follows from the EU's and NATO's restricted membership, which is based on territorial, political and economic criteria that are irrelevant from the standpoint of effective anti-terrorism. The same applies to legal provisions that are contained in the Brussels and North Atlantic Treaties. These features contrast sharply with the global reach of contemporary transnational terrorism, which freely operates across state and regional boundaries. NATO's 'out-of-area' operations are also questionable on doctrinal and political grounds when conducted in Asian or African states that do not militarily threaten any member of the Alliance. The same remark applies to the use of NATO's military capabilities for fulfilling essentially internal security tasks in the Balkans, Asia and, tomorrow, in Africa. Such activities have no legal foundation in the EU and NATO treaties. Furthermore the North Atlantic Alliance has no standing provisions for pre-emptive 'out-of-area' military operations. One would expect still greater political difficulties if similar tasks outside Europe were to be contemplated for the European Rapid Reaction Force.

The **fourth** handicap stems from the limited spectrum of resources that are commanded separately by the EU and NATO. The EU's financial measures could and in all probability have been easily circumvented. Much terrorist financing has been concealed in and outside the legal banking system anyway. Furthermore, police and intelligence cooperation, even if ideal, does not remove the roots of terrorism. As far as NATO is concerned, it is obvious that military power has limited utility in fighting this phenomenon. Terrorism (except of a purely criminal variety) is usually a 'continuation of political intercourse by other means' – to use the famous dictum about war by Carl von Clausewitz. But terrorism in itself greatly differs from war by its methods and goals. It is thus counterproductive to treat anti-terrorism as warfare, since it only marginally requires the application of military power. For example, even if massively employed, all of NATO's military capabilities could not have prevented the 11 September 2001 attacks in the US or the subsequent terrorist acts in Turkey, Spain and the UK. Yet the two principal operative incarnations of the North Atlantic Council – the Defence Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group – deliberate and decide on the employment of capabilities of which only about one per cent could be actively used against transnational terrorists, even if their preparations are timely detected. The largest, deadliest and costliest weapons' systems maintained by NATO and EU member states have lost most of their potency *vis-à-vis* a largely invisible enemy widely scattered among civilian populations in over 60 countries. In this asymmetric confrontation, nuclear arms ceased to deter or dissuade stateless adversaries.⁸ From a formidable security asset, nuclear arms and their vectors turned into valuable targets for terrorists and thus into a heavy security liability. This observation applies to nuclear weapons as well as to all of the nuclear facilities located in EU and NATO member states and reflects a profound geopolitical turnabout with far-reaching strategic consequences.

The International Community and the Requirements for a More Effective Global Struggle against Terrorism

By any objective criteria, terrorism in all of its forms has not constituted, so far, a serious threat to global security. The number of its victims calculated on an annual basis remains utterly negligible compared to the number of premature deaths caused by other phenomena: hunger; malnutrition; lack of safe water; contagious diseases (notably Aids, tuberculosis and malaria); smoking; drugs; alcohol; traffic accidents; natural disasters; fires; heat; cold weather; local wars; crime; and suicides, etc. The number of individuals who died as victims of any form of terrorism between 1991 and 2002 has been estimated by the US State Department at 6,721, or about 600 annually. A comparison to the one-quarter of a million victims of a single natural disaster in South-East Asia, lasting only several hours (the *tsunami* in December 2004), or several million persons dying annually from contagious diseases, shows the real dimension of this phenomenon.

The most worrying threat related to terrorism could appear in combination with its possible use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This combination, however, still remains conjectural and could become realistic only when actively supported and sponsored *de facto* by a sufficiently strong state, led by irresponsible leaders, and possessing the corresponding capabilities, organization and motivation. At present there are no credible candidates in this category. So far, the cost of the 'war on terrorism' and of numerous other measures justified under this heading has by far exceeded the measurable direct damage caused by transnational terrorists themselves. This cost has included the expenses of highly enhanced preventive security measures, an increased number of police and other security personnel, increased transportation and insurance charges, significantly reduced income and huge business losses in air transportation and tourism, etc. Liberal critics of the 'war on terrorism' and human rights' activists also point out its political price in the form of infringements on human rights and freedoms. Leftist and anarchist protesters claim, furthermore, that the 'war on terrorism' has been a smokescreen (ab)used by the Bush administration as a pretext to

strengthen American hegemony on a global scale and US control over strategic energy resources.

