

NATO's Organisational Evolution

The Case for a Civil Security Committee

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The challenges posed by the contemporary security environment require NATO to undergo organisational redesign in order to provide the formal structures and processes necessary to gain politico-military and civil balance and cohesion.

The purpose of this article is to propose an ambitious yet practical adaptation for the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation headquarters structure. The value proposition is the creation of a Civil Security Committee (CSC) that is equivalent in stature with other NATO committees and is networked externally with international organisations to promote multilateral collective security. This concept envisages NATO progressing from a politico-military alliance to a politico-military-civil alliance. This adaptation may be considered an 'evolution in security affairs' designed to meet the challenges posed by the contemporary security environment.

The main institutional architecture absent today is an effective forum for coordinating global strategic thinking on a set of specific practical challenges. Responding effectively to this shift in the strategic environment is the core institutional challenge for NATO and the driving force behind this proposal. The creation of the Civil Security Committee within NATO requires a paradigm shift in intellectual undertakings; it is a stepping-stone to strategic superiority that starts with organisational redesign within NATO HQs to gain politico-military-civil sector security balance and cohesion.

A Civil Security Committee would provide the institutional mechanisms and processes necessary to leverage human interoperability across diverse sectors. This strategic forum would shape organisational behaviors, create a culture of civilian inclusiveness and begin to form

a new collective identity for NATO. This institutional transformation should be organised in a top-down approach to gain unity of effort and create interdependence among constituents who will have a substantial interest in every member's well-being. An evolved NATO with civilian interfaces would help to manage the input and influence from members, and establish the procedural norms for mutual consultation and policy coordination for the transatlantic security community.¹

The Contemporary Security Environment

Global interdependence has reshaped the structure of our society. In the Euro-Atlantic zone the nation state will remain the most important unit of political, economic and security affairs, but it will coexist with diverse and empowered individuals and groups ready to collaborate or compete to reach new levels of political, social and economic power.² Information technology and mass media have compressed world events as the speed of interactions, degree of interconnectedness and interdependence have transformed traditional relationships in the international system. Small, adaptable, transnational networks have access to tools of destruction that are increasingly cheap, easy to conceal, and more readily available. The contemporary security environment is increasingly more a matter of population security measures from interconnected and interdependent threats posed by international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), climate change, limited or inaccessible natural resources,

economic crises, and failed states.³ Although the integration of the global economy has brought tremendous benefits, threats are more distributed and therefore more likely to arise without warning.⁴ As John Steinbruner in his article 'Consensual Security' states: "More intensive and consequential interactions now occurring among societies makes collaboration for mutual protection far more important than competition for national advantage."⁵

This unfolding era presents an increasingly complex mixture of culture, ethnicity and religion, where societies are becoming borderless, transnational and difficult to frame. Individuals, organisations and nations are discovering new identities while holding on to old ones and all the while seeking protection from uncertainty. The information age has heightened political consciousness for the masses but has also diminished traditional state powers to provide internal security measures. In this context the chances of nation state warfare, especially in Europe, has greatly diminished, while the conditions for instability across states has increased.

NATO now finds itself at the crossroads between national wills and international aims to provide security and overcome uncertainty. Economic, food, health, environmental, personal, and community security – more broadly defined as 'Human Security', jointly with 'Energy Security' covering the dependence of our society on fossil fuels, and 'Cyber Security' in the era of information and communications dependence, requires an inclusive framework from political, military and civilian national organisations, industry and academia. Indeed, at the Bucharest Summit it was declared that "many of today's security challenges cannot be successfully met by NATO acting alone. Meeting them can best be achieved through a broad partnership with the wider international community, as part of a truly comprehensive approach, based on a shared sense of openness and cooperation as well as determination on all sides."⁶

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The Civil Security Committee

The primary organising principle for NATO (a consensus-based collective defence political-military alliance) remains valid but requires adaptation to adjust to the new realities of our time. This adaptation is being called for by the leaders of our nations as they search for ways to redefine NATO's roles, relationships and responsibilities. As stated in the Bucharest Summit Declaration: "Demands on our Alliance have grown in complexity in the last twenty years, as the security environment has changed and both the scope of our missions and operations

and our membership have expanded. This requires continual adaptation and reform of the NATO headquarters' structures and processes."⁷ Change is also being called for by experts within NATO as Michael Rühle⁸ stated in his article 'Bucharest's Balance Sheet': "NATO needs to create the mechanisms and relationships necessary to embed NATO's military contributions into a broader civil-military approach [...] and examine how the NATO framework can be used to address new security challenges..."⁹ This requires security entrepreneurs – strategic integrators who see beyond obvious country and cultural differences.

NATO, as a values-based organisation, needs to transform to protect shared interests wherever they may lie. Many governments and institutions have not yet adapted to this reality at the geopolitical and strategic level. Responding effectively to this shift in the strategic environment is the core institutional challenge for NATO and other regional and global organisations to improve collaboration and cooperation. This by no means is to be seen as a call for unlimited expansion of NATO or a venture into purely civil matters or the creation of another parochial stovepipe. "The very notion of centralizing hierarchies is itself an anachronism in our fluid, highly dynamic and extensively networked world. Effective governance should not only put more responsibility on states and international institutions, but also non-state actors, the private sector and civil society. States in particular, need to develop a deeper awareness of their dual role in our global world."¹⁰

For NATO it is a strategic imperative and should be considered a strategic investment to establish closer coordination and integration with civilian organisations and agencies. That said, "NATO will have to work hard to build trust and to convince other actors that a call for coordination is not a veiled attempt to dominate them."¹¹

While consensus-based internationalism in the contemporary security environment will still be required for decisions at the highest level, the CSC's strength will be through norms-based multilateralism where power and influence is exercised by working through formal legal processes and informal frameworks of cooperation. Norms-based internationalism provides legitimacy for action and empowers actors in the engagement space to be effective in real-time, especially against non-state actors that often defy legitimacy.

The core competency of the CSC will be a forum of civilian experts networked together organisationally and positioned to provide recommendations to higher authorities. Local actors and partners from diverse sectors could be empowered to shape the environment and protect civil society. The main tenet is being proactive instead of reactive. Multilateral pluralism is required when dealing with the civil sector in order to satisfy diverse stakeholders, particularly in functional areas such as energy security and cyber security – which may increasingly take precedence over traditional static territorial defence measures in a globalised world.



CSC Organisational Design

The Civil Security Committee concept merges existing elements within NATO and restructures them to be more enduring and persistent. An in-house civilian forum will provide a consistent voice to the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and enhance decision-making. The enterprise architecture of the new Civil Security Committee could spawn from the Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee (SCEPC) and NATO's Civil Emergency Planning (CEP) directorate to form the basis of the CSC. They would become a permanent committee to build habitual relations with actors from civil sectors in a networked approach – and not just for emergency planning – but proactively to prevent and preclude emergencies and shape the security environment.

Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee (SCEPC)

The SCEPC is currently the top NATO advisory body for the protection of civilian populations and the use of civil resources in support of NATO's objectives. It meets twice a year in plenary session with representatives from capitals in both NATO and Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) formats. Forming a permanent committee will provide the mechanisms necessary to leverage collaboration with the Political and Military Committees and provide broad-based informed recommendations to the NAC. This internal voice within NATO structures would provide civilian recommendations that have been formulated

in consultation with the International Staff (IS) and International Military Staff (IMS) to provide balanced recommendations.

Civil Emergency Planning (CEP) Directorate

The Civil Emergency Planning directorate would form the backbone of the NATO CSC network with civil experts drawn from industry, business, government and other public administrations from across the Euro-Atlantic area and elsewhere. This outreach could be global as a consultative forum with functional and geographical representation in the subcommittees of the CSC. This body could provide the staff support necessary for collaboration with the IS and IMS. As the SCEPC and CEP merge to form the core of the enterprise architecture they would expand to collaborate with other national and nongovernmental organisations that have common purpose and objective.