Although many actors – individual states, groups of states and international organizations – have been actively engaged in combating terrorism, the global ‘war on terrorism’ has not been won and its intermediary results look inconclusive at best. Since this ‘war’ was declared, coalition troops in Afghanistan and Iraq have sustained nearly 3,000 fatalities and 20,000 casualties. On the other hand, several hundred alleged operatives and other adherents of al-Qaeda have been reportedly killed, detained or imprisoned. It is not known, however, how many new activists have entered the ranks of terrorists and have been trained and equipped worldwide. At any rate, it is doubtful that their total number in the Near East, Middle East, South and South-East Asia, North Africa and in the Russian Federation has declined. The frequency and volume of terrorist attacks have not diminished since September 2001 and in some regions and countries (including Israel, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, India and Indonesia) the exact opposite is true. Iraq has become a flashpoint and a source of transnational terrorism, which was not the case prior to the US-British invasion. The much publicized capture of Saddam Hussein has had no effect on the ferocity of terrorist acts in Iraq. And Osama Bin Laden is still at large and openly threatening the US and its allies.

It is hard to measure the real impact of the EU’s and NATO’s activities against transnational terrorism. It seems, however, undeniable that both organizations have played positive roles in this respect. Yet, according to some analysts, they remained on the sidelines throughout much of the global endeavour.⁹ With further improvements, the EU’s and NATO’s contributions to containing and reducing the threat of transnational terrorism may well be enhanced, through better adapting their internal structures, procedures of decision-making and capabilities to these needs. Doing away with the EU’s ‘pillar’ structure and integrating all terrorism-related activities across the three pillars would certainly be a cardinal step in this direction. As long as this institutional change remains politically unfeasible, it would make sense *inter alia* to entrust the European Commission with monitoring the implementation of the agreed-upon anti-terrorism decisions by member states and with reporting on it regularly to the Council and the European Parliament. This would complement and considerably strengthen the efforts and prodding of the member states by the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator.

The above-mentioned ‘Cold-War mindset’ in NATO is reflected in the (excessive) number and bureaucratic activities of many NAC auxiliary committees, which could well be merged or restructured. On the other hand, a lean structure of bodies dealing with non-military aspects of international security could be built into the NATO structure. It has been proposed already that a new Assistant Secretary-General be appointed and charged with coordinating NATO anti-terrorism efforts as a counterpart to the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator.¹⁰ Moreover, all NATO member states should station permanent representatives at NATO Headquarters for non-military aspects of international security. These representatives would meet regularly, as the permanent military representatives do, while the national chiefs for these matters would constitute a body functioning similarly to the NATO Military Committee. This new body would be organically linked with the NATO Response Force (NRF), the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre, a research and analysis centre, etc. It would be supported on a permanent basis by the NATO International Staff. On the political side, there is a need to enhance the transatlantic consensus concerning a proactive strategy, WMD counter-proliferation, as well as on the geographic reach of possible military anti-terrorist actions. Given their current handicaps and limited adaptability, neither the EU nor NATO can play central roles in the protracted global endeavour to defeat, let alone to prevent, the phenomenon of transnational terrorism from occurring. It is obvious that in order to counter the threat posed by transnational terrorism, a potent combination of instruments is required that currently fall predominantly or entirely outside the EU’s and NATO’s purviews.