The SCEPC and CEP are therefore key building blocks for the new Civil Security Committee as they provide a pre-existing mechanism for action and can leverage their experience to further expand the network. The CSC could emerge along two dimensions: "One concerning NATO's relationships with external actors; and the other internal focusing on coherent use of military and non-military tools to ensure efficient and effective planning and implementation of operations and activities."¹²

CSC: Connecting Civilian Organisations with NATO

The CSC charter would be the networking of governmental civilian departments and agencies within nation state structures of the Alliance, United Nations (UN) departments and agencies, the European Union (EU), neutral states, nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), and others. It would form an enterprise-wide network loosely based both functionally and geographically in a client-driven approach to address contemporary security issues beyond NATO's traditional boundaries and strictly military nature. It is intended to improve practical working relations between NATO and other entities and provide a mechanism for seamless cooperation. EU members could actually co-chair and have consultative positions within the CSC to add to the transparency and inclusiveness of the network. Finally, NGOs could be offered positions within the CSC subcommittees to ensure the network is linked strategically, operationally and locally with the engagement space.

Delineating the CSC's Roles, Relationships and Responsibilities

The CSC must have a cohesive rationale and institutional grounding to be effective and therefore must organise for success by identifying goals and establishing the structures to accomplish them. There can be no firewalls between committees and with external actors except for sensitive classified information – which the CSC will rarely be concerned with. Getting the roles, relationships and responsibilities (command and control) clearly delineated is a critical requirement. The chairman of the CSC would report directly to the Secretary-General and be subordinate to the NAC. The CSC would coordinate laterally with the other principal NATO committees and policy bodies under current business practices.

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Membership and Representations

Each member country could be represented in the CSC by nationally designated civilians with expertise in their respective sectors. The CSC would be strengthened by representation from external organisations such as the EU and the African Union, with expert representatives from industry such as oil, communications, infrastructure, as well as from academia, think tanks, and business. NGO representatives would be welcome within NATO structures to add transparency and gain shared awareness. Where interests and ethics are aligned, funding may also be derived from these powerful entities and from individu-

als on a humanitarian basis to achieve shared objectives. Institutions of cooperation, partnership and dialogue such as the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), the NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC), the NATO-Georgia Commission (NGC), the Mediterranean Cooperation Group (MCG), the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) could all have representatives in the CSC and its subcommittees.

Civil Security Committee Subcommittees

The Planning Board and Committees that already work with the SCEPC and bring together national government, industry experts and military representatives to coordinate emergency planning¹³ could readily become standing subcommittees under the CSC. The primary purpose of these subcommittees, to include additional ones such as a NATO Energy Security Subcommittee (NESS), a NATO Human Security Subcommittee (NHSS), and a NATO Cyber Security Subcommittee (NCSS) would be to provide functional and geographical expertise and policy recommendations to the NAC. Existing committees, such as the Economic Committee and other NATO agencies that are traditionally civilian in responsibility could fall under the auspices of the CSC.

The CSC and the United Nations

Connecting the CSC with United Nations entities adds legitimacy and enhances both organisation's effectiveness by extending the reach of activities and fostering human interoperability. In 2004, in a report to the UN Secretary-General, the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change further acknowledged that globalisation has changed the world to the extent that a new view on security is needed. It recognises that "a threat for one is a threat for all". It continues that the emphasis has to be on prevention, since "the consequences of allowing latent threats to become manifest, or of allowing existing threats to spread, are simply too severe".¹⁴

The United Nations focuses mainly on economic-social soft power which would add considerably to the goals of the Civil Security Committee. Possible UN bodies that could be networked with the CSC include:

- 1) The Peace and Security Commission: the advisory body of the United Nations that supports peace efforts in countries emerging from conflict;
- 2) The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), which runs the UN Peacekeeping efforts; and
- 3) Other United Nations offices and entities like the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) or the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).