Strategy

The dangers of contemporary, more technologically advanced terrorism (particularly of its transnational variety) require a different strategy, far-reaching adaptation at the global level and a radical alternation in the design of the state security structures at the national level. In Paul Wilkinson's opinion:

Military forces are inherently handicapped in their efforts to suppress terrorism. To win the struggle against al-Qaeda you need to win the intelligence war and use law enforcement agencies worldwide as well as organize cooperation in the finance sector, civil aviation industry, private sector and between the public and private sectors. [...] Over-dependence on military operations and heavy-handed use of fire power in civilian areas [...] is a huge strategic blunder.¹¹

Instead the main brunt of preventive, suppressive and protective anti-terrorism activities should be borne by civilian agencies (domestic and foreign intelligence-gathering, civil defence, rescue and health authorities, law enforcement, customs, diplomacy, private contractors, etc.) and by general and specialized police forces (including border and financial police) and by paramilitary formations (including the coast guards, gendarmerie-like forces, etc.). They are to be reinforced, when needed, by very flexible and mobile multinational expeditionary military forces that are capable of operating swiftly at great distances. Within the national armed forces a very prominent place should be given to specialized anti-terrorist formations (special commando units with the attached means of high-speed transportation, anti-radiation, medical support, decontamination facilities and personnel, etc.), while peace-enforcement and peacekeeping capabilities would have to be greatly enhanced at the expense of traditional territorially-oriented forces. These three segments in the armed forces would cut across traditional arms, executing partly overlapping tasks and rotating in and out of the expeditionary forces. It would be unrealistic to expect that the EU and NATO member states will in the foreseeable future radically modify the design and fully adapt the functioning of their security systems to the new agenda. One can foresee only gradual and partial adaptation because of, *inter alia*, institutional inertia and vested bureaucratic interests.

Most varieties of terrorism have deep social, psychological and political roots. Major sources of terrorism that have hit some countries in Europe and North America as boomerangs were created in past centuries by European conquests and colonization on other continents. Several of these flashpoints are still active, such as, for instance, in Palestine. In conjunction with the wider resistance to Western domination, with religious fundamentalism, racism and social injustice these sources also amply motivate recruits into terrorist ranks from other parts of the Islamic world, notably from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Important sources of terrorism in the past in Ireland, on Cyprus, in Algeria, southern Africa and elsewhere were not extinguished by superior military power, police repression and jails, but by negotiations and difficult political decisions (such as to grant independence, decolonize and abolish racist apartheid) to reach mutually acceptable political settlements.

Likewise, without equitable and bold political solutions for the Palestinian and Chechen problems, one cannot expect the lasting eradication of terrorism that has afflicted the Near East, occupied Palestine, Israel, the Russian Federation and by reflection also the West. In some cases the removal of privileged alien settlers and the spatial separation of culturally and/or ethnically distinct communities could also be a feasible solution. Thus the repatriation of the French *colons* has certainly contributed to the eradication of at least two sources of terrorism in Algeria, while the removal of Jewish settlers from Gaza could have a similar effect, if followed thoroughly also on the occupied West Bank. The pools of potential recruits into terrorists' ranks have existed among the underprivileged and discontented youth in large urban agglomerations and among the massively unemployed in refugee camps in the Near

and Middle East. Suicide bombers have also come from the predominantly Muslim immigrant communities residing in the West. Preventing and combating terrorism therefore requires very considerable, long-term and steady efforts in the social, political, economic, legislative, judicial and other domains. These activities cannot be successful if carried out by state institutions only, without active participation of civil society, political parties, religious communities and their leaders as well as of other non-governmental organizations and bodies. It follows logically that the attempts to eradicate terrorism predominantly by naked force cannot have lasting effects and are doomed in the long run.

Terrorism in all its forms will never be uprooted everywhere on our planet and destroyed for good. A 'war' with the radical goal of completely eliminating terrorism is thus an unrealistic undertaking. However, systematic prevention, disruption and, wherever possible, suppression of detected terrorist groups and organizations certainly need to be waged. A relatively small, specialized, low-profile international organization with wide transcontinental membership could be more effective in this area than the currently existing large international bodies. It would provide for regular, closer and faster confidential cooperation between national security services in their anti-terrorist activities. The overarching framework of the UN, which would link specialized agencies and regional security organizations, holds the best promise in this respect.

It is inaccurate to present the threat of modern terrorism as equal in gravity to that which emanated in the past from several great powers headed by dictators and with totalitarian systems of government. It is also inappropriate to confound the 'war on terrorism' with the efforts to promote democracy world-wide. Democratization of political systems does not and will not solve the problem of terrorism and could even worsen it. The levels of terrorist violence in the UK, France, Spain, Turkey, the Russian Federation, Israel, occupied Palestine, India, *et al.*, have been unrelated to democracy. Iraq under dictatorship had not experienced transnational terrorism. On the contrary, terrorism's intensity in Iraq has been growing and not diminishing simultaneously with the implantation in Iraq of competitive elections and other democratic institutions and bodies. Democratic election in occupied Palestine brought to power by ballot the Hamas movement, which has been engaged in terrorist activities. The US practice of closely cooperating in counter-terrorism activities with democratically illegitimate regimes¹² also clearly contradicts the main contention in the US President's National Security Strategy of 16 March 2006.

Terrorism has afflicted all kinds of political systems – democracies, semi-authoritarian regimes, military and civilian dictatorships, parliamentary and presidential republics, monarchies and even the Holy See. It follows that in order to make anti-terrorism struggles effective, a worldwide coalition ought to include as active participants also a wide variety of states, including the Russian Federation, China, Japan, India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Egypt *et al.* The EU, NATO and their members could and should play active roles in this global endeavour. A better organized world community would then be certainly more successful in dealing with the most burning problems of humanity, and among them with transnational terrorism.

Dr Anton Bebler is Professor of Political Science and Defence Sciences at the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Ljubljana, Slovenia.

Notes

1. The 'war on terrorism' has become a widely used but still partly controversial metaphoric expression describing various activities aimed at suppressing and eradicating the phenomenon of terrorism.
2. *A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy* (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, December 2003), pp. 6-9.
3. *The Prague Summit and NATO's Transformation* (Brussels: NATO Public Diplomacy Division,

- 2003), pp. 29-32.
4. *The Prague Summit and NATO's Transformation*, pp. 27-28.
 5. Richard A. Clarke and Barry R. McCaffrey, *NATO's Role in Confronting International Terrorism*, US Atlantic Council Policy Paper (Washington DC: Atlantic Council of the United States, June 2004), p. viii.
 6. Brian Michael Jenkins, 'The US Response to Terrorism and its Implications for Transatlantic Relations', in Gustav Lindstrom, *Shift or Rift: Assessing US-EU Relations after Iraq* (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of the European Union, 2003), pp. 231-250. Also see Gustav Lindstrom, 'Europe Seeks Unity on Homeland Security', *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 7 June 2006, p. 26.
 7. Nora Bensahel, *The Counter-terror Coalitions: Cooperation with Europe, NATO and the European Union* (Santa Monica CA: RAND, 2003), p. 22.
 8. David S. Yost, 'New Approaches to Deterrence in Britain, France and the United States', *International Affairs*, no. 1, 2005, pp. 83-114.
 9. Col. Russell D. Howard, 'Thinking Creatively in the War on Terrorism: Leveraging NATO and the Partnership for Peace Consortium', *Connections* (Garmisch: Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defence Academies and Security Studies Institutes, spring 2005), pp. 2-5.
 10. C. Richard Nelson, 'Expanding NATO's Counter-Terrorism Role', *NATO Review*, special issue, spring 2005, pp. 56-59.
 11. Paul Wilkinson, *International Terrorism: The Changing Threat and the EU's Response*, Chaillot Paper no. 84 (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, October 2005), p. 18.
 12. Daniel Byman, *Going to War with the Allies We Have: Allies, Counter-Insurgency and the War on Terrorism* (Carlisle PA: US Army War College, 2005), p. 17.