The Civil Security Committee and the European Union

The EU has also recognised the need for a new view on security and the means to face rising threats. The European Security Strategy states that the new threats are “more diverse, less visible and less predictable”.¹⁵ In response to this assessment the main goal is conflict and threat prevention. The strategy also emphasises a comprehensive approach stating that “the challenge now is to bring together the different instruments and capabilities: European assistance programs and the European Development Fund, military and civilian capabilities”.¹⁶ This can only be done in an internationally asserted effort since neither any single nation nor the EU is capable of facing the threats successfully alone. Therefore “the development of a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order”¹⁷ is the objective of the EU.

The EU’s Political and Security Committee (PSC) would link well with the Political Committee and Military Committee of NATO and provide a strategic forum for dialogue on topics such as the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and NATO’s Strategic Concept. In addition, the PSC is tasked to monitor the international situation in the areas covered by the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and deliver opinions to the Committee in order to help define policies. In time of

crises the PSC exercises ‘political control and strategic direction’ of the EU’s military response.

For military advice the PSC relies on the European Union Military Committee (EUMC) which can reach back to the European Union Military Staff (EUMS). This opens new connection possibilities on the respecting levels with NATO’s Military Committee and the IMS. Initial connections could be made between the political-military structures established for ESDP and the corresponding NATO entities. In addition, the EU has established the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM), which again would be well-designed to add to the soft power aspects of the Civil Security Committee and its subcommittees.

Next to the above mentioned security-oriented organisations, other existing entities of the EU could be valuable bodies to link with the CSC, such as the standing committees for:

- 1) Foreign Affairs (includes Human Rights, and Security and Defence);
- 2) Environment, Public Health and Food Safety;
- 3) Legal Affairs;
- 4) Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs; and
- 5) The Temporary Committee for Climate Change.

Without a habitual interface like the Civil Security Committee that confers with the political and military realms on a consistent basis, the comprehensive approach will remain theoretical. A Canadian tank in Afghanistan (Photo: Canadian Ministry of Defence)

The creation of a Human Security subcommittee under the CSC could be aligned with the newly formed European Fundamental Rights Agency under the EU that works with the Council of Europe (CoE) and has made human rights its core function. Aligning subcommittees along functional and geographical lines adds value and provides an internal voice to the NAC to improve decision-making and de-conflict the engagement space. The networked operating procedures of the CSC and the subcommittees with external organisations is integral to the design and required in a globalised world.

The CSC and the Comprehensive Approach

The Civil Security Committee represents the third prong (pol-mil-civ) required for the comprehensive approach. The comprehensive approach is the application of 'network-centric smart power', an approach that may be regarded as the way forward in international affairs to achieve operational effectiveness.

"Smart power is neither hard nor soft – it is the skillful combination of both. Smart power means developing an integrated strategy, resource base, and tool kit to achieve objectives, drawing on both hard (military) and soft (diplomatic, economic and social) power. It is an approach that underscores the necessity of a strong military, but also invests heavily in alliances, partnerships, and institutions at all levels to expand influence and establish the legitimacy for action. A smart power strategy requires that we make strategic trade-offs among competing priorities; develop proper authorizing and appropriating structures to fund and support agreements, and tap into and harness the vast soft power resources in the private sector and civil society."¹⁸

NATO requires these soft power mechanisms within its organisational design to effectively leverage smart power.

Without a habitual interface like the CSC that confers with the political and military realms on a consistent basis, the comprehensive approach will remain theoretical and NATO will be void of the strategic forum required for the contemporary security environment. The creation of a Civil Security Committee could also draw contributors that may not otherwise nest well with existing NATO committees. It will attract partners from diverse sectors where purpose and interest are shared.

The CSC offers a framework for political-military-civil sector security balancing that currently does not exist. With the impending new NATO headquarters under construction in Brussels for completion in 2013, and with a full feasibility study, the concept of the Civil Security Committee is relevant, timely and valid. Integrating the civilian sector into the formal processes and procedures of the Alliance is an 'evolution in security affairs' that is worthy of consideration and neces-

sary to gain strategic superiority and implement the comprehensive approach.

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